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Abstract 
As South African policymakers strive to tackle low economic growth, poverty, unemployment, 
and inequality, the ability to unpack the effects of policy at a firm-level is key to the 
reformulation of more effective policy. The effects of Acts and policies within the South 
African labour market have not been well studied, especially when considering them from the 
firm-level. This thesis adds to the sparse literature by providing insights into how particular 
government labour market policies have affected firm dynamics. 
Firstly, this thesis is the first to conduct an impact study of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 
on employment and production strategies of South African firms. The Act is a threshold policy, 
demanding that firms with 50 or more employees comply with it. Analysis revealed that there 
is a high possibility that the introduction of the Act has created a distortion in employment 
which has resulted in an inefficient allocation of resources at a firm level. This results in a lower 
employment of labour, particularly at the small, medium enterprise level, showing a potential 
unintended consequence of the Act.  
Secondly, this thesis utilises a new-to-the-world dataset, which was constructed purely to 
facilitate the research conducted within this thesis –the Bargaining Council Minimum Wage 
Dataset (BCMWD).  This dataset is then utilised to generate descriptive results, not only 
showcasing its usefulness as a dataset, but also illustrating the evolution of minimum wages 
over time, as well as providing up to date estimates of Bargaining Council coverage. 
Thirdly, by using the BCMWD this thesis unpacks the effects of the existence of Bargaining 
Councils and their minimum wage agreements on firm dynamics – particularly on wages, and 
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employment. The results reveal that despite the minimum wages prescribed by said Bargaining 
Councils, the average employee still reports a wage that is 42% below the stipulated minimum. 
Furthermore, the extension of updated Bargaining Council agreements is shown to have a 
detrimental effect on employment, whereby it decreases by approximately 8%. Yet again, this 
marks the intended effect of this area of policy as counterproductive. 
 
Lastly, this thesis unpacks the evolution of labour productivity in post-apartheid South Africa, 
especially in relation to Bargaining Councils. The thesis concludes that aggregate labour 
productivity (in manufacturing) in South Africa has been growing and that almost all of this 
growth has been driven by within-industry growth, with little being driven by cross-industry 
reallocation. Furthermore, this thesis suggests that the negative relationship exhibited by initial 
labour productivity and labour productivity growth speaks to a “catching-up” behaviour by 
lower labour productivity sub-sectors. And an analysis of Bargaining Council effects suggests 
that the presence of Bargaining Councils is correlated with sub-sectors being more productive. 
This result reinforces the notion that Bargaining Council agreements force less productive firms 
to restructure to become more productive, likely favouring more skilled employees over their 













Terwyl Suid-Afrikaanse beleidmakers daarna streef om lae ekonomiese groei, armoede, 
werkloosheid en ongelykheid aan te spreek, is die vermoë om die effek van beleid op die vlak 
van die firma te bepaal die sleutel tot die formulering van meer effektiewe beleid. Die effek van 
Wette en beleid in die Suid-Afrikaanse arbeidsmark is nog nie goed bestudeer nie, veral vanuit 
die oogpunt van die firma gesien. Hierdie tesis voeg by tot die skrapse, beskikbare literatuur 
deurdat dit insig bied in hoe dinamiek in die firma geaffekteer word deur regeringsbeleid ten 
opsigte van die arbeidsmark. 
 
Eerstens, hierdie tesis is die eerste om ‘n studie te maak van die impak van die Wet Op Gelyke 
Indiensneming van 1998 op die indiensnemings- en produksie strategieë van Suid-Afrikaanse 
firmas. Die Wet is ‘n drumpel beleid, deurdat dit vereis dat slegs firmas met meer as 50 
werknemers daaraan moet voldoen. Analise het openbaar dat daar dus ‘n groot moontlikheid 
bestaan dat die implementering van die Wet gelei het tot ‘n distorsie in indiensneming, met ‘n 
gevolglike oneffektiewe allokasie van bronne op firma-vlak. Dit lei tot verlaagde vlakke van 
indiensneming , veral by klein- en mediumgrootte firmas, wat ‘n potensiële en onbedoelde 
newe-effek van die Wet uitwys. 
 
Tweedens, die tesis maak gebruik van ‘n nuwe datastel wat geskep was met die uitsluitlike doel 
om die navorsing binne-in die tesis te fasiliteer – die sogenaamde Bedingingsraad Minimum 
Lone Datastel (“Bargaining Council Minimum Wage Dataset”, oftewel BCMWD). Die datastel 
word aangewend om beskrywende resultate te genereer, wat nie slegs die nuttigheid van die 
datastel tentoonstel nie, maar ook die evolusie van minimum lone oor ‘n gegewe tydperk 
illustreer, en onlangse skattings van die dekking van Bedingingsrade verskaf. 
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Derdens, deur gebruik te maak van die BCMWD ontleed die tesis die effek van Bedingingsrade 
en minimum loonooreenkomste op firma dinamiek – veral ten opsigte van lone en 
indiensneming. Die resultate wys dat ‘n gemiddelde werknemer, ten spyte van minimum 
loonooreenkomste voorgeskryf deur Bedingingsrade, nogsteeds ‘n loon wat 42% laer is as die 
voorgeskrewe minimum sal rapporteer. Daar word ook uitgewys dat die verlenging van 
opgedateerde loonooreenkomste ‘n negatiewe effek op indiensneming het, deurdat dit 
produktiwiteit met 8% verlaag. Dit beklemtoon weereens dat die uitwerking van hierdie area 
van beleid inderdaad teenproduktief is. 
 
Laastens ontleed die tesis die evolusie van arbeidsproduktiwiteit in post-apartheid Suid-Afrika, 
veral ten opsigte van Bedingingsrade. Die tesis kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat totale 
arbeidsproduktiwiteit in die Suid-Afrikaanse vervaardigingsektor gegroei het, en dat die 
meerderheid van die groei te dankie is aan groei binne-in spesifieke industrieë en nie gedryf 
was deur herallokasies tussen industrieë nie. Die tesis stel ook voor dat die negatiewe 
verhouding tussen aanvanklike arbeidsproduktiwiteit en die groei in arbeidsproduktiwiteit dui 
op “inhaal” gedrag deur laer arbeidsproduktiwiteitsubsektore. Verder stel ‘n analise van die 
effek van Bedingingsrade ook voor dat die teenwoordigheid van Bedingingsrade lei tot 
verhoogde produktiwiteit in subsektore. Dié resultaat beklemtoon die idee dat ooreenkomste 
met Bedingingsrade daartoe lei dat minder produktiewe firmas geforseer word om te 
herstruktureer om sodoende meer produktief te raak, waarskynlik ten bate van meer bekwame 
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After the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa became a free country, with equal rights, and 
a democratic voice. However, it also emerged with a legacy of low economic growth, a high 
poverty rate, chronic unemployment, and excessive inequality. Since this time policymakers 
have been tasked with alleviating poverty, remediating inequality, and stimulating employment.  
Almost one quarter of the South African population had to survive on less than $2 a day, with 
more than half the population surviving on less than $4 per day (Edwards et al., 2014). This 
poverty was heavily biased along racial lines with 61% of the African community living in 
poverty. One of the major contributing factors to this skewed poverty measure was the skewed 
labour market (see Banerjee et al., 2008), with the African labour force having the lowest 
employment rates, and exceedingly high unemployment rates. 
To tackle these challenges of poverty, unemployment, and inequality, the ANC government 
introduced the first of what would become many policy plans (Edwards et al., 2014). The 
Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) of 1994 was the first major policy plan to try and 
redress the imbalances left behind by the previous administration - socially, economically, and 
spatially. The aim of the RDP was to combine growth, development, reconstruction, 
redistribution, and reconciliation into one strategy. The RDP argued that growth and 
development were not mutually exclusive, and that development without growth would not be 
financially viable, whilst growth without development and transformation would simply 
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Rooted in the RDP principles were a suite of labour market reforms. These new regulations 
were driven primarily by a need to promote inclusion and transformation within the South 
African labour market. The five main Acts that were implemented during this period were, (i) 
the Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1995; (ii) the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) 
of 1997; (iii) the Employment Equity Act (EEA) of 1998; (iv) the Skills Development Act 
(SDA) of 1998; and (v) the Skills Development Levies Act (SDLA) of 1999. The aim of these 
laws was to put in place a set of socially acceptable minimum standards of working conditions 
and to bring South African employment legislation into line with international standards (Black 
& Rankin, 1998). Table 1.1 outlines the key aims of each respective Act. 
Table 1.1: Aims and coverage of South African labour legislation 
Name of Act Key aims of Act Coverage of Act 
Labour Relations 
Act (1995) 
• Ensure orderly collective 
bargaining and workplace 
democracy  
• Ensure effective labour market 
dispute resolution (CCMA) 
All workers expect the 
defence force, secret 
services and essential 
services 
Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 
(1997) 
• Improve minimum rights for all 
workers  
• Improve enforcement 
mechanisms 
• Role of Employment Conditions 
Commission to inform minister of 
labour. 
• Extend the rights of collective 
bargaining 
All workers except the 
defence force, secret 
services and essential 
services, including part-time 
Employment 
Equity Act (1998) 
• Eliminate unfair discrimination 
• Ensure implementation of 
affirmative action 
• Promote racial transformation of 
the labour market to be more in 
line with the country’s 
demographics. 
Employees in ‘designated’ 




• Devise and implement national, 
sector and workplace strategies to 
improve skills of the workforce 








Levies Act (1999) 
• Collect funding for the National 
Skills Fund 
All employers except the 
public service, religious and 
charity organisations 
Source: Leibbrandt et al (2010) 
Almost 20 years after the introduction of the LRA, a set of amendments to the LRA were passed 
in 2014. These amendments focused primarily on how to treat part-time and contract workers 
and those employed through temporary employment services (or labour brokers). These 
amendments generally strengthen the position of those already in jobs and reduced the 
flexibility of firms in terms of hiring. Secondly, a National Minimum wage was implemented 
in South Africa in early 2019. 
The effects of these Acts and policies on the South African labour market have not been well 
studied, especially when considering them from the firm-level. With a lot of current discussions 
being held in South Africa regarding the transformation of the labour market, workers’ rights, 
and the implementation of a National Minimum Wage, this thesis aims to add to the sparse 
literature by providing insights into how these government policies have affected firm 
dynamics. This thesis aims to provide comment on the outcomes of these policies, as well as 
the potential unintended consequences. As is the case with all policies, these policies have costs 
and benefits attached to them, and this thesis will unpack these at firm-level to provide a more 
nuanced and comprehensive discussion of their impacts. 
This thesis extends the existing South African literature in multiple ways. It is the first to 
conduct an impact evaluation of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 and its impact on 
employment levels and firms’ choice of inputs. Secondly, this thesis brings with it a new-to-
the-world dataset, which was constructed purely to facilitate the research conducted within this 
thesis – that of the Bargaining Council Minimum Wage Dataset (BCMWD). Thirdly, by using 
this new dataset, this thesis unpacks the effects that collective bargaining in South Africa has 
on firm employment, workers’ wages, and labour productivity.  
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1.2 THE IMPACT OF THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT OF 1998 ON 
EMPLOYMENT STRATEGIES OF FIRMS 
The legislative and regulatory environment of the South African labour market has been 
radically transformed, with a key focus on extending a large range of rights to all employees in 
order to address inequalities created under the apartheid regime (Benjamin, 2005). However, 
while the introduction of the new regulatory framework through the Labour Relations Act, the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act, and the Employment Equity Act has created a more 
secure work environment for some employees (especially in the formal sector), it has been 
argued that it has significantly increased the cost of employing labour. These costs, however, 
are presumably more burdensome for smaller firms and firms that are trying to compete in the 
global market (Rankin, 2006; CDE, 2013). 
Chapter 2 investigates the impact of one particular labour market policy – the Employment 
Equity Act of 1998 - on South African firms’ employment and production strategies.  
The Act was designed to address unequal access to employment opportunities created by the 
racially segmented labour market under the apartheid regime. Thus, by legislating affirmative 
action, the Act requires firms that employ more than 50 employees to provide a detailed 
employment strategy, over a five-year period, that outlines how the firm intends to restructure 
its workforce to reflect the demographic composition in the region in which it operates. 
A number of recent international studies have investigated the impact of size-dependent 
regulation on employment and production dynamics of firms around the policy assignment 
threshold (Garicano et al, 2013; Gourio & Roys, 2013; Ramasawy, 2013). A common finding 
is that the distribution of firms in countries with size-dependent regulations exhibits a 
significant concentration of firms below the policy threshold. This indicates that regulation 
influences firm decisions and firm growth. 
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This chapter extends these analyses to the South African context. Using the fact that the 
Employment Equity Act is also a size-dependent regulation which applies to firms of 50 
employees and more, the chapter utilises a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) approach 
to investigate the impact of the Act on firm dynamics for firms that fall just around the policy 
threshold. Using matched 1996 Manufacturing Census and 2001 Large Sample Survey data to 
track changes in employment intensity and production strategies of firms that operated in 1996 
with a workforce of around 50 employees allows the observation of firms before and after the 
implementation of the Act. If the standard RDD assumptions hold, then any differences in 
employment intensity or production strategies of policy treated firms that were initially above 
the threshold and therefore were exposed to the Act compared to firms that fell below the 
threshold can be attributed to the fact that the policy treated firms were required to comply with 
the Act. 
The chapter concludes that there is a high possibility that the introduction of the Employment 
Equity Act of 1998 has created a distortion in employment which has resulted in an inefficient 
allocation of resources at a firm level. What results is a lower employment of labour, 
particularly at the small and medium enterprise level. This illustrates that smaller firms may be 
changing their capital-to-labour composition to avoid having to comply with the Act. 
1.3 THE BARGAINING COUNCIL MINIMUM WAGE DATASET 
The labour market reforms of the late 1990s and early 2000s introduced two types of 
institutionalised wage bargaining. The first is sectoral determination. This covers a group of 
sectors where it is difficult for workers to organise. In these sectors the Minister of Labour sets 
minimum wages which are periodically renewed (Edwards et al., 2014). The second are 
Bargaining Councils, which cover sectors where worker organisation is more easily established. 
Bargaining Councils cover collective bargaining at a sectoral, rather than firm or plant, level 
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and are formed by representatives of businesses and workers in a specific sector. If a Bargaining 
Council represents most workers and employers within a sector then agreements reached by 
that council are extended to all participants in the sector, irrespective of whether they were party 
to such agreements, although a formal exemption can be applied for and granted by the Minister 
of Labour (Edwards et al., 2014). 
Prior to this chapter there has been no fully-fledged dataset containing the wages prescribed by 
the respective Bargaining Councils that could be used for research. This particular form of data 
is essential for unpacking various outcomes related to collective bargaining within the South 
African labour market i.e. the effects on employment, wages, and labour productivity.  Existing 
literature has only been able to make use of cross-sectional or sector specific Bargaining 
Council data. 
The dataset in question currently contains wages and other details for 28 of the 38 registered 
private sector Bargaining Councils; the other ten are excluded due to lack of availability of their 
Bargaining Council agreements. The dataset contains 19 409 observations, with varying 
degrees of variation in minimum wage announcements, particularly sectorally, sub-sectorally, 
geographically, occupationally and by time. Some councils have national representivity, while 
others are restricted to a particular province, or even to a particular city or town. Some cater for 
very specific industries, while others cover a wide range of sub-sectors. The vast majority of 
councils captured provide minimum wages that have been disaggregated by occupation. 
Chapter 3 outlines the history and background of Bargaining Councils (paying attention to their 
importance in South Africa’s labour economy). The chapter then offers a discussion on the data 
collection process, and cleaning methodologies employed to create the Bargaining Council 
Minimum Wage Dataset.  
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Lastly, the chapter proceeds with a discussion of the metadata of the dataset, as well as of some 
descriptive statistics to illustrate its importance and potential usage. 
1.4 EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF BARGAINING COUNCIL DECISIONS 
Bargaining Councils have been shown to cause lower levels of employment and fewer small 
firms in the areas and sectors where they exist (Magruder, 2012). In sectors like clothing there 
is descriptive evidence of their deleterious effects (Nattrass and Seekings, 2012). However, 
these studies have only used cross-sections of data and broad definitions of coverage 
(Magruder, 2012) or focused on a specific industry (Nattrass and Seekings, 2012) and have not 
considered how these councils may constrain firm-level adjustment - and, consequently, 
employment adjustment. This chapter provides a detailed analysis of these Bargaining Councils 
and their relationship with wages and employment. 
Using the dataset discussed in chapter 3, chapter 4 matches the Bargaining Council data to 
officially collected labour market data. The Post-Apartheid Labour Market Series (PALMS) 
combines 39 labour market surveys collected by Statistics South Africa since 1994, defines 
variables in a consistent way, weights observations consistently and calculates real earnings at 
an individual level during this period. Respondents in these surveys also report the size of the 
firms that they work for. This data is linked to the Bargaining Council database through the 
sectors in which people work. This chapter thus investigates sector level outcomes which are 
correlated to Bargaining Council coverage and agreements and allows the chapter to explore 
whether or not workers are receiving the prescribed minimum wages. 
This chapter exploits three aspects of variation to identify the effect of Bargaining Councils  on 
employment and wages: first, regional variation in coverage (some areas are covered by 
Bargaining Councils whilst others are not); second, time variation (different Bargaining 
Councils  have rounds of collective bargaining at different times); and third, variation in wage 
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levels for different occupations within a Bargaining Council (different occupational levels have 
different set wages for different sectors and these do not correspond across sectors). This 
variation, and the changes which occur after different rounds of collective bargaining, is then 
used to examine whether these agreements are associated with wage outcomes, employment 
levels and employment by different sizes of firms. 
The results of this chapter conclude that despite minimum wages prescribed by said Bargaining 
Councils, the average employee still receives (or reports) a wage that is 42% below the 
stipulated minimum. Furthermore, the extension of updated Bargaining Council agreements is 
shown to have a detrimental effect on employment, whereby the presence of a new bargaining 
council agreement decreases employment in firms subjected to the new agreement by 
approximately 8%. These results are robust to both individual and firm level characteristics. 
1.5 SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND THE IMPACT OF 
BARGAINING COUNCILS 
Very little is known about the evolution of labour productivity in post-apartheid South Africa, 
especially with its relation to Bargaining Councils. Existing work on labour productivity in 
South Africa has mostly focused on aggregate figures and generally portrayed the observed 
increase in labour productivity levels as a positive outcome. In a country that is grappling with 
glaring unemployment issues, while trying to navigate effective policy mix to remedy this issue, 
the study of labour productivity with its relation to Bargaining Councils should be considered 
vital. 
 
Chapter 5 unpacks the effects of Bargaining Council agreements on labour productivity in two 
distinct ways: (i) at a sectoral level – utilising the created Bargaining Council Minimum Wage 
Dataset this chapter is able to match this with sectoral-level data and conduct an evaluation of 
the effects of these councils; (ii) at a firm-level – relying on firm level data, this chapter will 
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unpack which firms (by way of firm characteristics) are most affected by Bargaining Council 
decisions. The evaluation techniques in both aforementioned contexts rely on regressions to 
control for fixed effects. 
 
This chapter concludes that aggregate labour productivity (in manufacturing) in South Africa 
has been growing and that almost all of this growth has been driven by within-industry growth, 
with minimal of the growth being driven by cross-industry reallocation.  
 
This chapter suggests that the negative relationship exhibited by initial labour productivity and 
labour productivity growth speaks to a “catching-up” behaviour by lower labour productivity 
sub-sectors. The analysis of Bargaining Council effects suggest that the presence of Bargaining 
Councils is correlated with sub-sectors being more productive. This result reinforces a notion 
that Bargaining Council agreements force less productive firms to restructure to become more 
productive, likely favouring more skilled employees over their less skilled counterparts – 
placing a burden on those employees who would be considered to be in the most precarious 
employment position. Another explanation may be that these Bargaining Council agreements 
force less productive firms (which are typically more labour intensive) to exit the market. 
1.6 SUMMARY 
The research contained in this thesis explores the effects of government policy (particularly that 
of labour market regulations) on the dynamics of firms. The research is unique and adds to the 
existing literature in three distinct ways. Firstly, it is the first to conduct a thorough impact 
evaluation of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 – thus determining whether the Act 
facilitated the transformation of the labour market that the South African government aimed to 
achieve. Secondly, this thesis utilises a new-to-the-world dataset, which was constructed purely 
to facilitate the research conducted within this thesis – that of the Bargaining Council Minimum 
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Wage Dataset (BCMWD). A substantial amount of time and effort was dedicated to capturing, 
cleaning, and constructing this dataset. Thirdly, by using this new dataset, this thesis unpacks 
the effects that collective bargaining in South Africa has on firm employment, workers’ wages, 
and labour productivity.  
Literature on the effects of the Acts and policies discussed in this thesis is typically quite sparse, 
and the studies that do exist typically are only evaluated at an aggregate level, with minimal 
research being conducted at the firm-level. Since discussions on transformation of the labour 
market, workers’ rights, and the implementation of a National Minimum Wage, are consistently 
topical in the South African economy, this thesis adds to the limited literature by providing 
insights into how these government policies have affected firm dynamics. 
In summary, this thesis highlights the importance and usefulness of robust, and comprehensive 
studies on South African labour market regulations. This thesis makes it quite clear that while 
these policies and regulations are rooted in good intentions, they can result in unexpected trade-
offs. If the South African government truly wishes to stimulate growth, accelerate 
transformation, reduce inequality, and generate employment it is imperative that a deeper 
understanding of firm behaviour is obtained. The results of this thesis serve to caution against 
treating firms as homogeneous, especially through the application of policy and regulation:  it 
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 The Impact of the Employment 
Equity Act of 1998 on Employment 
Strategies of Firms  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
With the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, the newly elected government 
inherited an economic system of low growth, high government debt, mass unemployment, 
poverty and inequality with little worker protection, especially of African workers. To address 
these socio-economic problems, the newly elected government combined a development path 
of job creation through macro-economic stability, fiscal discipline and export-oriented growth 
and a radical restructuring of the labour market with a focus on worker rights. Thus, during the 
1990s South Africa was not only re-introduced into the global economy through the lifting of 
sanctions and deliberate trade liberalisations, but various progressive labour regulations were 
introduced to create a more inclusive labour market. The rationale of these policies was to create 
an environment that would improve the quality of employment for South Africans, especially 
those most disadvantaged under apartheid. Together these two broad policy changes introduced 
a tension which firms had to grapple with: how to respond to a new set of labour regulations 
whilst simultaneously facing increased global competition. This chapter’s focus is on labour 
regulation, specifically the Employment Equity Act of 1998. 
 
After the fall of apartheid, the legislative and regulatory environment of the South African 
labour market was radically transformed. A key focus was on extending a large range of rights 
to all employees to address inequalities created under the apartheid regime (Benjamin, 2005). 
However, while the introduction of the new regulatory framework through the Labour Relations 
Act (LRA), the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA), and the Employment Equity 
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(EE) Act has created a more secure work environment for some employees (especially in the 
formal sector), it has been argued that it has significantly increased the cost of employing labour 
(Rankin, 2006). These costs are presumably more burdensome for smaller firms, since they 
often have a fixed-cost component (for example employing specific human resource time or 
skills), and firms that are trying to compete in the global market, since the period of introduction 
corresponded with an increase in global trade driven by the re-emergence of low labour-cost 
producers like China (Rankin, 2006). 
 
The Employment Equity Act (EEA) of 1998 was designed to address unequal access to 
employment opportunities created by the racially segmented labour market under the apartheid 
regime. Thus, by legislating affirmative action, the Act requires firms that employ 50 or more 
employees to provide a detailed employment strategy over a five-year period that outlines how 
the firm intends to restructure its workforce to reflect the demographic composition in the 
region in which it operates. 
 
While this Act may have been instituted over 20 years ago, it has become topical again more 
recently. In the latter half of 2015 the South African Department of Labour announced its plans 
to take approximately 1,400 firms to the Labour Court for failing to comply with the 
Employment Equity Act of 1998. This announcement linked to the 2014-15 report of the 
Commission for Employment Equity which found that the pace of transformation in the private 
sector had remained slow.  
 
With focus being put heavily back on the South African labour market, this chapter aims to 
explore the shifts in labour market regulation and legislation in South Africa from 1994 
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onwards. It will investigate the impact of one particular labour market policy –the Employment 
Equity Act of 1998 – on South African firms’ employment and production strategies. 
 
The paper shows that the Employment Equity Act of 1998 indeed created a discontinuity at the 
50-employee level; with firms above the 50-employee threshold having significantly less 
employment, asset value, and capital expenditure relative to firms that fall beneath the 
threshold. Thus, the introduction of the Act has resulted in two distinctly different groups of 
firms that have adopted different approaches to how they treat capital and labour within the 
firm. 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.2.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR REGULATION 
The fall of apartheid in 1994 prompted a radical transformation of the South African labour 
market. Through a suite of new labour regulations which were rooted in the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP1) principles of a more inclusive society with equal 
opportunities and the prevention of worker exploitation, the South African labour market was 
reformed. These new labour regulations were driven by at least two forces (Edwards et al., 
2014). The first was the need to modernise the existing labour regulations to become more 
inclusive, especially since under the apartheid regime, many rights of workers who were not 
white were ignored. The second was the role which organised labour played in the final years 
of apartheid and the negotiated transition to democracy. The Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) was an active opponent of the apartheid system and played an important 
                                                 
 
1 The Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) of 1994 was South Africa’s  first major policy plan to try to 
redress the imbalances of the previous administration, socially, economically and spatially. The aim of the RDP 
was to combine growth, development, reconstruction, redistribution and reconciliation into one strategy. 
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role in the negotiations surrounding the transition and the crafting of regulations during the 
early period of democracy (Edwards et al., 2014). 
 
The five main Acts2 introduced during this period consisted of: 
1. The Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1995: The key aim of the LRA was to ensure 
orderly collective bargaining and workplace democracy; as well as to ensure effective 
labour market dispute resolution through the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation 
and Arbitration (CCMA). This Act covered all workers apart from those employed by 
the South African defence force, secret services, and essential services3. 
2. The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) of 1997: The key aim of the 
BCEA was to improve the minimum rights for all workers in South Africa, including 
part-time workers, but excluding those employed by the South African defence force, 
secret services, and essential services. 
3. The Employment Equity Act (EEA) of 1998: The key aim of the EEA was to eliminate 
unfair discrimination and ensure the implementation of affirmative action in South 
Africa. This Act was only pertinent to designated firms – i.e. firms with more than 50 
employees. 
4. The Skills Development Act (SDA) of 1998: The key aim of the SDA was to design 
and implement national, sector, and workplace strategies to improve the skill set of the 
South African workforce.  
                                                 
 
2 A sixth Act was added in 2001 by means of the Unemployment Insurance Act (UIA), which set out the 
conditions pertaining to unemployment insurance. 
3Almost 20 years after the introduction of the LRA, a set of amendments to the LRA were passed in 2014. These 
amendments focused primarily on how to treat part-time and contract workers and those employed through 
temporary employment services (or labour brokers). These amendments generally strengthen the position of those 
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5. The Skills Development Levies Act (SDLA) of 1999: This Act was utilised to collect 
funding for the National Skills Fund – a fund which was inherently supported by all 
employers except for public service, religious, and charity organisations. 
 
The main aim of these Acts was to ensure that a socially acceptable minimum standard of 
working conditions was in place in South Africa, and to bring South African employment 
legislation into line with international standards (Black & Rankin, 1998). Since this chapter has 
its primary focus on the Employment Equity Act of 1998, it is imperative that more detail is 
given surrounding this particular policy. 
 
The rationale of introducing the EEA in South Africa was to enforce transformation on the basis 
that organisations would not empower sufficient numbers of black employees of their own free 
will (Leonard & Grobler, 2006). Leonard & Grobler (2006) go on to say that there has been 
some evidence of transformation at work, but the implementation of the EEA is often reduced 
to a question of legal compliance.  
 
The available literature regarding the EEA of 1998 is relatively thin. The majority of research 
that has been done surrounding this Act is often of a qualitative nature4, and has often relied on 
a survey-type basis in which the researcher utilises various techniques to draw meaning from 
open-ended questions posed to the subjects. Research surrounding the EEA which has been 
more quantitative has been focused on the upper echelons of employment, namely the executive 
and management positions within firms. This work is clearly not representative of the greater 
population of South Africa and is often criticised by South African labour unions as being 
                                                 
 




Chapter 2: The Impact of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 on Employment Strategies of Firms 
 
16 
“meaningless” within the context of true transformation (Coetzee & Vermeulen, 2003). This 
chapter fills a void in the existing literature by focusing on the impact of the EEA on smaller 
firms, particularly those falling around the 50-employee level, thus being more inclusive and 
more attuned with South Africa’s population. 
2.2.2 DISCRIMINATION AND THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT OF 1998 
Discrimination within the labour market can be defined as a scenario where workers are treated 
differently in terms of recruitment, pay, benefits, and promotion from other workers due to their 
inherent non-economic characteristics including gender, religion, race, and/or age. Treatment 
may be positive, whereby one group receives perks that the other does not, but in reality, 
discrimination tends to follow the path of the negative, and involve a particular group being 
treated unfavourably – especially in the case of pre-1994 South Africa. 
 
Negative discrimination typically leads employers to downgrade their expected value of 
employment of a particular group, reducing the expected marginal revenue of productivity, and 
shifting the demand curve leftwards (see figure 2.1). This effectively reduces the wage rate of 
the discriminated group (unfavoured – WU), while also reducing employment prospects (shown 
by equilibrium EU). 
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Figure 2-1: MRP of favoured and unfavoured employees 
 
To combat discrimination, The Employment Equity Act was enacted by President Nelson 
Mandela and the Parliament of South Africa in 1998. The Act recognised that “as a result of 
apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices, there are disparities in employment, 
occupations and income within the national labour market; and that those disparities create such 
pronounced disadvantages for certain categories of people that they cannot be redressed simply 
by repealing discriminatory laws [sic]” (Department of Labour, 1998). 
 
As a result, the purpose of this Act is to “promote the constitutional right of equality and the 
exercise of true democracy” (Department of Labour, 1998), “eliminate unfair discrimination in 
employment” (Department of Labour, 1998), “ensure the implementation of employment equity 
to redress the effects of discrimination” (Department of Labour, 1998), “achieve a diverse 
workforce representative of our people [sic]” (Department of Labour, 1998), “promote 
economic development and efficiency in the workforce” (Department of Labour, 1998), and to 
“give effect to the obligations of the Republic as a member of the International Labour 
Organization” (Department of Labour, 1998). Parts of the Act address all employers within the 
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South African labour market (such as Chapter 2 of the Act – ‘Prohibition of unfair 
discrimination’). However, this chapter is primarily concerned with the aspects that deal with 
designated employers5 and designated employees6, which mainly appears in chapter 3 of the 
Act – ‘Affirmative Action’. 
 
Affirmative action measures are intended to ensure that suitably qualified employees from 
designated groups have equal employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all 
occupational levels of the workforce. Such measures must include: 
i. Identification and elimination of barriers with an adverse impact on designated groups; 
ii. Measures which promote diversity; 
iii. Making reasonable accommodation for people for designated employees from 
designated groups; 
iv. Retention, development and training of designated groups, including but not limited to 
skill development; and 
v. Preferential treatment and numerical goals to ensure equitable representation, which 
excludes quotas. 
 
In order to implement affirmative action measures, a designated employer is expected to: 
i. Consult with employees – this consists of but is not limited to discourse with employees 
over areas of concern for discrimination in the workplace; 
ii. Conduct analysis; 
                                                 
 
5 A designated employer refers to an employer that employees 50 or more employees. May also be referred to as 
a ‘designated firm’. 
6 A designated employee refers to an individual that is either black (black is a blanket term to represent African, 
Coloured, and Indian individuals), female, or disabled who are citizens of the Republic of South Africa by birth 
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iii. Prepare an Employment Equity Plan – this plan may not be shorter than one year and 
not longer than five years, and must include a timetable for the achievement of 
objectives and goals for each year of the plan; and 
iv. Report to the Director-General on progress made in the implementation of the plan – 
the Director-General may appeal to the labour court of South Africa to impose a fine on 
a designated employer if the preparation and execution of the Employment Equity Plan 
are not met. 
 
Furthermore, a designated employer is expected to appoint a manager to oversee the preparation 
and execution of the Employment Equity Plan; consequently, the designated firm is also 
expected to make resources available for these endeavours.  
 
It is readily apparent from clauses within the Employment Equity Act (most notably the chapter 
on ‘affirmative action’) that the Act is a threshold policy and is only applicable to firms with 
50 or more employees. Thus, this chapter will move on to discuss threshold policies, their 
impact on firms, and methodologies for investigating them. 
2.2.3 THRESHOLD EFFECT ON FIRMS 
Small firms often face lighter regulation than their larger counterparts. It is economically 
rational for small firms to only have to comply with a handful of regulations as the cost of 
compliance may be too high for these firms to bear. However, regulation must be phased in as 
a firm grows – thus creating a phase-in effect at a few finite points which are sometimes referred 
to as “threshold effects” (Gourio & Roys, 2012). In the case of this chapter, the threshold effect 
being investigated is that of compliance with the Employment Equity Act of 1998 which applies 
to firms with 50 or more employees. 
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Annual Turnover Gross Assets, excluding 
fixed property 
Medium < 100 - 200*. < 4,000,000 – 50,000,000*. < 2,000,000 – 18,000,000*. 
Small < 50. < 2,000,000 – 25,000,000*. < 2,000,000 – 4,500,000*. 
Very Small < 10 - 20*. < 200,000 – 500,000*. < 150,000 - 500,000*. 
Micro < 5. < 150,000. < 100,000. 
Source: The National Small Business Act 102 of 1996 
Note: Units for ‘annual turnover’ and ‘gross assets’ presented above are in South African Rands. 
Note: * indicates industry dependence – the large bands shown above indicates the global definition for classification, but each 
industry in the South African economy has its own well-defined size-classification system. 
 
As the preceding table shows, consideration of firms around the 50-employee threshold implies 
that the Act could directly affect firms that can be considered small, medium enterprises 
(SMEs), and that the EEA is not a policy geared towards only the larger South African firms. 
South Africa’s National Development Plan (NDP) recognises the importance of small, and 
medium enterprises in South Africa as drivers of economic growth, and as absorbers of excess 
labour within South Africa. According to Abor and Quartey (2010), small businesses contribute 
approximately 57% to the South African GDP and are responsible for approximately 61% of 
South African employment. These figures alone provide a clear indication that small businesses 
in South Africa have a massive impact on the country’s economy. 
 
Bearing in mind the aforementioned divisions, it is important to ascertain what proportion of 
the South African business environment these divisions represent. Wittenberg, Arrow and Kerr 
(2013), produced work based on figures gathered from the Quarterly Employment Survey of 
Statistics South Africa which contains employment information on a nationally representative 
sample of enterprises, from 2005 to 2011. The authors illustrate that firms employing 20-49, or 
50-99 employees account for approximately 27% of the manufacturing sector. These firms 
could directly encounter the threshold effects of the EEA, making the EEA a serious 
consideration for firms within this bracket.   
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Almeida & Carneiro (2008) studied the effects of labour regulation in Brazil; utilising data on 
employment, output, capital, and regulations at specific levels, it was established that labour 
regulation constrains firm size. Almeida & Carneiro (2008) stated that these negative effects on 
firm size (when measured in terms of employment numbers) are also likely to be associated 
with negative effects on overall country employment. This sentiment was echoed by Gourio & 
Roys (2012) who studied the threshold effects of various labour regulations in France around 
the 50-employee threshold. It was revealed that the size distribution of firms became visibly 
distorted with a large contingent of firms having exactly 49 employees in order to avoid tighter 
regulation. The paper went on to state that firms treated the regulations as a sunk cost which 
was approximately equal to one year of an average employee salary – clearly illustrating that 
regulation is providing a constraining effect on firm size.  
 
Ramaswamy (2013) further solidifies the idea that threshold effects can be a hindrance to firm 
size by claiming that there is a “missing middle7” within the size distribution of the Indian 
manufacturing sector. The paper claims that this “missing middle” is a result of threshold effects 
that are generated by various labour regulations within India. This effect was first observed by 
Dhar & Lydall (1961), and corroborated by Mazumdar & Sarkar (2013), where it was stated 
that the size group of 6-49 workers accounts for more than 55% of total non-household 
manufacturing in 2005. Hasan & Jandoc (2013) estimated that this number could be as high as 
85% in 2005 if household enterprises were included in total manufacturing employment. 
 
Ramaswamy (2013) analyses data from 1998-2008 and reports that this missing middle is still 
prevalent within India. Firms falling within this size-class have higher contract-worker 
                                                 
 
7 ‘Middle’ is in reference to medium-sized firms.  
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intensity, which supports the proposition that firms utilise non-permanent workers in order to 
stay beneath the threshold. These empirical results supported the threshold effects of size-
dependent labour regulations and fiscal incentives. 
 
As previously stated, South Africa relies heavily on its SME industry for labour absorption and 
economic growth. If the threshold effects of size-dependent labour regulations (such as those 
generated by the EEA) hold in the same way that they do within Brazil, France, and India, there 
may be a cause for concern. This chapter will attempt to fill a vital gap in the literature by 
unpacking potential threshold effects of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 and seeing how 
South African firms respond8. 
2.3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.3.1 ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
The impact of anti-discrimination labour market regulation on both efficiency and equity 
remains a hotly contested topic that has given rise to two schools of thought. According to 
Freeman (1993), these differing perspectives can be summed up as the “distortionist” 
perspective, and the “institutionalist” perspective. 
 
Distortionists view additional regulation as a cost and as an interference in the market process 
that impedes efficiency and creates a sub-optimal allocation of labour (Fontana & Paciello, 
2007). Due to this reduction in overall efficiency, additional regulation is expected to reduce 
                                                 
 
8Due to limited information on the decision making process that lead to the development of the Act, it is not 
possible for this paper to present alternate scenarios whereby the paper would have been able to measure the impact 
if there was no Act at all; nor will the paper be able to measure the impact if the Act had been passed for a different 
threshold; nor will it be able to measure the impact if the Act had not had a threshold and had instead been binding 
on all firms. In order to tackle any of these alternate scenarios, this paper would have to be able to find information 
(information that seemingly does not exist) that explains the deliberation process that lead to the enactment of the 
Employment Equity Act of 1998 as it currently stands. It is possible that the threshold of 50 employees was decided 
on by following international evidence, or alternatively because 50 employees represents a cut-off point between 
small and medium business classification as shown by table 2.1. 
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economic growth, which is further expecting to increase inequality. In the distortionist view, 
the alternative to a regulated market is one that is characterised by a perfectly competitive 
structure that ensures workers choose whether they shall work or not by comparing the given 
perfectly competitive wage with the marginal utility of a non-market activity (Fontana & 
Paciello, 2007). 
 
However, in developing countries, policymakers have to contend with issues that are more 
complex than what the distortionist view suggests. The ‘removal’ of distortions may not reveal 
an underlying perfectly competitive model of the labour market. Instead, it may expose 
imperfections on both the labour demand side and the labour supply side (Fontana & Paciello, 
2007). Market imperfections on the demand side often take the form of monopsony, of which 
there is evidence in both developed and developing countries (Fontana & Paciello, 2007). 
Employers derive monopsony power from the fact that it is costly for workers to leave the firm 
and to get a new similar job. Uneven market power becomes a significant problem especially 
for workers who belong to vulnerable groups – such as those who were discriminated against 
in South Africa. Under these circumstances, employers can discriminate against disadvantaged 
workers, underpay those who are immobile, force employees to work more than they wish under 
the threat of dismissal or fail to ensure them against the risk of illness or disability.  
 
Even when distortionists recognise the limited relevance of the perfectly competitive model, 
the proponents of labour market liberalization still argue that intervention could only cause 
further distortions (Fontana & Paciello, 2007).  By contrast, institutionalists think that labour 
market interventions could potentially increase allocative efficiency, thus leading to a better 
economic performance.  Institutionalists would argue for policies that involve positive 
discrimination, such as job quotas for more favourable jobs or the disproportionate provision 
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of more resources for education and training, and affirmative action policies which encourage 
the recruitment and promotion of disadvantaged workers. 
 
With both views in mind, most of the empirical evidence on the impact of anti-discriminatory 
labour market reforms both in developed and developing countries suggests that labour 
regulations have modest effects on economic efficiency and growth (Fontana & Paciello, 2007).   
The efficacy of affirmative action as a policy to overcome discrimination depends, in part, upon 
the impact it has on employment. Some economists argue that the relationship between wage 
increases and employment is such that the resulting job losses would be small, but the social 
transformation aspect would outweigh the prospect of the job losses. 
2.3.2 RESPONDING TO THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 
One of the main points of analysis in this chapter is how firms respond to EEA in terms of their 
trade-off between labour and capital. From baseline economic theory on production, it is known 
that firms can trade-off between capital and labour in order to maintain a pre-specified level of 
production. Thus, firms aim to optimise production (either through cost minimisation or through 
profit maximisation). This trade-off is not new to South Africa and has been happening for a 
number of years.  There has been a steady rise in the capital-to-labour ratio in manufacturing 
over time (especially during the 1990s9) – thus, production still increased as employment fell 
due to the higher investment in capital stock. It is possible that this shedding of labour in favour 
of capital was exacerbated by the implementation of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 – a 
fact that this chapter aims to establish. 
 
Intuitively, the cost of labour can be classified as L; however, after the passing of the 
Employment Equity Act of 1998, the cost of labour for firms that are above the threshold of 50 
                                                 
 
9 See Samson et al., 2001 
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employees becomes L+λ. Naturally, this implies that the relative cost of capital would be lower 
at the threshold of 50 employees, and firms would gravitate towards increasing capital 
employed, and decreasing labour.  
 
Figure 2-210: Expected Discontinuity in Profit Construction of Firms 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the proposed discontinuity that would exist within firms’ profit construct. 
Gourio & Roys (2012) proposed that threshold policies are treated by firms as lump-sum sunk 
costs. As a result, the relationship between profit and employment would be maintained once 
the EEA was introduced; however, a discontinuity would be created. Firms would have 
incentive to be at either point A, or at point B in the preceding figure, but no firm would have 
incentive to be at point C. As a result, it can be expected that a shedding of employment around 
the threshold as firms would try to maintain profit levels by reducing costs would be seen; 
alternatively, firms would show a much larger growth in employment to get back to a level of 
profit that was being generated before the threshold was introduced. In simple terms, a firm has 
two strategies at its disposal when facing the Employment Equity Act of 1998: it can either 
substitute capital for labour, resulting in decreased employment, or it may increase employment 
dramatically if it treats the Act as a sunk cost. Ultimately firms will create a negative effect on 
                                                 
 
10 This figure presents the relationship between profit and employment as a linear relationship for simplicity only 
– it is more likely that this relationship is actually quadratic in nature. 
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the labour market (in terms of decreased employment) only if the first strategy is dominant. Due 
to the nature of the data at this chapter’s disposal, it is easy to identify four distinct groups of 
firms within the panel. These are firms that have differed in response to the EEA with regard to 
how they decided to treat their employment levels. Consequently, these four types of firms are: 
i. Firms that were below 50 employees for both time periods. 
ii. Firms that were above 50 employees for both time periods. 
iii. Firms that were below 50 employees in 1996 and above 50 employees in 2001. 
iv. Firms that were above 50 employees in 1996 and below 50 employees in 2001. 
 
These groups can be assumed to be distinctly different from each other in the way that they 
choose to approach their labour/capital ratios within their firm. The production function that 
this chapter has imposed on these firms is that of a typical Cobb-Douglas. Classically, a Cobb-
Douglas production functions is a particular functional form of the production function that is 
widely used to represent the relationship between two or more inputs and the amount of output 
that can be produced. In this instance, the inputs utilised are those of capital and labour. The 
function utilised within this chapter can be shown in its linearised form as: 
 
)ln()ln()ln()ln( 21 KaLaAY ++=        (2.1) 
 
As a result, it is expected that these four different groups will exhibit different production 
functions after the passing of the employment equity Act. This will be further discussed under 
section 2.6.4 of this chapter. 
2.4 DATA 
This chapter will make use of one primary dataset; a matched dataset using data from the 
Manufacturing Census of 1996, and the Large Sample Survey (LSS) of 2001. Statistics South 
Africa (Stats SA) has carried out a census of the 3-digit manufacturing sector on a biannual 
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basis (Fedderke & Simbanegavi, 2008), the last of which was conducted in 1996. After this, 
Stats SA started to produce the Large Sample Survey, the first of which was released in 2001. 
In order to make this data useful, this chapter has matched firms from the 1996 census to the 
2001 LSS according to firm identification numbers and, as a result, 1471 firms were matched. 
The dataset captures variables such an employment numbers, book value of fixed assets at the 
beginning of the year (asset value), capital expenditure on new assets, wages, and output value. 
This panel dataset will be referred to as the LSS 96/01 from this point forward.  
 
The manufacturing sector is the sector of focus for a variety of reasons, that can be summarised 
as: (i) it is a traditional industry within South Africa and has a long history; (ii) it is well-defined, 
and as a consequence, it has reliable data; (iii) when publishing the National Development Plan, 
the South African government highlighted manufacturing as a key sector that can play a pivotal 
role in alleviating poverty and growing the economy – this has been reiterated in subsequent 
Industrial Policy Action Plans. 
 
Naturally, there are limitations to the data that is being utilised. Firstly, the dataset can be 
considered small, especially with regard to the number of firms that fall within the 
neighbourhood of the 50-employee threshold. Secondly, since the data collected deals 
exclusively with manufacturing firms, the data is not representative of the South African 
population. Thirdly, the dataset cannot account for firms that split their business into separate 
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The dataset is also not able to observe firms that left the market due to the introduction of the 
EEA, nor the firms that didn’t enter the market due to the EEA’s presence. Thus, these results 
can only be extended to firms that remained within the market after the passing of the EEA. 
2.4.1 VARIABLES 
There are a handful of variables of interest in this Chapter. These will shed light on the manner 
in which firms deal with the implementation of the Employment Equity Act of 1998. A short 
description of why each variable is important, and what this chapter expects that variable to 
reflect is as follows: 
• Employment numbers: This variable is crucial to the chapter as the chapter aims to 
investigate the impact that the Employment Equity Act of 1998 had on firm 
employment. It is expected that employment numbers would fall for firms trying to 
remain (or transition to) below the threshold of the Act. 
• Book value of fixed assets at the beginning of the year (asset value): This measure 
provides insight into the labour-capital ratio that a firm has. It is to be expected that 
firms that choose to actively engage with the Act will have higher asset values than other 
firms. 
• Capital expenditure on new assets: If firms change the level of labour that they 
employ, it is expected that a shift would also be seen in terms of capital. Firms would 
trade off labour for capital if they are trying to remain (or transition to) below the 
threshold of the Act. 
• Average wages: The average wage would indicate the firm’s behaviour and stance 
towards labour once the Act was passed. If a firm were to stay below the threshold, it 
can be expected that firms of this nature would pay a higher average wage in order to 
retain more skilled staff. Firms falling above the threshold would show the opposite as 
they would not have the need to pay an efficiency wage. 
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• Output value: This chapter hypothesises that firms will trade off labour with capital if 
the firm actively tries to avoid having to comply with the Act. This chapter expects that 
output should not change, as firms would change their labour-capital ratios in such a 
way that output remains constant. 
• Labour productivity: This variable is important in regard to this chapter as it further 
indicates how firms are adjusting both their labour-capital ratio, and their output once 
the Act was implemented. This chapter expects that labour productivity would rise for 
firms that actively shed employment to fall below the threshold, as these firms would 
aim to have their output remain constant, while dealing with a smaller workforce. 
2.5 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter will employ a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), Ordinary Least Squares 
Regressions, and descriptive statistics as its methodologies for analysis. 
2.5.1 DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH 
The descriptive statistics approach will allow this chapter to illustrate changes that occurred 
within firms that were affected by the implementation of the Employment Equity Act. 
Furthermore, this approach will allow the chapter to contrast how firms have adapted to the 
implementation of the Act in terms of their hiring policies, capital structure, production 
technologies, and wage structures. 
2.5.2 ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
In order to understand the relationship between capital and labour more intensely, a Cobb-
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which may be linearised as: 
 
)ln()ln()ln()ln( 21 KaLaAY ++=        (2.3) 
 
Utilising Ordinary Least Squares regressions, this function will be estimated for various 
neighbourhoods within the data. 
2.5.3 REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN 
This chapter makes use of a sharp regression discontinuity design11. Utilisation of the RDD 
methodology allows for the causal effects of interventions by assigning a cut off or threshold 
above or below which an intervention is assigned to be elicited. In this Chapter, the intervention 
that is considered is that of the introduction of the Employment Equity Act; as a result, the 
threshold that will be utilised is 50 employees; furthermore, the running variable in question 
will always be employment. This chapter will employ the RDD on the LSS 96/01 in order to 
ascertain what effects the Employment Equity Act of 1998 had on the firms within the sample. 
This dataset is ideal as the EEA falls exactly between the two waves, which allows this chapter 
to track firms prior to the implementation of the Act when they were less likely to be aware of 
the Act, as well as to three years after the Act’s implementation. Furthermore, as this chapter 
uses 50 employees as the policy threshold, it will consider firms with 40-49 employees as the 
data to be used before the threshold, and firms with 50-60 employees as the firms after the 
                                                 
 
11 The intention of this chapter is to measure the implementation of the legislation and not the 
enforcement thereof. In this case, all firms with less than 50 employees would not be treated.  
 
Firms above 50 employees would be treated with what one may call a two-stage treatment. In 
essence, (i) firms are expected to comply, and (ii) if they don’t, they will be punished. In 
essence, all firms above 50 employees will end up being treated by one of these two scenarios 
– which is the reason for arguing that this is a sharp RDD. 
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threshold. This bandwidth is based on similar decisions that were made by the studies that were 
discussed in the literature review, as well as the results of rdrobust12 which indicate a bandwidth 
selection of 10 units on each side of the cutoff. 
2.5.3.1 PARAMETRIC 
The purpose of this methodology is to provide a graphical depiction of the variables of interest 
and how they may differ before and after the 50-employee threshold. A typical approach is 
followed here as proposed by Lee & Lemieux (2009) whereby bins are generated, the mid-
points of these bins are found, and interaction terms for treatment are generated before running 
polynomial regressions. These polynomial regressions take the form of: 
 
p





iipiiiii XdXdXdd  +++++   (2.4) 
 
where Yi represents the variable of interest, Xi is the running variable (1996 employment), and 
di the assignment dummy variable.  
 
In RDD, the shape of the functional relation between the outcome variable and the assignment 
score is very important. Misspecification of the model can lead to biased estimation of the 
treatment effect (Lee & Munk, 2008).  Bias may also be increased in model estimates if the data 
points utilised are too close to the cut-off (Lee & Munk, 2008). When a polynomial model is 
fitted to the data, a term of higher order than the data may suggest should be included in the 
starting model; however, this leads to inefficient estimates. 
 
                                                 
 
12 A Stata package 
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To reduce bias due to model misspecification, over-fitting of the model may be necessary. But 
this will require either a larger sample size or lower efficiency of estimates; under-fitting of 
the parametric model, meanwhile, leads to increased bias. There is therefore a need to strike a 
balance between efficiency and bias - this is known as the “variance-bias trade off”. 
 
Gelman & Imbens (2014) add to the argument by showing three somewhat related reasons why 
high-order polynomials are a poor choice in regression discontinuity analysis. Firstly, estimates 
based on a polynomial regression can be interpreted as the difference between a weighted 
average of the outcomes for the treated variables and a weighted average for the controls. These 
weights depend only on the threshold and the values of the forcing variable, and not on the 
values of the outcomes. The chapter found that weights implied by higher order polynomial 
regressions were not as attractive as those for local linear regressions. Secondly, the chapter 
argues that results are highly sensitive to the order of the polynomial that is imposed. Thirdly, 
Gelman & Imbens (2014) state that inference based on higher order polynomials is often poor 
– which can have misleading results. 
 
For the reasons mentioned above this chapter begins by over-fitting the model with more 
polynomial and interaction terms than is deemed necessary. The chapter proceeds by 
eliminating insignificant orders (moving from higher order to lower order), stopping once the 
polynomial order is shown to be significant. After proceeding in this fashion, it was established 
that a second-degree polynomial provided the best fit for the available data, with a bandwidth 
of 10 units either side of the 50-employee threshold for the parametric design13. These results 
are also supported by descriptive graphs shown later in this chapter. 
                                                 
 
13 This bandwidth was selected to create a large enough sample size for the parametric regression discontinuity 
design, as well as to be in-keeping with the prevailing literature. 
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Non-parametric estimation does not represent a solution to functional form issues raised by 
parametric RD designs, and should therefore be viewed as complementary to, rather than as a 
substitute for, parametric estimation (Lee & Lemieux, 2009). It is for this reason that the non-
parametric approach is also utilised by this chapter. As mentioned above, this chapter makes 
use of a sharp regression discontinuity design, whereby the impact of the threshold generated 
by the EEA can be calculated via the following expression (Khandker, Koolwal, & Samad, 
2010): 
 
),/()( −+−+ −−= ssyyI  (2.5) 
 
where y+ is the mean outcome for firms that fall above the 50-employee threshold, and y- is the 
mean outcome for firms that fall below the 50-employee threshold; s+ is the mean treatment 
status for firms that are expected to comply with EEA regulation, and s- is the treatment status 
for firms that are not expected to comply with EEA regulation. This chapter treats the RD design 
as strict, implying that the treatment status of a firm is a deterministic function of whether or 
not the firm falls above the 50-employee threshold. As a result, firms that fall above the 
threshold are assigned s+=1, and firms that fall below the threshold are assigned s-=0. The 
design is considered sharp rather than fuzzy because the chapter has no meaningful way of 
measuring firm compliance with EEA. In this respect, what is being measured is intention to 
treat (ITT) – implying that this chapter is truly measuring the lower bound of treatment on firms. 
 
It must be noted that the parametric and the non-parametric approaches have different 
bandwidths. The bandwidth selected for the parametric approach was based on the need to keep 
a large enough sample size, while not increasing the bias of estimators from being too close to 
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the threshold; this reasoning has been reiterated by previous studies that have been cited within 
the literature review of this chapter. The non-parametric approach has a stricter method for 
selecting optimal bandwidth available to it; this is the approach offered up by Imbens & 
Kalyanaraman (2009).  
 
Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2009) argue that there is an optimal, data dependent, bandwidth 
choice rule available when selecting the optimal smoothing parameter (bandwidth) for the 
regression discontinuity estimator in a non-parametric design. Utilising this rule through the 
application of an additional Stata package, “RD”, the optimal bandwidth is shown to be 5 units 
on either side of the 50-employee threshold. 
 
This chapter will proceed by running the parametric analysis with the bandwidth of 10 units. 
This bandwidth will also be applied to the non-parametric approach, before running the non-
parametric at its optimal bandwidth of 5 units – comparisons between the two will be noted and 
assessed. 
 
While extremely interesting, we have no way of studying phase two, since we do not have 
data on firms that did comply or not. Thus, all we can measure is stage one, which is purely 
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2.6 THE RESPONSE TO EEA – ANALYSIS OF 1996/2001 DATA 
2.6.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
This section of the chapter will deal exclusively with the LSS 96/01 sample and will utilise the 
methods discussed earlier in order to investigate the impact of the Employment Equity Act on 
firms within South Africa. This section will look at the impact the Act had on firms when it was 
unanticipated, and consequently how firms changed their employment strategies, capital outlay, 
and wage structures once the Act had been passed. 
 
Figure 2-3: Number of firms per employment bracket in 1996, and 2001 
 
 
The passing of the Employment Equity Act in 1998 could not be anticipated by firms – thus, it 
is unlikely that many firms managed to adjust to the threshold effects that were imposed by the 
Act before it was passed. Figure 2.3 plots the firm size distribution of the LSS 96/01 sample. 
 
In the period of 1996 employment showed no noticeable patterns. However, once the EEA was 
passed in 1998, the line-plot of 2001’s employment numbers elicits a concise result. After the 
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passing of the Act, firm employment started to cluster below the 50-employee threshold, with 
a noticeable dip in the number of firms employing more than 50 employees. There is an obvious 
increase in the number of firms falling below the 50-employee threshold, and a clear decrease 
in firm numbers above the threshold. As expected, the employment bracket showing the greatest 
increase is that of 49 employees – eliciting the idea that many firms were willing to decrease 
employment numbers to just below the threshold, but not a large degree further. With firms 
acting according to a priori expectation, it is equally important to take note of how output 
reacted to the changes in firm employment.14 
 
In order to investigate the potential effects that the Employment Equity Act may have had, it is 
vital to look at the average levels of employment, asset value, capital expenditure on new assets, 
wages, and output value in 1996, 2001, and the average differences between the two for firms 
that were below, and above the 50-employee threshold. These figures are summarised in table 
2.2. 
Table 2.2: Average levels, and average differences for firms above and below the 50-
employee threshold in 1996, and 2001 (R’000s) 
 Average level for 
firms with 40-49 
employees 
(1996/2001) 
Average level for 

















Asset value 1,212.60 / 1,528.06 1,305.60 / 1,787.88 360.72 417.18 
Labour productivity15 5.11 / 5.17 5.19 / 5.28 .08 .20 
Output 9,816.19 / 11,905.52 11,492.62 / 
13,976.99 
2,867.26 2,752.08 
Average wages per 
employee 
42.22 / 44.42 43.20 / 44.46 1.96 3.04 
Capital expenditure on 
new assets 
265.47 / 309.98 216.75 / 230.37 54.21 -5.74 
Note: All figures quoted in 1996 Rands. 
 
                                                 
 
14 Table A1 in Appendix 1 shows figure 3 in numerical terms. 
15 Labour productivity is defined as total firm output divided by total firm employment. 
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The preceding table highlights what happened to two different classes of firms after the passing 
of the Employment Equity Act. The first group is comprised of firms that had employment 
numbers falling within the band of 40-49 employees in 1996 (below); the second group being 
that of firms with 50-60 employees in 1996 (above). 
 
The first figure that stands out is the average change on capital expenditure on new assets for 
firms with 40-49 employees. This figure stands at an average of R54 211, which elicits the idea 
that these firms are becoming more capital intensive in order to avoid hiring additional labour. 
Consequently, their 50-60 employee counterparts showed a negative average difference of R5 
742, suggesting a slowdown in capital expansion. Both groups of firms showed growth in terms 
of output, both of which came close to the R2 800 000 mark. However, it can be concluded that 
this growth in output is likely to have been attributed to a growth in capital of the firm, as labour 
productivity was virtually unchanged for both groups (and is also fairly equal in both groups). 
Knowing that employment numbers had changed, which was illustrated earlier on by the 
clustering effects shown in figure 2.3. It can be concluded that the capital expenditure on new 




Chapter 2: The Impact of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 on Employment Strategies of Firms 
 
38 
Figure 2-4: Average difference in log of capital expenditure on new assets of firms above and 
below the 50-employee threshold in 1996, in terms of 2001 employment 
 
 
These average levels and average differences provide mass insight into the practices of firms in 
the presence of the Employment Equity Act. But it is more illuminating to follow one particular 
group of firms and see how they changed over time. The following series of graphs illustrate 
the average differences16 that occurred for firms that fell within the 40-60 employee bracket in 
1996 for all of the aforementioned variables, plotted against employment in 2001. Average 
differences are plotted against the Y-axis, with the X-axis measuring 2001 employment figures.  
The first major finding to emanate from figure 2.4 is that capital expenditure on new assets for 
firms that were below the threshold in 1996 outstrips that of firms that were above the threshold 
in 1996, when looking at the 50-employee mark in 2001. This prompts the idea that these firms 
were intent on keeping employment levels below the threshold, and instead substituting away 
from labour towards capital. Furthermore, firms that were below the threshold in 1996 and 
                                                 
 
16 All average differences were calculated as the mean of the 2001 value less the 1996 value. 
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above it in 2001 tend to show a downward slope in capital expenditure, yet again reiterating the 
clear relationship between capital and labour – the firms that chose to increase employment 
consequently started spending less on capital expansion. However, it is not only the capital 
expenditure on new assets that is of interest to this chapter. Hence the following graph will 
illustrate the average difference in asset values for firms that were above and below the 
threshold in 1996. 
 
Figure 2-5: Average difference in asset value of firms above and below the 50-employee 
threshold in 1996, in terms of 2001 employment 
 
 
As is evident from the preceding graph, firms that were above the 50-employee threshold in 
1996 show an average difference that tracks zero. However, firms that were below the threshold 
in 1996, and above it in 2001, showed a very high average difference in asset value. This 
illustrates that firms that chose to cross the threshold and start to comply with the Employment 
Equity Act regulations did so in order to accelerate their growth through higher employment, 
and capital values. This is concurrent with the proposed model in the theoretical background of 
this chapter: firms aim to maintain output by either shedding employment, or by increasing it 
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exorbitantly to try and get back to the initial level of output that was attained before the 
discontinuity created by the implementation of the EEA. 
 
Figure 2-6: Average difference in average wages per employee of firms above and below the 
50-employee threshold in 1996, in terms of 2001 employment 
 
 
Figure 2.6 shows the average difference in average wages per employee. It is easily 
recognisable that firms that were above the threshold in 1996, and subsequently below in 2001, 
had a higher average difference in wages than those that remained below the threshold. This is 
indicative of firms choosing to pay higher wages in order to retain skilled and efficient labour 
to try and maintain their level of output. Conversely, firms that were below the threshold in 
1996, and above it in 2001, paid lower wages as the need to pay efficiency wages in order to 
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Figure 2-7: Average difference in output of firms above and below the 50-employee 
threshold in 1996, in terms of 2001 employment 
 
 
Perhaps the most important variable considered is that of the average change in output. As 
figure 2.7 illustrates, for the most part the change in output is close to 0, especially for firms 
that were above the 50-employee threshold in 1996. This is a key finding as it shows that output 
was maintained irrespective of a firm’s decision to switch employment strategies. Furthermore, 
firms that actively chose to cross from below the threshold in 1996 to above it in 2001, recorded 
a positive average difference. This shows that these firms experienced output growth, and 
consequently chose to keep growing their firms while accepting the regulation of the 
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Figure 2-8: Average difference in labour productivity of firms above and below the 50-
employee threshold in 1996, in terms of 2001 employment 
 
 
At the threshold, both firms that were above and below the 50-employee threshold in 1996 have 
a very similar log of labour productivity – a fact that was already easily observed in table 2.2. 
However, what is interesting is the fact that firms that were above the threshold in 1996 have a 
fairly constant positive average difference in labour productivity across all levels of 
employment in 2001. This is explained by these firms either having fewer employees, higher 
output, or a smaller negative change in output relative to a negative change in employment. 
Firms that were below the threshold in 1996 offer up a more variable trend in terms of their 
average difference in labour productivity. 
 
This chapter is focused on the threshold effects provided by the Employment Equity Act of 
1998; as a result, it is important to establish that firms on both sides of this threshold before the 
Act was passed were intrinsically the same via their inherent characteristics. The following 
tables provide the mean values of wages, output, capital expenditure on new assets, asset value, 
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and labour productivity for firms falling either just above the threshold, or just below it. This is 
done for both the 40-49/50-59 and 45-49/50-55 bands for reasons that have been previously 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
Table 2.3: Mean characteristics of firms above/below 50 employee threshold in 1996 







 Mean Mean t-stat Pr(|T|>|t|) 
Asset value 1,212.60 1,305.60 -0.79 0.43 
Capital Expenditure On New Assets 265.47 216.75  0.04 0.97 
Output 9,816.19 11,492.62 -1.10 0.27 
Average Wages 42.22 43.20 -0.25 0.80 
Labour Productivity 5.11 5.19 -0.66 0.51 
 
Table 2.4: Mean characteristics of firms above/below 50 employee threshold in 1996 







 Mean Mean t-stat Pr(|T|>|t|) 
Asset value 1,167.33 1,370.70 -0.93 0.35 
Capital Expenditure On New Assets 255.77 236.11 0.89 0.37 
Output 9,038.26 11,224.90 -2.38 0.02 
Average Wages 42.46 41.41 0.38 0.70 
Labour Productivity 5.09 5.08 0.12 0.91 
 
It is easily observable that the means of each category are fairly close to each other; however, 
this is not sufficient to state that these two groups are similar to each other. In order to establish 
similarity, a basic Student’s t-test was employed for independent samples with equal variances. 
 
As the Student’s t-test reveals in table 2.3, all of the variables in question have p-values that are 
well past the value of 0.05. Thus, at a 95% confidence level it may be said that the two groups 
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are similar, and not different. As a result, these two groups are perfectly comparable, and this 
chapter may continue on to use them within the intended RDD analysis. As it is seen in table 
2.4, p-values of all variables besides output indicate similarity at the 95% level. Since output is 
still significantly similar at the 10% level, it is sufficient for this analysis that the similarity is 
high enough for this band to be utilised within analyses of this chapter. 
 
However, when making use of the rdrobust package in Stata to ensure that there are no marked 
differences in the variables of 1996, a scenario arises whereby discontinuities in these variables 
do appear to be present. These discontinuities arise even when using a “fake” cut-off points. 
This likely occurs due to the sparsity of data around the cut-off point, and since RDD primarily 
relies on information very close to the cut-off to estimate the causal effect, this chapter would 
be remiss not to urge caution in interpreting the results presented by the RDD analysis. 
 
2.6.2 PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS 
The preceding analysis is useful, and indicative of the fact that prior to the implementation of 
the EEA in 1998, firms falling around the threshold were inherently similar; this similarity 
allows the chapter to proceed with its parametric analysis of the impact that the EEA may have 
had on firms in 2001. 
 
Table 2.5 below illustrates the results of estimating equation (2.4) in both first and second-
degree polynomials for variables of interest that include, output, capital expenditure, asset 
value, labour productivity, and average wages per worker. These regressions were restricted to 
include only firms that had between 40 and 59 employees in 1996. The most noticeable result 
is that all 5 regressions in the second-degree polynomial exhibit impacts that are significant at 
the 5% level at least. All of the coefficients of impact (γ) exhibit negative signs, implying that 
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after the introduction of the EEA, there was a decrease in output, asset value, capital 
expenditure, average wages per workers, and labour productivity. It is to be expected that the 
linear results would potentially have incorrect signs and magnitude, as well as being 
insignificant due to the fact that the production function, and relationship between capital, 
labour, and other variables would not be linear, but more quadratic in nature. So, the quadratic 
results are the ones to which attention should be given. These results reiterate the findings 
presented by figures 2.4 - 2.8; most notably the fact that firms moving from below the threshold 
in 1996 to above it in 2001 show a decrease in a capital expenditure. This directly corroborates 
the substitution of labour with capital. Furthermore, it is also noticeable that average wages 
decreased for firms that went from below to above the threshold – this is intuitive since these 
firms have no need to pay higher wages in order to retain more skilled and efficient staff. The 
rest of these quadratic results can be interpreted in a similar fashion. 
 
Table 2.5: Mean characteristics of firms above/below 50 employee threshold in 1996 (40-
49/50-59 bandwidth) 
 Linear Quadratic 
Capital Expenditure 2001   
γ (Impact) 3.97 -277.921*** 
 (6.134) (18.067) 
Constant -.691 60.267*** 
 (1.792) (16.116) 
Asset Value 2001   
γ (Impact) -.899 -111.718*** 
 (2.935) (17.467) 
Constant 7.241*** 17.312 
 (.590) (12.091) 
Output 2001   
γ (Impact) 3.341 -104.633*** 
 (2.199) (30.477) 
Constant 8.565*** 51.054 
 (1.406) (29.970) 
Average Wages 2001   
γ (Impact) .867 -43.666** 
 (1.085) (16.575) 
Constant 4.486*** 32.887** 
 (1.033) (11.724) 
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Labour Productivity 2001   
γ (Impact) 2.502* -48.121** 
 (1.204) (20.516) 
Constant 5.156*** 26.421* 
 (.975) (13.748) 
Note: *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
Standard errors are given in parentheses 
 
These results of the preceding parametric analysis are depicted graphically below. The graphs 
show both the linear and quadratic RDD for the variables of interest and a noticeable, significant 
“jump” occurs in each graph at the 50-employee threshold. Following the suggestion of (Lee & 
Lemieux, 2009), a non-parametric approach will now be utilised in order to complement the 
parametric RD design estimation, and as a way to ensure robustness of the findings. 
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Figure 2-10: Parametric RDD of the log of Asset Value in 2001 
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Figure 2-3: Parametric RDD of the log of Average Wage in 2001 
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2.6.3 NON-PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Following the preceding parametric analysis, this section deals with the application of a non-
parametric approach to the LSS 96/01. The utilisation of a non-parametric approach is useful in 
this chapter: the ultimate benefit of the non-parametric approach it that it does not assume a 
functional form, and the data alone dictates the functional form that is employed. The following 
table presents the treatment effect size (the observed coefficient) which is estimated via 
equation (2.5), the estimate bias, the estimate standard error, as well as the t-statistic in order to 
test the hypothesis that the treatment effect is different from zero. 
 
 
Table 2.6: Strict regression discontinuity design results of various outcome variables (40-60) 
 Observed Bias Std. Error t-stat 
Employment 3.761 -.400 4.242 .887 
Output 2,121.248 138.287 2,326.026 .912 
Asset Value 46.398 38.819 396.956 .117 
Capital Expenditure -136.468* 21.050 81.335 -1.678 
Average Wages -.550 -.215 4.076 -.135 
Labour Productivity .083 .008 .090 .924 
∆ Employment -6.951* -.445 4.161 -1.670 
∆ Output -335.701 157.342 1,805.665 -.186 
∆ Asset Value -115.620 34.587 367.361 -.315 
∆ Capital Expenditure -105.858 6.270 102.671 -1.031 
∆ Average Wages .289 -.116 3.725 .078 
∆ Labour Productivity .0598 .011 .064 .929 
Note: *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 
Table 2.6 illustrates the results of the non-parametric RDD on the bandwidth of 40-49/50-60 
employees. Significance only emanates from capital expenditure and the change in 
employment. With a negative sign on the capital expenditure coefficient, this would constitute 
firms that grew their employment base, and switched towards labour and away from capital. 
This is in keeping with a priori expectation.  
 
What is of more interest in this set of results is the change in the variables as outcomes. The 
change in employment, asset value, capital expenditure, average wages, labour productivity, 
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and output were constructed by taking the deflated 2001 values and subtracting the 1996 values. 
These variables were then estimated using the same non-parametric approach and illustrate the 
relative changes between the treated and non-treated firms. 
 
It is apparent that the change in employment produces a significant result. Relative to firms 
below the threshold of 50 employees, firms above the threshold would have seven employees 
fewer; i.e. if firms below the threshold (non-treated) grew their employment base, the treated 
firms would have grown by seven employees fewer than the firms below them.  
 
However, with so few significant estimates found within these results, it is important to recall 
the earlier argument by Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2009) surrounding the optimal bandwidth for 
non-parametric RDD. Following the procedure outlined by Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2009), 
the bandwidth utilised is tightened to be optimal – this should lessen the bias witnessed in some 
instances of the previous results, while the optimal design strives to strike a better balance 
between bias and variance. As previously discussed, this optimal bandwidth lies at five units 
either side of the threshold. Utilising the tightened bandwidth, the non-parametric regression 
discontinuity design was run again, and the following results were obtained. 
 
Table 2.7: Strict regression discontinuity design results of various outcome variables (45-55) 
 Observed Bias Std. Error t-stat 
Employment -5.914 0.034 6.059 -0.976 
Output -755.622 -583.687 3,037.546 -0.249 
Asset Value -666.738* -66.810 532.733 -1.282 
Capital Expenditure -476.591*** -11.826 198.055 -2.406 
Average Wages 1.007 -0.576 6.572 0.153 
Labour Productivity 0.123 -0.018 0.158 0.779 
∆ Employment -11.161** -0.018 6.036 -1.849 
∆ Output -1,471.169 -358.288 1,738.149 -0.846 
∆ Asset Value -544.415** -48.081 277.300 -1.963 
∆ Capital Expenditure -331.438*** -3.803 136.517 -2.428 
∆ Average Wages 1.779 -0.331 4.920 0.362 
∆ Labour Productivity 0.090 -0.013 0.105 0.854 
Note: *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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After tightening the bandwidth, asset value and capital expenditure are shown to be significant, 
with both estimates exhibiting negative signs - reinforcing the idea that both capital expenditure 
and asset value decreased for firms that were below the threshold of 50 employees in 1996, and 
above it in 2001. This makes intuitive sense as these firms would constitute firms that had grown 
their employment base and switched towards labour and away from capital.  
 
Change in employment, change in asset value, and change in capital expenditure all produce 
significant results. Utilising the same interpretation as for the previous table’s results reveals 
that firms above the threshold are growing slower in terms of assets, capital, and employment 
relative to their smaller counterparts. This is concerning as it should be expected that larger 
firms (in relative terms) would be more adept at growing, adding to the economy, and absorbing 
excess labour. 
2.6.4 GROUP ANALYSIS 
Until now, this chapter has shown results on how firms that were within a 10-employee radius 
of the threshold in 1996 responded in terms of their 2001 characteristics. This section of the 
chapter will unpack the story further and delve into what characteristics exist between the four 
groups that were identified earlier. This will be done utilising an Ordinary Least Squares 
approach in order to approximate a Cobb-Douglas production function for each of the four 
groups. The following equations show the estimations of the Cobb-Douglas production 
functions for each of the groups in question. The equations are estimated utilising 2001 data, 
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Group 1: Above threshold in 1996, below threshold in 2001 
ln(Y) = 3.896     +     0. 834 ln(L)    +     0. 328 ln(K) 
(0.466)*** (0.129)*** (0.056)*** 
 
Group 2: Above threshold in 1996, above threshold in 2001 
ln(Y) = 7.088     +     0. 248 ln(L)    +     0. 202 ln(K) 
(1. 302)*** (0.319) (0.067)** 
 
Group 3: Below threshold in 1996, above threshold in 2001 
ln(Y)= 6.560     +     0. 597 ln(L)    +     0. 075 ln(K) 
(1. 266)*** (0.300)** (0.068) 
 
Group 4: Below threshold in 1996, below threshold in 2001 
ln(Y) = 4.448     +     0. 799 ln(L)     +     0. 231 ln(K) 
(0.742)*** (0.213)*** (0.070)** 
 
The first noticeable implication is that both group 1 and group 4 have increasing returns to scale, 
while groups 2 and 3 have decreasing returns to scale. Since these production functions are 
based on 2001 data, this could speak to the idea that group 2 and group 3 are in fact above the 
50-employee threshold in 2001; while groups 1 and 4 are below it. The implication of this is 
two-fold. Firstly, these results match a priori expectation; firms that have increasing returns to 
scale would find themselves on portion “1” of the following production function. These firms 
do not have to comply with the EEA as they are below the 50-employee threshold, thus making 
it possible that these firms experience increasing returns to scale because they have been 
restrained to a lower level of labour due to the Act. Firms experiencing decreasing returns to 
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scale would be shown by portion “2” of the following figure; as these firms have crossed over 
the threshold of 50 employees, they have no reason to hold back on increasing their labour force 
(in terms of avoiding EEA compliance). Labour and capital are not perfect substitutes, but they 
are substitutes nonetheless; thus, it would be expected that firms would trade off between the 
two to attain the input that affords the firm the higher marginal product. 
 
Figure 2-5: Firm production function illustrating returns to scale 
 
 
When studying the marginal products of capital and labour for each of the above groups, it is 
noticeable that the marginal product of labour is higher for firms that are below the threshold 
in 2001 (groups 1 and 4) than for groups that are above it, confirming a priori expectations set 
out above. This is an obvious finding in terms of traditional theory as marginal product is 
usually a decreasing function. However, since it could well be the case that the firms have been 
forced to reduce employment in order to escape compliance with the EEA, it is possible that 
these firms are missing out on a rather large potential marginal product of labour, and are instead 








This chapter has explored the effects of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 on firms in South 
Africa, by using panel data from 1996, and 2001. This allowed the chapter to utilise Regression 
Discontinuity Design in order to analyse the effect of the 50-employee threshold that was 
imposed by the Act. One of the primary findings of this chapter is that the introduction of the 
Employment Equity Act of 1998 resulted in a clustering effect around the 50-employee 
threshold that the Act had imposed. There was a noticeable cluster of firms at the 49-employee 
level that may have been actively trying to escape the additional regulation by shedding 
employment. Following conventional production theory, it appears firms that chose to accept 
the Act as a sunk cost increased employment by a large degree in order to maintain initial output 
levels. Furthermore, these firms also increased their capital investment and asset value levels in 
order to further facilitate growth of the firm. 
 
The utilisation of both parametric and non-parametric regression discontinuities confirmed a 
correlation between the implementation of the EEA and the discontinuity at the 50-employee 
level; with firms above the threshold having significantly less employment, asset value, and 
capital expenditure relative to firms that fell beneath the threshold. Thus, the introduction of the 
Act has potentially resulted in two distinctly different groups of firms that have adopted 
different approaches to how they treat capital and labour within the firm. 
 
Due to the nature of the data available to this chapter, it was able to unpack firms into four 
distinct groups, namely: those that stayed above the threshold in both 1996, and 2001; those 
that stayed below the threshold in both time periods; those that were above the threshold in 








By fitting a Cobb-Douglas production function to each of these four groups through an Ordinary 
Least Squares estimation technique, it was established that these four groups treat their labour 
capital ratios very differently to each other. It was further revealed that the marginal product of 
labour is higher for firms that are below the threshold in 2001 than for groups that are above it. 
Since it could well be the case that the firms have been forced to reduce employment in order 
to escape compliance with the EEA, it is possible that these firms are missing out on a rather 
large potential marginal product of labour, and instead have to resort to the significantly lower 
marginal product of capital. 
 
Ultimately these results create a sense of concern surrounding the South African labour market. 
These results suggest that due to this threshold, it is possible the distortion in employment that 
has been created can be labelled as an inefficient allocation of resources (within the 
manufacturing sector). This would have been caused by firms choosing lower levels of 
employment as a way to escape the additional policy burden17. However, it is not only the 
implementation of the Act that may have caused higher level levels of unemployment. It is also 
possible that firms may have outsourced production processes that utilise unskilled labour as 
the main production input. Thus, while the Employment Equity Act (and the Labour Relations 
Act) was meant to provide a more secure environment for unskilled workers, the responses by 
firms may have actually led to an increased casualisation of the labour market. Furthermore, 
these Acts would only help individuals currently in employment to stay in employment, but not 
necessarily create employment for those individuals who have yet to gain employment. 
Ultimately this creates an insider-outsider hysteresis within the South African labour market. It 
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follows that an understanding of the effect of the changes in labour legislation, not only on the 
quantity of individuals employed, but also on the ratio of “decent” work18 to precarious 
unemployment is needed. It is plausible that total employment in the economy had not 
decreased13 but simply shifted towards casual employment. With labour regulations currently 
being further extended to cover those in casual employment, it is likely that an increase will be 
seen in unemployment of workers who had to move into informal employment. 
 
 If small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are truly to be the drivers of job creation in South 
Africa, it is possible that this Act has created a distortion that does not allow these SMEs to 
deliver on their potential for the South African economy. While the notion of transformation 
within the labour force is imperative, especially for a nation that suffered years of segregation 
and discrimination, it would seem that the introduction of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 
has not had an optimal effect and has actually led to a situation whereby unemployment may 
be exacerbated. For the labour market to become truly transformative, while not creating a 
larger problem in terms of the employment context of South Africa, it would seem that more 
research would need to be conducted, and a better solution found. 
 
 
                                                 
 
18 Employment regulated under labour regulation. 
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 The Bargaining Council Minimum 
Wage Dataset: A Discussion of 
Capturing, Cleaning, and 
Descriptives 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Bargaining Councils are collective units made up of one or more trade unions and one or more 
registered employer organisations in a specific industry. Bargaining Councils are important 
institutions in South Africa’s formal labour markets. They are responsible for determining 
national wages throughout all industries through a process of collective agreements. 
Prior to this chapter there has not been a fully-fledged dataset containing the wages prescribed 
by the respective Bargaining Councils that could be used for research. For this reason, it was 
essential to partner with the South African Department of Labour (DoL) in order to gain access 
to all physical records of the data, as no electronic database of these decisions exists.  
The following sections of this chapter will outline the history and background of Bargaining 
Councils (paying attention to their importance in the labour economy of South Africa). The 
chapter will then discuss the data collection process and cleaning methodologies employed to 
create the Bargaining Council Minimum Wage Dataset. Lastly, this chapter will provide a 
discussion of the metadata of the dataset, as well as of some descriptive statistics to illustrate 
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3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.2.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 
Bargaining Councils have their innate roots in the multi-employer bargaining system that was 
present in Europe in the early part of the 20th century. Sinzheimer argued that collective 
bargaining was a mechanism through which trade unions and employers’ organisations could 
democratise the economy (Dukes, 2011). In short, this combination of trade unions and 
employers’ organisations (bargaining councils) could jointly regulate sectors of the economy 
by reaching collective agreements that would be extended to the entire sector (Dukes, 2011). 
A similar concept of industrial self-government found it’s placed during a similar time period 
in the United Kingdom in the form of Whitley councils. The concept influenced early labour 
legislation in a number of Commonwealth countries, including South Africa (Godfrey et al., 
2010). 
 
The emergence of social democratic parties after the First World War in advanced 
industrialised countries created an environment in which the establishment of this form of 
bargaining councils thrived (Godfrey, 2018). However, shortly after the economic downturn in 
the early 1970s, increasing competition from industrialising economies, as well as 
technological advancement created a less favourable environment for bargaining councils 
(Godfrey, 2018). As a result, the progress made by organized labour over the years in developed 
nations began to be rolled back, being described as ‘deregulation’ or ‘flexibility’ (Godfrey, 
2018). Bargaining councils were one of the main targets of this new-found flexibility as they 
were seen as a proponent of the perceived rigidity within the labour market. In particular, it 
was argued that multi-employer bargaining was a ‘one size fits all’ type of approach that did 
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Subsequently, during the 1980s, a global trend towards decentralisation of collective 
bargaining has emerged as a response to globalisation, and employers and employees are more 
likely to conclude collective agreements at workplace level. South Africa, where sectoral 
bargaining is encouraged by the Labour Relations Act is one of the very few exceptions to this 
practice. 
 
3.2.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICAN BARGAINING COUNCILS 
The Industrial Conciliation Act19 of 1924 set up the industrial council system20, and represented 
the first institutionalised representation of collective bargaining in South Africa (SALDRU, 
1990). According to Bhorat et al. (2009), “the Act provided the legislative framework for the 
establishment of industrial councils as well as the framework for the regulation of collective 
bargaining and industrial conflict”; the Act’s primary act was to establish national, industry-
wide councils that would allow industrial sectors to govern themselves by representative 
employer organisations and trade unions (Godfrey, 1992). 
 
An industrial council was formed when an employer (or a group of employers), met with a 
registered trade union, and agreed upon the conditions for the industrial council, and then 
registered the council in term of the Act. Once such a council had been registered, it became a 
permanent fixture within the collective bargaining system of South Africa (Godfrey, 1992). 
The establishment of such a council was voluntary, and the geographical and industrial scope 
was left to be determined by the council itself. However, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 
1924 did have an important conditionality to it: a requirement that the council must be 
representative of the jurisdiction for which the council was seeking registration. The decisions 
                                                 
 
19 Later renamed to the Labour Relations Act of 1956. 
20 Now known as the Bargaining Council system. 
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made by these councils are assumed to operate “ergo omnes”, which extends these decisions 
to workers and firms in the sector that may not even be part of the Bargaining Council.  
 
One of the more nuanced statements within the Act was that only employees whom belonged 
to registered unions could be represented in the industrial council negotiations. The Act went 
further to define exactly what was recognised as an employee; amongst all of the conditions 
set out to define an individual as an employee, this Act laid out an important caveat which 
excluded African people21 from this definition (Butcher & Rouse, 2001). With African workers 
formally excluded as employees, their unions were defined as unregistered but not illegal. This 
ensured that they could not have a say in industrial council bargaining decisions (Bendix, 
1989), creating a system that only benefitted white employees. The exclusion of African 
workers essentially resulted in a dual system of industrial relations which was defined by race 
(Godfrey, 1992), with the collective bargaining process for white South African workers being 
highly centralised, and that of African workers being decentralised. 
 
The voluntary nature of the industrial council system created a situation whereby industrial 
councils developed in a massively uneven and excessively diverse way (Bhorat et al., 2009). 
The initial hope of national industrial councils failed to come to fruition for a variety of reasons, 
including but not limited to: (i) the exclusion of African employees, (ii) deep racial and skills 
divisions between trade unions, (iii) diverse patterns of industrial development, and (iv) low 
levels of trade union organisation (Bhorat et al., 2009). These factors bred a system whereby 
there existed many local and regional industrial councils, but a severely limited number of 
national industrial councils.  
                                                 
 








Employer organisations dominated the majority of these councils due to weak trade union 
organisation, while trade union representation was generally dominated by artisans (Godfrey 
& Macun, 1991). Thus, employers generally dictated the levels at which collective bargaining 
took place within the industrial councils, resulting in low levels of prescribed minimum wages, 
especially for less skilled employees (Godfrey & Macun, 1991). The exclusion of African 
workers from the bargaining system only served to deepen the systematic wage gap between 
African and white workers, while reinforcing the dual nature of industrial relations. This 
exclusion of African workers also led to a situation whereby white workers, particularly in the 
unskilled and semi-skilled brackets, were replaced by African workers, as employers were able 
to avoid paying the prescribed minimum wage (Godfrey & Macun, 1991). 
 
African worker participation in the Bargaining Council system started to increase in the early 
1980s when the Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1981 removed race from the definition 
of employee (Butcher & Rouse, 2001) – essentially ending the dual system that had initially 
been created. Following the Amendment, African workers were encouraged to register and to 
start to work within the existing system; however, the distrust of the system22 led African 
workers to continue to work outside of the existing system by resorting to firm/plant level 
bargaining instead. 
  
Over the course of the 1980s there was a call for greater African worker participation in the 
Bargaining Councils, with many of the larger unions pressing for more intensive, focused 
                                                 
 
22 As the system was still seen as primarily associated with white workers of the apartheid regime. 
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collective bargaining, claiming that it would be more effective than the firm-by-firm strategy 
that had been followed to that point (Butcher & Rouse, 2001).  
  
The 1990s saw greater change in the Bargaining Council system. With the first democratically 
elected government succeeding the apartheid government, South African labour regulation 
needed to be overhauled to reflect the period of transformation and inclusion. The main aim of 
Acts introduced in this period was to ensure that a socially acceptable minimum standard of 
working conditions was in place in South Africa, and to bring South African employment 
legislation into line with the international standards (Black & Rankin, 1998). The five main 
Acts that were introduced during this period were 
 
1. The Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1995. 
2. The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) of 1997 
3. The Employment Equity Act (EEA) of 1998. 
4. The Skills Development Act (SDA) of 1998.  
5. The Skills Development Levies Act (SDLA) of 1999. 
 
The inclusion of prescriptions from these Acts helps to round out the system that exists today, 
whereby Bargaining Councils are made up of the employers and employees of what are 
typically the larger firms within a sector. With the transformation laid out within the 
aforementioned Acts, the inclusion of African employees has essentially shifted the balance of 
power from being a “whites only” phenomenon, to a situation in which the African workforce 
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3.2.3 BARGAINING COUNCILS OF SOUTH AFRICA: ESTABLISHMENT 
In the current system of Bargaining Councils, there are three primary categories under which a 
registered Bargaining Council may fall: (i) registered private sector Bargaining Councils; (ii) 
registered local government and government Bargaining Councils; and (iii) registered statutory 
councils23. Table 3.1 shows the evolution of the number of Bargaining Councils between 1983 
and 2018. 
 
Table 3.1: Number of Bargaining Councils over time 
Year 
Number of Bargaining 
Councils 
Number of employees 
covered by Bargaining 
Council agreements24 
1983 104 - 
1992 87 735 533 
1998 77 632 992 
2000 78 - 
2004 57 2 358 012 
2008 48 - 
2010 47 2 520 718 
2014 47 2 505 074 
2018 48 - 
Source: Godfrey (2012); Department of Labour (2018); Du Toit et al. (2015) 
 
There has been a dramatic reduction in the number of Bargaining Councils over time. In 2018, 
the 48 Bargaining Councils were comprised of 39 registered private sector Bargaining Councils 
(21 at the national level, five at a provincial level, and 13 at a city/town level), six registered 
local government and government Bargaining Councils, and three registered statutory councils.  
 
Du Toit et al. (2006) and Godfrey (2007) provide two reasons for the major drop-off in the 
number of Bargaining Councils over time. The first being that there was a series of 
amalgamations of smaller councils to form larger councils – for instance, some regional 
                                                 
 
23 A full list of Bargaining Councils (accurate as of October 2018) is provided in Appendix B. 
24 The number of employees covered by Bargaining Councils is not available for every year – where possible, 
this information has been included. 
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councils were merged to form a national council. The second reason is that there has been a 
collapse and deregistration of a number of Bargaining Councils over the past 35 years – the 
building sector was one of the worst casualties, with most of its regional Bargaining Councils 
disappearing. Du Toit et al. (2006) and Godfrey (2007) go on to state that there are a number 
of councils that continue to exist but suffer from weak capacity and will likely collapse in 
coming years – this is particularly suspected of the smaller local councils. Despite the drop-off 
in the number of Bargaining Councils over time, the number of employees covered by 
Bargaining Council agreements has continued to grow (table 3.1). 
 
Of the current existing Bargaining Councils, 46% were established in democratic South Africa, 
with approximately 10% being established in the last eight years alone. The 1940s and 1950s 
were periods of growth for the establishment of councils, with approximately 31% of current 
Bargaining Councils established in those eras. Table 3.2 shows a concise breakdown of which 
councils were established per decade. 
Table 3.2: Percentage of current Bargaining Councils established per decade25 
Decade Number established Percentage 
1920s 1 2.08% 
1930s 4 8.33% 
1940s 7 14.58% 
1950s 8 16.67% 
1960s 1 2.08% 
1970s 1 2.08% 
1980s 0 0.00% 
1990s 11 22.92% 
2000s 10 20.83% 
2010s 5 10.42% 






                                                 
 
25 This is a breakdown of current Bargaining Councils and does not account for Bargaining Councils that may 
have ceased to exist, or merged during this time. 
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Table 3.3: Timeline of establishment of current Bargaining Councils 
1920s 1930s 1940s 
❖ Bargaining Council for the Canvas 
Goods Industry (Witwatersrand and 
Pretoria) 
 
❖ Bargaining Council for the Restaurant, 
Catering and Allied Trades   
❖ Building Industry (Bloemfontein)  
❖ Building Industry Bargaining Council 
(Southern and Eastern Cape)  
❖ National Bargaining Council of the 
Leather Industry of South Africa   
❖ Bargaining Council for the Food Retail, 
Restaurant, Catering & Allied Trades    
❖ Bargaining Council for the Laundry, 
Cleaning and Dyeing Industry (Cape)   
❖ Building Industry Bargaining Council 
(Cape of Good Hope) 
❖ Building Industry Bargaining Council 
(East London) 
❖ Building Industry Bargaining Council 
(Kimberley)   
❖ Metal and Engineering Industries 
Bargaining Council  
❖ National Bargaining Council for the 
Sugar Manufacturing and Refining 
Industry   
 
1950s 1960s 1970s 
❖ Bargaining Council for the Furniture 
Manufacturing Industry of the Western 
Cape   
❖ Bargaining Council for the Furniture 
Manufacturing Industry of the Eastern 
Cape   
❖ Bargaining Council for the Furniture 
Manufacturing Industry of the South 
Western Districts   
❖ Bargaining Council for the Furniture 
Manufacturing Industry, KwaZulu-Natal    
❖ Bargaining Council for the Laundry, 
Cleaning and Dyeing Industry (KwaZul- 
Natal)   
❖ Building Bargaining Council (North and 
West Boland)  
❖ Motor Industry Bargaining Council  
❖ National Bargaining Council for the 
Road Freight and Logistics Industry 
(NBCRFLI)  
 
❖ The Bargaining Council for the Diamond 
Cutting Industry  
 
❖ Bargaining Council for the New Tyre 
Manufacturing Industry  
 
1990s 2000s 2010s 
❖ Bargaining Council for the Contract 
Cleaning Services Industry (KwaZulu-
Natal) 
❖ Bargaining Council for the Grain 
Industry  
❖ Bargaining Council for the Meat Trade, 
Gauteng   
❖ Education Labour Relations Council 
❖ General Public Service Sectoral 
Bargaining Council 
❖ National Bargaining Council for the 
Electrical Industry of South Africa  
❖ Public Health and Social Development 
Sectoral Bargaining Council 
❖ Public Service Coordinating Bargaining 
Council 
❖ Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining 
Council 
❖ Bargaining Council for the Fishing 
Industry  
❖ Furniture Bargaining Council   
❖ Motor Ferry Industry Bargaining Council 
of South Africa  
❖ National Bargaining Council for Clothing 
Manufacturing Industry   
❖ National Bargaining Council for the 
Chemical Industry   
❖ National Bargaining Council for the 
Wood and Paper Sector   
❖ National Textile Bargaining Council   
❖ South African Local Government 
Bargaining Council 
❖ Statutory Council for the Squid and 
Related Fisheries of South Africa 
❖ Amanzi Bargaining Council  
❖ Bargaining Council for the Civil 
Engineering Industry   
❖ National Bargaining Council for the 
Hairdressing, Cosmetology, Beauty and 
Skincare Industry   
❖ National Bargaining Council for the 
Private Security Sector 
❖ Statutory Council for the Fast Food, 
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❖ South African Road Passenger 
Bargaining Council (SARPBAC)  
❖ Transnet Bargaining Council (National)   
❖ Statutory Council of the Printing, 
Newspaper and Packaging Industry of 
South Africa 
Source: Godfrey (2012); Department of Labour (2018); Du Toit et al. (2015) 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, and indeed the Bargaining Council Minimum Wage Dataset 
(BCMWD) as a whole, only registered private sector Bargaining Councils were captured. This 
decision was driven largely by the availability of data, and the bureaucracy that is entailed in 
gathering such information – more details on this are provided in the following data section of 
this chapter. 
3.3 DATA: THE BARGAINING COUNCIL MINIMUM WAGE DATASET 
(BCMWD) 
3.3.1 CAPTURING 
Prior to the creation of the BCMWD, there existed no dataset that captured multiple Bargaining 
Council decisions (with respect to the minimum wages they enforce) with a panel dimension. 
All studies that have been conducted in this research space have been forced to make use of 
either single/repeated cross-sections of data, or data for a singular Bargaining Council across 
time. This is not surprising as access and availability of the data that underlies the BCMWD 
was extremely hard to come by26. 
 
Bargaining Council agreements are published by way of government gazettes and are made 
available to the public. However, there is limited access to digital copies of these agreements 
– especially in the context of historical publications – a result that is mainly driven by the South 
African government’s slow approach to digitisation and e-government in general. Thus, relying 
                                                 
 
26 There are a few public websites that record published minimum wages – however, these websites tend to focus 
on specific sectors and are not all-encompassing. Furthermore, these websites tend to have gaps in time, or are 
highly aggregated (providing the average minimum wage per sector rather than the varying levels of 
disaggregation that are prescribed by the Bargaining Council agreement). Lastly, these public websites tend to 
rely on self-reported data from employees, thus not accurately capturing the true minimum. As a result, it is 
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on existing physical copies for historical data was the only option left available for the creation 
of this dataset. 
 
This in itself presented another challenge. The physical copies of these Bargaining Council 
agreements are meant to be stored at the South African Department of Labour (DoL); and while 
this is the case for a good majority of the records, there are a number of gazettes that have been 
lost over time either through moving of record repositories, inadequate inventory of storage, or 
damage. Furthermore, the DoL does not keep electronic copies of historical gazettes, only 
keeping copies of the most recent agreements. Bargaining Councils themselves are also meant 
to keep historical records of their agreements, however, some Bargaining Councils refuse to 
share the information, stating that it is “not for public use”; while other Bargaining Councils 
are simply uncontactable – either due to outdated contact details, or due to lack of interest in 
responding.  
 
Bargaining Councils do not have to publish new agreements on an annual basis; instead these 
agreements are published after each new round of collective bargaining. There is no uniform 
time pattern for this, and this varies from council to council. Of the 38 registered private sector 
Bargaining Councils, 28 have been captured in the BCMWD. Table 3.4 below outlines which 
Bargaining Councils were captured, and the years in which bargaining agreements existed and 
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Table 3.4: Captured Bargaining Councils, and years captured 
Bargaining Council Years 
Bargaining Council for the Building Industry (Bloemfontein)  2014-2018 
Bargaining Council for the Canvas Goods Industry (Witwatersrand and Pretoria) 2009-2018 
Bargaining Council for the Civil Engineering Industry   2014-2018 
Bargaining Council for the Fishing Industry  2007-2008; 
2012-2014; 
2016-2018 
Bargaining Council for the Food Retail, Restaurant, Catering & Allied Trades    2007-2018 
Bargaining Council for the Furniture Manufacturing Industry of the Western Cape   2012-2017 
Bargaining Council for the Grain Industry  2017 
Bargaining Council for the Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Industry (Cape)   2007-2018 
Bargaining Council for the Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Industry (KwaZulu-Natal)   2014-2016 





Bargaining Council for the Restaurant, Catering and Allied Trades   2011-2015 
Building Bargaining Council (North and West Boland)  2007-2018 
Building Industry Bargaining Council (Cape of Good Hope)   2010-2018 
Building Industry Bargaining Council (Kimberley)   2011-2015 




Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council  1988-1989; 
1991-2011; 
2013-2018 
Motor Ferry Industry Bargaining Council of South Africa  2012-2013 
Motor Industry Bargaining Council  2004; 
2008--2018 
National Bargaining Council for Clothing Manufacturing Industry    2006-2011; 
2013 
National Bargaining Council for the Chemical Industry   2001-2018 
National Bargaining Council for the Electrical Industry of South Africa  2001-2017 
National Bargaining Council for the Hairdressing, Cosmetology, Beauty and Skincare 





National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight and Logistics Industry (NBCRFLI)  2009-2018 
National Bargaining Council for the Wood and Paper Sector   2012-2016 





National Textile Bargaining Council   2006-2014 
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South African Road Passenger Bargaining Council (SARPBAC)  2012-2015; 
2017 
The Bargaining Council for the Diamond Cutting Industry  2005-2007 
 
 
Table 3.5: Non-captured Bargaining Councils, and reasons for non-capture 
Bargaining Council Reason for non-capture 
Amanzi Bargaining Council  Agreements unavailable; Bargaining Council 
uncontactable 
Transnet Bargaining Council (National)   Agreements said to be not be for public 
dissemination 
Bargaining Council for the Contract Cleaning Services 
Industry (KwaZulu-Natal) 
Agreements unavailable; Bargaining Council 
uncontactable 
Bargaining Council for the Furniture Manufacturing 
Industry of the Eastern Cape   
Agreements unavailable; Bargaining Council 
uncontactable 
Bargaining Council for the Furniture Manufacturing 
Industry of the South Western Districts   
Agreements unavailable; Bargaining Council 
uncontactable 
Bargaining Council for the Furniture Manufacturing 
Industry, KwaZulu-Natal    
Agreements unavailable; Bargaining Council 
uncontactable 
Bargaining Council for the New Tyre Manufacturing 
Industry  
Agreements unavailable; Bargaining Council 
uncontactable 
Building Industry Bargaining Council (East London)  Agreements unavailable; Bargaining Council 
uncontactable 
Building Industry Bargaining Council (Southern and 
Eastern Cape)   
Agreements unavailable; Bargaining Council 
uncontactable 
National Bargaining Council for the Private Security 
Sector 
This is a recently established council; agreement 
had not been published at time of capturing 
National Bargaining Council for the Sugar 
Manufacturing and Refining Industry   




As previously mentioned, digital copies of South African Bargaining Council agreements are 
decidedly scarce; in the face of this, this chapter had to rely on manual and optical character 
recognition (OCR) data capturing techniques – physical copies of the available agreements 
were scanned and then had OCR applied to them. The implementation of the OCR 
methodology was automated using basic scripting techniques in Python. With each Bargaining 
Council presenting their agreed upon wages in a different format, and with some of the scanned 
copies of agreements being of poor quality (due to years of weathering and fading of the 
original physical document) there was no way to eliminate the manual element of the capturing 
process entirely.  
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Figure 3.1 illustrates a maximally disaggregated wage table. Whilst not every sector 
disaggregated and presented the minimum wages in such a completely disaggregated fashion, 
each sector’s wage table was a permutation of this variation; disaggregating and displaying 
wages by: sub-sector, and/or grade, and/or occupation, and/or area, and/or wage period. 
 
Figure 3-1: Presentation of a maximally disaggregated wage table 
Sector A 
Sub-sector Grade Occupation Minimum wage Wage period 
      Area XX Area YY  
      Rands Rands  
(AA) Grade 1:     
 (i) Qualified        
   Occupation 1 X11 X12 Daily 
   Occupation 2 X21 X22 Hourly 
   ⁞      




      
 
   Occupation 1 X13 X23 Hourly 
   Occupation 2 X14 X24 Hourly 




      
 
   Occupation 1 X15 X25 Monthly 
   Occupation 2 X16 X26 Hourly 




      
 
   Occupation 1 X17 X27 Weekly 
   Occupation 2 X18 X28 Weekly 
   ⁞      
 (ii) Thereafter, 
qualified wage 
      
 
   Occupation 1 X11 X12 Daily 
   Occupation 2 X21 X22 Hourly 
   ⁞      
 Grade 2:     
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
 
Once the data had been captured for each sector, cleaning methodologies had to be employed 
to ensure the usefulness of the data, as well as the uniformity of the data’s presentation across 
both space and time.  
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Since the BCMWD is comprised of multiple sources of data that are being integrated, the need 
for data cleaning increases significantly. A good data cleaning approach needs to satisfy several 
requirements. Firstly, it should detect and remove all major errata and inconsistencies in both 
individual data sources and when integrating multiple sources (Rahm & Do, 2000). This 
approach should be created with appropriate tools so as to limit manual inspection, while also 
being easily extended to cover additional sources. Data cleaning should not be performed in 
isolation, but together with schema-related data transformations based on comprehensive 
metadata (Rahm & Do, 2000). Lastly, mapping functions should be specified in a declarative 
way and be reusable for additional data sources as well as for data querying (Rahm & Do, 
2000). 
 
Problems that arise in the dataset can largely be classified as either single-source or multi-
source (figure 3.3). Schema-level problems can also be reflected at the instance level; and can 
be addressed at the schema level by improved schema design, schema translation, and schema 
integration (Rahm & Do, 2000). Instance-level problems refer to errors and inconsistencies that 











Figure 3-2: Classification of data quality problems in data sources 
 
Source: Rahm & Do (2000)  
 
The data quality of a source largely depends on how it is governed by schema and integrity 
constraints controlling which data values are permissible (Rahm & Do, 2000). The most 
common single source problems that arose in the BCMWD are described in table 3.6.  These 
single source problems are aggravated when multiple sources are integrated (Rahm & Do, 
2000). Each source typically contains dirty data and the data sources may be represented in a 
different fashion (as shown in figure 3.2). This is because data sources are typically developed, 
deployed, and presented independently to serve specific needs – resulting in a large degree of 




                                                 
 
27 I.e. if occupation = “Security Gard” in Sector A, occupation = “Security Guard” in Sector B, these 
occupations will be unmatchable. 
  Data Quality 
Problems 
  
     
      
Single-Source Problems Multi-Source Problems 
  
 
Schema Level Instance Level  Schema Level Instance Level 
 




(Data entry errors) 
  
(Heterogenous data 






     
• Uniqueness • Misspellings  • Naming conflicts • Inconsistent aggregating 
• Referential integrity • Redundancy/duplicates  • Structural conflicts • Inconsistent timing 
… • Contradictory values  … … 
 …    
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Table 3.6: Single source problems 
Problem Dirty Data Example (if applicable) Reasons/Remarks 
Missing values Minwage = . Unavailable values during data 
capturing/OCR failed to identify 
values due to poor quality 
documents. 
Illegal values Minwage = 123.33.33 OCR failed to differentiate between 
commas and full stops due to poor 
quality documents. 
Duplicated records Minwage = 123 occurs as two line items with 
all other variables remaining constant. 
Data entry error/same gazette being 
captured twice. 
Minimum wage not 
strictly increasing 
Minwaget < Minwaget-1 Occurs in a handful of cases – 
mistakes in government gazettes are 
typically to blame. 
Numeric variable 
appearing as string 
 Data entry error. 
 
Misspellings Occupation = “Security Gard” Data entry error/mistakes in 
government gazette. 
Misfielded values Occupation = “Grade 1” Data entry error/OCR failure. 
 
In general, the data cleaning process that was followed to ameliorate the aforementioned 
problems can be broken down into three phases: 
 
1. Data analysis: Utilised to detect which kinds of errors and consistencies are to be 
removed (table 3.6 already gave examples of those that were most common to the 
BCMWD). In addition to manual inspection of the data, fit-for-purpose analysis 
programs and built-in-checkers were employed to detect data quality problems. 
2. Definitions of transformations and mapping rules: The quality issues identified in 
step 1 were remediated with fit-to-purpose code that fixed each single source problem. 
With the BCMWD being comprised of 28 different sectors worth of Bargaining Council 
agreements, a schema translation was employed to map the different data sources to a 
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3. Verification: The correctness and effectiveness of step 2 was tested and evaluated. 
Since some errors only become apparent once reaching this step, steps 1 – 3 were 
repeated until a dataset that was devoid of problems was created. 
 
Having gone through the three phases, the resultant dataset takes the form of figure 3.3. It is 
immediately observable that each row is now unique, allowing for easier data manipulation, 
matching, and analysis.  
 




Grade Occupation Area Wage 
Wage 
period 
A (AA) Grade 1: Qualified Occupation 1 Area XX X11 Daily 
A (AA) Grade 1: Qualified Occupation 2 Area XX X21 Hourly 
A (AA) Grade 1: Qualified Occupation 1 Area YY X12 Daily 
A (AA) Grade 1: Qualified Occupation 2 Area YY X22 Hourly 
A (AA) Learners: 1st four months 
exp. 
Occupation 1 Area XX X13 Hourly 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
 
3.3.3 THE FINAL DATASET 
The BCMWD contains 19409 observations and varying degrees of variation in minimum wage 
announcements, particularly sectorally, sub-sectorally, geographically, occupationally, and by 
year. Some councils have national representivity, while others are restricted to a particular 
province, or even to a particular city or town. Some cater to very specific industries, while 
others cover a wide range of sub-sectors. The vast majority of councils captured provide 
minimum wages that have been disaggregated by occupation.  
 
Table 3.7 outlines the final structure of the BCMWD, including the description of the variables 
available, the format of the variable, and the number of unique values the variable takes on. 
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Table 3.7: Variables of the BCMWD 
Variable 
name 




Sector Sector covered by Bargaining Council Discrete String 28 
Sub-sector Sub-sector covered by Bargaining Council Discrete String 58 
Occupation Job description of employee Discrete String 1 517 
Year Year in which agreement was published Discrete Numeric 31 
Wage Stated nominal wage per hour/day/week/month Continuous Numeric 8 006 
Minwage Nominal monthly minimum wage Continuous Numeric 7 477 
Deflwage Real monthly minimum wage (2010=100) Continuous Numeric 10 287 
Grade Grade scale into which occupation falls Discrete String 94 
Area Geographic area wage applies to Discrete String 69 
CPI CPI with forecast (World Bank Estimates) Continuous Numeric 31 
Yearofest Year of establishment of Bargaining Council Discrete Numeric 28 
Wageperiod 
Frequency of wage payment: Either hourly, daily, 
weekly, or monthly 
Discrete String 4 
Source: BCMWD (2019) 
 
In order to illustrate how the BCMWD can be utilised, this chapter will now proceed with a 
descriptive analysis of Bargaining Councils with the manufacturing industry of South Africa. 
For the purposes of illustration, and to simplify the analysis, the manufacturing Bargaining 
Councils that are considered must fit two conditions; (i) be representative at a national level 
(Bargaining Councils that are representative at only a provincial/town/city level are excluded), 
and (ii) must have data available for the period of 2008-2017. The Bargaining Councils that 
meet these conditions are: 
• Bargaining Council for the Grain Industry 
• Furniture Bargaining Council   
• Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council 
• Motor Industry Bargaining Council 
• National Bargaining Council for Clothing Manufacturing Industry  
• National Bargaining Council for the Chemical Industry   
• National Bargaining Council for the Electrical Industry of South Africa 
• National Bargaining Council for the Wood and Paper Sector   
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
Chapter 3: The Bargaining Council Minimum Wage Dataset: A Discussion of Capturing, Cleaning, and Descriptives 
 
76 
• National Bargaining Council of the Leather Industry of South Africa   
• National Textile Bargaining Council   
3.4 ESTIMATED BARGAINING COUNCIL COVERAGE 
This analysis begins by estimating the number of employees covered by Bargaining Council 
agreements within the manufacturing sector. To effectively estimate the coverage of these 
Bargaining Councils, the BCMWD is matched with employment data drawn from the Post-
Apartheid Labour Market Series (PALMS) (Kerr et al., 2017).  
 
PALMS is a stacked, cross-sectional dataset containing microdata from 1994-2017, the 
majority of which had been collected through various surveys over time by Statistics South 
Africa (StatsSA). The dataset is comprised of the October Household Surveys (OHS) which 
ran from 1994 to 1999, the bi-annual Labour Force Survey (LFS) running from 2000 to 2007, 
and the Quarterly Labour Force Surveys (QLFS) which are available from 2008 to 2015. The 
data is collected at the household level, with each member of the household being surveyed 
and then weighted using census weights in order to create a sample representative of the South 
African population. The PALMS dataset captures approximately 120 different variables across 
time (Kerr et al., 2016). To ensure that coverage is correctly estimated, a few conditions have 
to be adhered to. 
 
Firstly, the division between formal and informal employment is of crucial importance. 
Bargaining Council agreements are generally only extended to employers and employees who 
form part of the formal sector – for this reason, individuals that reported to be self-employed 
or employed in the informal sector were removed from the PALMS sample. This was further 
restricted to only include workers who have written contracts with their employers, as a 
Bargaining Council agreement cannot be binding without one. 
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Secondly, managers, professionals, associate professionals, and technicians are generally 
excluded from Bargaining Council coverage. Bhorat et al. (2009) mentions that this is not a 
legal prescription, but rather one that has been propagated throughout history. Bhorat et al. 
(2009) goes on to mention that this is only the case in the private sector and not in the public 
sector. Since the Bargaining Councils covered by this chapter all fall within the private sector, 
the condition was imposed.  
 
Lastly, each Bargaining Council outlines occupations that are not covered by the respective 
agreements – to this end; these specific occupations were removed from the dataset. This 
resulted in a sample that generally falls into the bracket of unskilled and semi-skilled (with 
little to no skilled individuals28).  
 
The results of this Bargaining Council coverage estimation are presented in two fashions, (i) 
by percentage of the formal employed cohort of South Africa (table 3.8), and (ii) by the total 
formal employed cohort of the manufacturing sector of South Africa (table 3.9). 
 
A noticeable pattern emerges from the results in terms of coverage and its relationship with 
total formal employment – as one proceeds forward in time total formal employment grows, 
while the percentage of employees covered by Bargaining Councils relative to total formal 
employment falls.  This can potentially be partially explained by the fact that in recent years, 
even though total formal employment has been growing in South Africa (in absolute terms), 
there has been a decline in the number of employees in the manufacturing sector (SARB, 2016). 
                                                 
 
28 This is corroborated in Bhorat et al., (2009). 
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Noting the decline in employment in the manufacturing sector, attention is turned to the 
coverage of these Bargaining Councils, relative to total formal manufacturing employment.  
Table 3.9 shows that in 2008 approximately 61% of formal manufacturing employment was 
covered by a Bargaining Council; this number declined to approximately 46% in 2017. Metals 
and engineering was the sector that showed the greatest reduction (approximately 5% when 
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Table 3.8: Bargaining Council Coverage by total formal employment (2008 - 2017) 29 
Sector 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Chemicals 114 093 96 732 80 013 95 484 94 197 102 456 93 424 101 179 94 181 101 237 
 1.15% 1.05% 0.97% 1.13% 0.99% 1.02% 0.90% 0.97% 0.89% 0.94% 
Clothing 111 135 111 941 88 743 92 223 82 922 83 451 92 526 76 496 87 240 76 588 
 1.12% 1.22% 1.07% 1.09% 0.87% 0.83% 0.89% 0.73% 0.83% 0.71% 
Electrical 34 523 25 194 16 897 16 036 23 208 18 095 21 516 18 669 19 148 12 881 
 0.35% 0.27% 0.20% 0.19% 0.24% 0.18% 0.21% 0.18% 0.18% 0.12% 
Furniture 39 098 34 351 27 800 27 975 32 143 27 450 35 579 30 615 20 405 18 363 
 0.39% 0.37% 0.34% 0.33% 0.34% 0.27% 0.34% 0.29% 0.19% 0.17% 
Motor Industry 99 131 83 428 81 599 95 884 85 065 82 771 77 931 64 925 59 589 57 092 
 1.00% 0.91% 0.99% 1.13% 0.89% 0.82% 0.75% 0.62% 0.57% 0.53% 
Leather 10 355 9 808 9 474 8 803 7 684 18 640 12 440 6 951 9 059 8 396 
 
0.10% 0.11% 0.11% 0.10% 0.08% 0.19% 0.12% 0.07% 0.09% 0.08% 
Metal and 
Engineering 
338 630 293 000 266 906 258 732 244 250 243 929 253 264 216 447 212 286 247 093 
 3.41% 3.18% 3.23% 3.06% 2.56% 2.43% 2.43% 2.07% 2.01% 2.28% 
Textiles 47 336 49 238 29 626 33 611 38 601 32 726 34 220 37 270 37 228 27 836 
 0.48% 0.54% 0.36% 0.40% 0.40% 0.33% 0.33% 0.36% 0.35% 0.26% 
Wood and Paper 109 976 92 340 85 922 74 567 75 884 57 940 66 074 73 771 66 302 78 550 
 1.11% 1.00% 1.04% 0.88% 0.79% 0.58% 0.63% 0.71% 0.63% 0.73% 
Grain 15 039 12 163 13 881 25 497 20 152 29 523 24 605 23 362 11 667 17 947 
 0.15% 0.13% 0.17% 0.30% 0.21% 0.29% 0.24% 0.22% 0.11% 0.17% 
Total BC coverage 919 316 808 195 700 861 728 812 704 106 696 981 711 579 649 685 617 105 645 983 
 9.27% 8.78% 8.49% 8.61% 7.37% 6.94% 6.84% 6.22% 5.85% 5.97% 
Total formal 
employment 
9 920 541 9 202 017 8 258 730 8 467 545 9 559 026 10 044 473 10 406 087 10 439 429 10 542 062 10 826 781 
Source: BCMWD (2019); Author’s own calculations.
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Table 3.9: Bargaining Council Coverage by total formal manufacturing employment (2008 - 2017) 30 
Sector 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Chemicals 114 093 96 732 80 013 95 484 94 197 102 456 93 424 101 179 94 181 101 237 
 7.54% 6.69% 5.95% 6.90% 6.53% 7.09% 6.57% 7.46% 7.09% 7.19% 
Clothing 111 135 111 941 88 743 92 223 82 922 83 451 92 526 76 496 87 240 76 588 
 7.35% 7.74% 6.60% 6.66% 5.75% 5.77% 6.51% 5.64% 6.57% 5.44% 
Electrical 34 523 25 194 16 897 16 036 23 208 18 095 21 516 18 669 19 148 12 881 
 2.28% 1.74% 1.26% 1.16% 1.61% 1.25% 1.51% 1.38% 1.44% 0.91% 
Furniture 39 098 34 351 27 800 27 975 32 143 27 450 35 579 30 615 20 405 18 363 
 2.58% 2.37% 2.07% 2.02% 2.23% 1.90% 2.50% 2.26% 1.54% 1.30% 
Motor Industry 99 131 83 428 81 599 95 884 85 065 82 771 77 931 64 925 59 589 57 092 
 6.55% 5.77% 6.06% 6.93% 5.90% 5.73% 5.48% 4.79% 4.49% 4.05% 
Leather 10 355 9 808 9 474 8 803 7 684 18 640 12 440 6 951 9 059 8 396 
 0.68% 0.68% 0.70% 0.64% 0.53% 1.29% 0.88% 0.51% 0.68% 0.60% 
Metal and Engineering 338 630 293 000 266 906 258 732 244 250 243 929 253 264 216 447 212 286 247 093 
 22.38% 20.25% 19.84% 18.69% 16.93% 16.88% 17.82% 15.96% 15.99% 17.55% 
Textiles 47 336 49 238 29 626 33 611 38 601 32 726 34 220 37 270 37 228 27 836 
 3.13% 3.40% 2.20% 2.43% 2.68% 2.26% 2.41% 2.75% 2.80% 1.98% 
Wood and Paper 109 976 92 340 85 922 74 567 75 884 57 940 66 074 73 771 66 302 78 550 
 7.27% 6.38% 6.39% 5.39% 5.26% 4.01% 4.65% 5.44% 4.99% 5.58% 
Grain 15 039 12 163 13 881 25 497 20 152 29 523 24 605 23 362 11 667 17 947 
 0.99% 0.84% 1.03% 1.84% 1.40% 2.04% 1.73% 1.72% 0.88% 1.27% 
Total BC coverage 919 316 808 195 700 861 728 812 704 106 696 981 711 579 649 685 617 105 645 983 
 60.76% 55.87% 52.09% 52.65% 48.80% 48.22% 50.07% 47.91% 46.48% 45.88% 
Total formal manufacturing emp. 1 513 001 1 446 590 1 345 425 1 384 240 1 442 983 1 445 456 1 421 201 1 355 953 1 327 637 1 408 045 
                                                 
 
30 Percentages indicated represent individuals covered per sector, divided by total formal employment. 
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3.5 EVOLUTION OF MINIMUM WAGES IN MANUFACTURING 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, there is no rule or pattern for how sectors may disaggregate 
their minimum wages. Table 3.10 illustrates descriptive statistics for the considered Bargaining 
Councils in 2017.  As can be expected, sectors with higher levels of wage disaggregation exhibit 
higher levels of wage variation. This variation is shown graphically in figure 3.4, with the 
electrical and motor industries showing the highest levels of variation. Figure 3.5 extends this 
decomposition to show the variance between the various minima and maxima of minimum 
wages of different sectors across time – reinforcing the notion that sectors with higher levels of 
wage disaggregation exhibit higher levels of wage variance. 
 
Table 3.10: Descriptive results for 2017 
Sector Unique values Minimum Maximum Median Mean 
Chemicals 4 5 000 7 000 5 975 5 988 
Clothing 110 2 534 11 664 4 088 4 579 
Electrical 275 1 316 20 744 6 215 7 264 
Furniture 30 1 582 4 305 2 816 2 864 
Motor Industry 131 1 078 15 936 5 928 6 262 
Leather 105 1 566 8 846 5 481 5 467 
Metal and 
Engineering 46 5 963 13 586 9 904 9 932 
Textiles 52 3 098 10 956 5 156 5 512 
Wood and Paper 4 2 800 6 503 4 544 4 598 
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Figure 3-4: Variation of minimum wages by sector for 2017 
 
Source: BCMWD (2019); Author’s own calculations. 
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Figure 3-5: Variance between smallest and largest minimum wage per sector (2012 – 2017) 
 
Source: BCMWD (2019); Author’s own calculations. 
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Table 3.11 shows that the average nominal minimum wage31 in every sector has steadily 
increased (apart from years in which there was no Bargaining Council agreement – in these 
years, the nominal wage would remain static). In 2017, the metal and engineering sector had 
the highest average minimum wage, outstripping the lowest average minimum wage (occurring 
in the furniture sector) by 347%. 
 
Table 3.11: Average nominal wages by sector (2012-2017) 32 
Year 
Chemicals Clothing Electrical Furniture Motor 
Industry 
Leather Metal and 
Engineering 
Textiles Wood and 
Paper 
2012 4 789 3 508 5 631 2 590  4 362 3 758 6 756 4 138 3 897 
2013 5 168 4 259 5 782 2 590 4 706 4 302 6 768 4 409 4 109 
2014 5 249 4 259 5 782 2 662 5 293 4 302 8 482 4 667 4 316 
2015 5 622 4 259 5 782  2 662 5 518 4 302 9 199 5 068 4 598 
2016 5 988 4 259  6 261  2 804 5 886  5 290 9 932 5 068 4 598 
2017 5 988 4 579 7 264  2 864 6 262 5 467 9 932 5 512 4 598 
Source: BCMWD (2019); Author’s own calculations. 
 
 
While this growth in average nominal minimum wages may appear impressive, it is the change 
in the real wages that one is most concerned with, as this better indicates the standard of living 
that may be attained by an employee. Figure 3.6 illustrates that since 2011 there has been a 
contraction and stagnation in the growth of real average minimum wages across the 
manufacturing sector – with only the period of 2012-2014 showing growth of the average real 
minimum wage that is above 0%. This is a worrying trend as the entire foundation of Bargaining 
Council minimum wages rests on the notion of social transformation, the protection of the most 
vulnerable employees, and the amelioration of poverty; however, with what appears to be a 
shrinking of the real average minimum wage, these goals are not being met33.  
                                                 
 
31 Note: This is the average of the prescribed nominal minimum wage – this is not necessarily the wage that 
employees are receiving. For more on compliance with minimum wages, please see Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
32 Averages are taken are the summation of unique average wage values per sector divided by the number of 
unique average wages per sector. 
33 It is worth noting that these findings should only be considered for the manufacturing sector. It is plausible that 
stagnation of real minimum wages corresponds to manufacturing's performance in international markets. 
Should data become available on public sector bargaining councils, one would be able to unpack this 
further – this will be considered for further research. 
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Figure 3-6: Nominal and real growth rates of average minimum wages vs. inflation 
 
Source: BCMWD (2019); Author’s own calculations. 
 
Noting that it is plausible that averages may be misleading, as one sector could be dragging 
down the average as a whole, attention is turned to the average nominal and real minimum wage 
by sector. These wages are illustrated in figures 3.7 and 3.834. 
 
When comparing the 2012 period to 2017, chemicals, clothing, and furniture show a noticeable 
decline in real wage or 5%, 4%, and 22% respectively. The motor and leather industries show 
the most positive real wage growth with 24% and 35% increases respectively. 
 
                                                 
 
34 Further graphical decomposition of these wages across time by sector are shown in Appendix B. 
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Figure 3-7: Average nominal and real minimum wages (2012-2017) 
 
Source: BCMWD (2019); Author’s own calculations. 
 
Figure 3-8: Average real minimum wages by sector (2012-2017) 
 








































Bargaining Councils are a complex phenomenon with effects on the economy that have only 
just begun to be unpacked. Due to the lack of coherent and complete data in this space – 
specifically with regards to the minimum wages set by Bargaining Councils – this particular 
research area has had to rely on limited analysis, small samples, and has largely been limited to 
time-invariant estimations. 
 
This chapter has described the capturing, construction, and cleaning of the most comprehensive 
Bargaining Council minimum wage dataset for South Africa thus far (The Bargaining Council 
Minimum Wage Dataset (BCMWD)). The chapter further delved into the metadata of the 
dataset, laying out basic descriptives obtainable from the data, as well as illustrating some of 
the practical applications of such data. From the evolution of wages, to the estimation of 
Bargaining Council coverage, this chapter has shown that this new dataset has a place within 
this field of research and will be greatly beneficial for future studies. 
 
The next two chapters of this thesis will make use of this dataset to unpack the effects of these 
minimum wages that have been set by Bargaining Councils on (a) employment and earnings, 
and (b) labour productivity within the South African economy.  
 
With this data entering the public domain, it is hopeful that this data will find its natural place 
among the literature and serve as a tool to further expand the growing field of Bargaining 
Council and minimum wage research in South Africa. 
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 Employment Effects of Bargaining 
Council Decisions: An Analysis of 
Minimum Wages in South Africa 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
After the fall of apartheid in 1994, unions and Bargaining Councils played a crucial role in 
South Africa’s early stages of transformation. However, research into the effects of Bargaining 
Councils have been constrained by the opaqueness of their wage rates and decisions – there are 
many different wages, covering many different types of jobs, decided at various time.  And 
although this data should be easily available within the public domain since it is gazetted, it is 
extremely hard to come by. As a result, research in this space has remained sparse. 
South Africa has a unique collective bargaining structure: wages are mostly set at a sectoral 
level. In this structure wages are set in two ways. The first occurs where worker organisation is 
difficult. In this circumstance, the National Minimum wage will apply to all workers within that 
sector. This minimum wage applies regardless of the job level but may differ geographically. 
The second approach to wage setting is through Bargaining Councils - these are made up of the 
employer and employee representative. The decisions made by these Bargaining Councils, if 
these councils are deemed to be sufficiently representative of the sector, are assumed to operate 
“ergo omnes” – which means that these decisions are extended to all workers and firms in the 
sector, even those who were not part of the decision-making process. These Bargaining 
Councils set minimum wages for different levels of employee which may differ by region. In 
practice “representivity” is interpreted as employing more than half of the workers within the 
industry and large employers tend to dominate these councils.  
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It is claimed that the decisions made by Bargaining Councils are essential for South Africa, 
specifically in a transformation context, whereby minimum wages set by these Bargaining 
Councils have been argued to be necessary for supporting not only the worker, but the extended 
family of said worker due to the lingering effects of the apartheid regime (Finnemore & van der 
Merwe, 1987)35. Furthermore, it is suggested that the existence of Bargaining Councils and the 
extension of their decisions protects workers from low wages, long hours and unhygienic 
conditions (Finnemore & van der Merwe, 1987). Critics of the collective bargaining system 
have shown the deleterious effects of the system whereby it places a special burden on small 
firms, increases business failures and discourages start-ups, and contributes to South Africa’s 
high unemployment rate. However, these studies have only used cross-sections of data and 
broad definitions of coverage (Magruder, 2012) or focused on a specific industry (Nattrass and 
Seekings, 2012) and have not considered how they may constrain firm level adjustment, and 
consequently employment, to increasing import competition. This chapter will provide a 
detailed analysis of these Bargaining Councils and their relationship with wages and 
employment during a period of increasing trade in South Africa. 
This chapter requires that a database of Bargaining Councils and their decisions is built through 
the extraction of information from government gazettes. Wages and working conditions agreed 
upon by Bargaining Councils vary by coverage of the council, by region and by job description. 
This database will capture the various agreements of these councils and will link these to 
individual level outcomes in officially collected labour market data. 
Using this database, the chapter exploits three aspects of variation to identify the effect of 
Bargaining Councils on employment and wages: first, regional variation in coverage (some 
                                                 
 
35 These effects include (but are not limited to): a lack of skills of an individual; insufficient work experience of 
an individual due to being excluded from the workforce during Apartheid. 
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areas are covered by Bargaining Councils whilst others are not); second, time variation 
(different Bargaining Councils have rounds of collective bargaining at different times); and 
third, variation in wage levels for different occupations within a Bargaining Council (different 
occupational levels have different set wages for different sectors and these do not correspond 
across sectors). This variation, and the changes which occur after different rounds of collective 
bargaining, can then be used to examine whether these agreements are associated with wage 
outcomes, employment levels and employment by different sizes of firms. 
The results from this analysis can be used to discuss how this collective bargaining structure 
may constrain firm responses to increases in competition through imports. It seems likely that 
these structures will prevent firms from adjusting to increased competition, potentially from 
imports, by decreasing real wages (Rankin, 2016). This in turn raises questions about how 
countries can create, or protect, better paying “decent” jobs in a globalised environment. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1 THE EFFECTS OF BARGAINING COUNCILS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The effects of Bargaining Councils in South Africa have been widely discussed in the past two 
decades36; however, much of the academic research has been limited by the availability of data. 
Existing research has dealt with this in two ways. First, by only conducting a cross-sectional 
analysis, ignoring time effects and, secondly, by focusing only on a specific industry or sector. 
This section will proceed to outline the literature in two components: the first a theoretical 
model as described by Moll (1996), and the second South African empirical literature outlining 
the impact of Bargaining Councils in the South African context. 
 
                                                 
 
36 See Godfrey & Macun, 1991; Godfey, 1992; Moll, 1996; Schultz & Mwabu, 1998; Butcher & Rouse, 2001; 
Bhorat et al., 2009; Magruder, 2012.  
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4.2.1.1 MOLL’S MINIMUM WAGE MODEL 
Since the right to bargain centrally is one which must be voluntarily exercised, it is possible 
that Bargaining Council agreements exist systematically in the industries, magisterial districts, 
and years in which local labour markets make them particularly profitable for the firms who 
pursue centralised bargaining (Magruder, 2012). Moll (1996) followed this rationale and 
outlined a theoretical model discussing the implications of Bargaining Councils for small and 
large firms. This model rests on the basis of a few assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that there 
is no government intervention in labour markets, and that wages are correlated with firm size. 
This is because there are economies of scale in union organisation, so union densities are higher 
at large firms, and because there are no unions below a threshold firm size. In the absence of a 
bargaining agreement, large unionised firms would pay a privately bargained wage (wLU), while 
non-unionised firms and small firms would pay a wage dictated by market forces, (wMF). If a 
Bargaining Council agreement existed, and a wage accord was reached under this agreement, 
there would be a third wage possibility, (wBC). Due to the ergo omnes nature of Bargaining 
Councils, all firms within the sector would have to comply with the prescribed wage, wBC. 
 
According to Moll (1996), it is presumed that wLU  > wBC > wMF, making it readily apparent that 
under a Bargaining Council agreement the wages for large unionised firms decrease, while the 
wages for small firms and large non-unionised firms increase. The net result of this is that larger 
firms pay a lower wage than they would have if market forces had dictated the wage, and some 
small firms are forced out of the market, with others facing a barrier to entry. With lower 
amounts of small firms within the market competition is decreased, and larger firms have lower 
incentive to operate efficiently. The result is a pervasive negative effect on economic growth37. 
                                                 
 








The following section of this chapter outlines existing literature which demonstrates the impact 
of Bargaining Councils on the South African labour market, as well as evidence that supports 
Moll’s model. 
4.2.1.2 THE IMPACT OF SOUTH AFRICAN BARGAINING COUNCILS 
Schultz and Mwabu (1998) investigated the impact of unions on South African wages. The 
authors used a national probability sample of the South African population collected at the end 
of 1993 by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit. Some 43 974 individuals 
from 9 000 households were drawn from 360 sample clusters. Schultz and Mwabu (1998) used 
quantile Ordinary Least Squares regressions to first examine the impact of union status 
dummies across deciles on wages. The wage function estimates show that union membership 
among African workers increases their wages by 145% at the bottom 10th percentile of the 
wage distribution and by 11% at the top 90th percentile. Among white workers, the relative 
increase in union wages is 21% at the 10th percentile but is associated at the 90th percentile 
with a reduction of 24%. The authors found that on average a unionised African worker received 
a wage that was 60% higher than a non-unionised African worker with the same characteristics. 
A white union worker received a wage that was 5% lower than their un-unionised counterpart. 
Schultz and Mwabu (1998) observed that the centralised bargaining system in South Africa was 
meant to minimise ‘within-industry union and non-union’ wage differentials; however they 
found wage differentials to still be significant (controlling for human capital variables, rural 
residence and industry). The authors estimated that cutting the union wage effect by half could 
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Building on the implications for small firms that ultimately pay higher wages38, many papers 
have shown that Bargaining Councils induce a wage premium for their members (Butcher & 
Rouse, 2001), particularly at the bottom of the income distribution (Schultz & Mwabu, 1998). 
Bhorat et al. (2009) levelled a major criticism against Bargaining Council agreements in that, 
due to the ergo omnes nature of the agreements small firms - and consequently their employees 
- are negatively affected. The authors use the 1995 October Household Survey and the 
September 2005 Labour Force Survey (LFS) to estimate the proportion of workers covered by 
Bargaining Councils. In 1995, 15% of formally employed workers were part of Bargaining 
Councils; the figure stood at 32% in 2005. Through quantile regressions Bhorat et al. (2009) 
estimated the impact of a range of explanatory variables on the wage distribution. Between 
1995 and 2005, union membership awarded a wage premium across the wage distribution; it 
also reduced wage inequality especially at the lower end of the distribution. Another major 
finding of Bhorat et al. (2009) was that public sector Bargaining Council members earned more 
than private sector Bargaining Council members, and on average more than workers not 
covered by the Bargaining Council system. This observation held true across employees of all 
races, genders, and even held when controlling for occupation. There was a strong association 
between wage premium and union membership between 1995 and 2005.  
 
Magruder (2012) used the South African Labour Force Survey and Government Gazette to 
estimate the effect of Bargaining Council on wages and employment, paying attention to 
variations with space, across industries and over time. The author assumed spatial continuity 
and used a difference-in-differences approach as a benchmark for Bargaining Councils on 
employment and small firm employment. Magruder (2012) argued that although Bargaining 
                                                 
 
38 As discussed in section 2.2.1 
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Council agreements are enforced in a spatially discontinuous way, it can be assumed that labour 
markets are spatially continuous within South Africa. The author then employed a spatial 
regression discontinuity, and spatial fixed effects to show that Bargaining Councils in South 
Africa are associated with lower employment in a particular industry, higher wages and lower 
employment in small firms; the employment per industry decreased by an estimated 8-13% due 
to Bargaining Council agreements, with the loss in employment being largely concentrated in 
small firms. For spatial fixed effects, Magruder (2012) found that the estimates were robust to 
magisterial district, magisterial district-year and magisterial district-industry effects.  
 
Revisiting the Bargaining Council dilemma, Bhorat et al. (2012) examined union and 
Bargaining Council wage premia for formally employed Africans using the Labour Force 
Survey of 2005. The authors argued that previous literature found higher estimates of the wage 
premium by failing to control for variables that capture the nature of the workplace such as firm 
size, type of work and non-wage benefits. Utilising an OLS regression the authors estimated a 
union wage gap of between 6% and 41%, depending on the specifications used. To correct for 
the fact that the union status may be endogenous with respect to wages, the authors then utilised 
a probit model within the wage equation. The authors found that the wage premiums for non-
union workers were 9% and 10% for private and public sector Bargaining Council systems 
respectively. Bhorat et al. (2012) further found evidence that unions negotiate for awards for 
their members outside of the bargaining system. 
 
Von Fintel (2016) investigated South Africa’s unemployment problem from both a supply side 
and demand perspective. The author made use of a district pseudo-panel compiled from 
Household Surveys and OLS estimated elasticities of labour demand, labour supply and 
unemployment with respect to wages. The author estimated various labour market outcomes to 
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district level wages and concluded that the labour market was primarily driven by wages, while 
labour supply was less sensitive to changes in wages. A major finding by the author was that in 
comparison to low paid workers, the wage effects of middle to highly paid workers lead to 
suppressed demand for labour and increased local unemployment. Cross-district unionisation 
rates and the distribution of large firms were responsible for this observation. According to von 
Fintel (2016), a significant component of the wage effect on labour market outcomes was due 
to these wage-setting institutions. 
 
Nattrass & Seekings (2012) further the criticism of Bargaining Councils by stating that 
“Bargaining Councils push some employers to restructure production in more capital and skill 
intensive directions. The result is job destruction (sic).” This is not the first South African policy 
to be criticised for achieving the exact opposite of its goal. Chapter 2 already showed that the 
implementation of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 had similar results in terms of 
restructuring and not the protection effects of workers as it had intended – a similar result that 
Nattrass and Seekings (2012) show to be true of Bargaining Councils.  
 
This chapter aims to address three primary shortcomings of the previous analyses39. Firstly, this 
chapter will not be restricted to a cross-sectional analysis, and thus can identify trends over 
time. Secondly, this chapter will not be limited to a single sector or industry and can thus study 
effects between industries. Lastly, this chapter has largely disaggregated data and can thus 
exploit between variations of occupation, industry, and region. 
                                                 
 
39 Of which each previous paper suffered from at least one. 
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The dataset used in this chapter was created specifically for studying the effect of Bargaining 
Council decisions and their implications on employment effects – the Bargaining Council 
Minimum Wage Dataset (BCMWD)40. 
As the time of writing this chapter, the dataset only contained the minimum wage decisions of 
three Bargaining Councils41: (i) Metal and Engineering, (ii) Textiles, and (iii) Clothing. The 
data on these Bargaining Councils were chosen as the first to be captured because they represent 
three of the top five largest Bargaining Councils, in terms of their coverage (Bhorat et al., 2009).  
 
To conduct the analysis in this Chapter, the BCMWD is matched with employment and wage 
data drawn from the Post-Apartheid Labour Market Series (PALMS).  
 
PALMS is a stacked, cross-sectional dataset containing microdata from 1994-2015, the 
majority of which was collected through various surveys over time by Statistics South Africa 
(StatsSA). The dataset is comprised of the October Household Surveys (OHS) which ran from 
1994 to 1999, the bi-annual Labour Force Survey (LFS) running from 2000 to 2007, and the 
Quarterly Labour Force Surveys (QLFS) which are available from 2008 to 2015. The data is 
collected at the household level, with each member of the household being surveyed and then 
weighted using census weights in order to create a sample that was representative of the South 
African population. The PALMS dataset captures approximately 120 different variables across 
time (Kerr et al., 2016), including wages, occupation, gender, race, province, years of education, 
and hours worked in the previous week. 
 
                                                 
 
40 As discussed in Chapter 3. 
41 The dataset is considered to be in on-going development, hence why only three councils had been captured at 
the time of writing. 
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Before matching could proceed, certain conditions had to be imposed on the PALMS dataset to 
ensure congruence with the BCMWD. 
 
Firstly, the division between formal and informal employment is of crucial importance. 
Bargaining Council agreements are generally only extended to employers and employees who 
form part of the formal sector – for this reason, individuals who reported themselves as self-
employed or employed in the informal sector were removed from the sample. This was further 
restricted to only include workers who have written contracts with their employers, as a 
Bargaining Council agreement cannot be binding without one. 
 
Secondly, managers, professionals, associate professionals, and technicians are generally 
excluded from Bargaining Council coverage. Bhorat et al. (2009), mentions that this is not a 
legal prescription, but rather one that has been propagated throughout history. The authors go 
on to mention that this is only the case in the private sector and not in the public sector. Since 
the Bargaining Councils covered by this Chapter all fall within the private sector, the condition 
was imposed, and individuals matching this description were removed.  
 
Lastly, specific occupations that were not covered by the Bargaining Councils (as stated in the 
government gazettes) were removed. This resulted in a sample that generally falls into the 
bracket of unskilled and semi-skilled (with little to no skilled individuals42).  
 
Having restricted the sample to only those individuals that meet the aforementioned criteria, a 
standardised grade structure was imposed on both datasets. This standardised grade structure 
                                                 
 
42 This is corroborated in Bhorat et al., (2009). 
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exists within some Bargaining Councils already, as these councils were used as the basis for the 
imposed structure. 
 
Each grade within a specific Bargaining Council represents a variety of occupations. Under this 
approach, a cleaner (along with other very low-skilled occupations) would be classified under 
a lower grade than what a driver (and other similarly skilled occupations) is. These grade 
structures vary from sub-sector to sub-sector. 
 
To illustrate how these grade structures may vary, the following example is considered. When 
considering the textile sector, if the “woven and crochet” sub-sector grade structure is compared 
with the “carpet” sub-sector grade structure (shown below), it is immediately noticeable that 
the “woven and crochet” sub-sector has a more disaggregated grade structure than that of the 
“carpet” sub-sector. Different grade structures exist within most of the captured sub-sectors, 
which brings a lot of disaggregation into the data. 
 
Woven and crochet43: 
 
𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐴1 <  𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐴2 <  𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐴3 <  𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐵1 <  𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐵2 <  𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐵3




𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 1 < 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 2 < 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 3 < 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 4 < 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 5                  (𝟒. 𝟐) 
                                                 
 
43 Grade A1 is the lowest skilled – i.e. has the lowest minimum wage. 
44 Grade 1 is the lowest skilled – i.e. has the lowest minimum wage. 
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In order to ensure comparability, this chapter created a standardised grade structure upon into 
which wages were reassigned, with Grade 1 being the least skilled and Grade 5 being the most 
skilled (shown below)45. For sub-sectors that assigned a unique minimum wage for each 
occupation, these occupations were manually assigned into the new grade structure based on 
the varying skill level that each distinct occupation entails46. With this standardised structure in 
hand, the PALMS data was reduced to the same form – assigning each occupation into its 
requisite grade.  
 
𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 1 < 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 2 < 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 3 < 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 4 < 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 5                  (𝟒. 𝟑) 
  
With the PALMS dataset having been adequately restricted to only those employees who are 
covered by a Bargaining Council agreement, the dataset was matched with the BCMWD on 
four distinct variables, namely: year, sector, region, and grade. This resulted in a matched 
dataset that contains employment and wage information at the individual level, along with the 
minimum wage that said individual should receive, with that minimum wage depending on the 
year, sector, region, and grade that the individual falls into. 
 
4.4 BARGAINING COUNCILS AND THEIR EFFECTS 
This chapter exploits three key aspects of variation to identify the effect of Bargaining Councils 
on employment and wages: first, regional variation in coverage; second, time variation 
(different Bargaining Councils have rounds of collective bargaining at different times); and 
                                                 
 
45 (1) Least skilled; (2) Less skilled; (3) Average skilled; (4); More skilled; (5) Most skilled. 
46 These occupations were compared with similar occupations in other sub-sectors in order to gather an idea of 
what skill level should be assigned, as well as checking that minimum wages were higher for higher skilled 
individuals after reassignment had taken place 
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third, variation in wage levels for different occupations within a Bargaining Council (different 
occupational levels have different set wages for different sectors and these do not correspond 
across sectors). This variation, and the changes which occur after different rounds of collective 
bargaining, can then be used to examine whether these agreements are associated with wage 
outcomes, employment levels and employment by different sizes of firms. 
 
This chapter concludes with an exploration of the coverage of Bargaining Councils, whether or 
not there is a non-compliance of minimum wage agreements by employers, and the effect of 
Bargaining Council agreements on wages and employment.  
 
4.4.1 ESTIMATION OF BARGAINING COUNCIL COVERAGE 
Extending the work of Bhorat et al. (2009), this analysis begins by estimating the number of 
employees covered by Bargaining Council agreements for the three sectors of interest. Covered 
employees are defined in the same way as they were previously: namely, they are formal 
employees, working for a wage, with a written contract, in the private sector, and they are not 
managers, professionals, associate professionals, or technicians. The number of covered 
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Table 4.1: Estimated Bargaining Council coverage by percentage of total formal employment 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Clothing 107,545 95,004 98,869 90,654 88,761 97,284 85,956 
 (1.17%) (1.15%) (1.17%) (0.95%) (0.88%) (0.94%) (0.82%) 
Metal and 
Engineering 
288,577 271,471 256,295 267,185 267,701 260,303 219,030 
 (3.14%) (3.29%) (3.03%) (2.80%) (2.67%) (2.50%) (2.10%) 
Textiles 48,523 33,696 38,061 39,568 36,366 39,142 41,595 
 (0.53%) (0.41%) (0.45%) (0.41%) (0.36%) (0.38%) (0.40%) 
Total formal 
employment 
9,200,493 8,247,306 8,458,264 9,546,210 10,034,927 10,398,459 10,423,018 
 
A noticeable pattern emerges from the results in terms of coverage and its relationship with 
total formal employment – as one proceeds forward in time, total formal employment grows, 
while the percentage of employees covered by Bargaining Councils relative to total formal 
employment falls. This can potentially be partially explained by the fact that all three of the 
captured Bargaining Councils fall under the manufacturing (when talking about the sectoral 
organization in terms of national accounts), and in recent years, even though total formal 
employment has been growing in South Africa (in absolute terms), there has been a decline in 
the number of employees in the manufacturing sector (SARB, 2016). 
 
Noting the decline in employment in the manufacturing sector, attention is turned to the 
coverage of the three Bargaining Councils, relative to total formal manufacturing employment.  
Table 4.2 illustrates that on average, the clothing Bargaining Council covers approximately 
6.7% of formal manufacturing employees, while metal and engineering, and textiles cover 
approximately 18.6% and 2.8% respectively. These three Bargaining Councils alone cover 
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approximately 28% of all formal manufacturing employees – again validating the choice of 
these three councils for analysis47. 
 
Table 4.2: Estimated Bargaining Council coverage by percentage of total formal 
manufacturing employees 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Clothing 107,545 95,004 98,869 90,654 88,761 97,284 85,956 
 (7.43%) (7.06%) (7.14%) (6.28%) (6.14%) (6.85%) (6.34%) 
Metal and 
Engineering 
288,577 271,471 256,295 267,185 267,701 260,303 219,030 
 (19.95%) (20.18%) (18.52%) (18.52%) (18.52%) (18.32%) (16.15%) 
Textiles 48,523 33,696 38,061 39,568 36,366 39,142 41,595 


















Source: PALMS (2009-2015) and BCMWD, authors’ own calculations. 
 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 have expressed how many employees are covered by the three Bargaining 
Councils in question, relative to both total formal employment, and total formal manufacturing 
employment. The result is that a sizable portion of employees are covered by these three 
Bargaining Councils alone, and as a consequence, a large portion of employees are therefore 
entitled to some form of minimum wage. However, as implied by Bhorat et al. (2011) and Basu 
et al. (2010), the existence of a minimum wage, and employees actually earning said minimum 
wage are not mutually exclusive. The following section of this chapter is dedicated to 
quantifying the gap between reported earnings and prescribed minimum wages. 
 
                                                 
 




Chapter 4: Employment Effects of Bargaining Council Decisions: An Analysis of Minimum Wages in South Africa 
 
104 
4.4.2 THE GAP BETWEEN REPORTED REAL EARNINGS AND THE 
PRESCRIBED MINIMUM WAGE 
When utilising matched employment and minimum wage data, the existence of a minimum 
wage is by no means a guarantee that earnings reported by an employee will be greater than or 
equal to said minimum wage. An increasing body of literature outlines non-compliance with 
minimum wage agreements as the primary reason for this observed gap48. 
 
An employer that is covered by a Bargaining Council agreement yet fails to adhere to the 
conditions laid out therein can be considered to have been non-compliant with the agreement.  
It is the responsibility of the South African Department of Labour to monitor and enforce 
compliance with the agreements; this is done using a team of labour inspectors. If through the 
course of an inspection a firm is found to have violated the conditions of these agreements, the 
inspector issues a warning to the firm and gives said firm 21 days in which to comply. If at the 
end of 21 days the firm is still found to be non-compliant, the firm is issued with another written 
document, namely a compliance order (Bhorat et al., 2011). If at the end of the next 21 days, 
the firm is still non-compliant, the case is referred to the South African Labour Court, which 
will institute punitive measures upon the firm if the firm is found to be in contravention of the 
conditions of the agreement. However, there are caveats to the idea of non-compliance, the most 
notable being the idea of exemptions.  
 
An employer may apply to be exempt from some or all clauses of the extension of the 
Bargaining Council agreement. This application will then be considered by the respective 
Bargaining Council, and a decision will be made as to whether or not the application for 
exemption will be accepted or denied. There can be up to nine criterions upon which the 
                                                 
 
48 See Bhorat et al., 2011; Ronconi, 2008; Andalόn & Pages, 2008; Lemos, 2009; and Maloney & Nuňes, 2003. 
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Bargaining Council makes its decision, and it is unknown what weight each criterion carries in 
the decision-making process (Godfrey, 2006).  These exemptions are the most critical way in 
which an SMME may be able to bypass the extension of these agreements if it cannot comply 
with the requirements49. 
 
According to Bhorat et al. (2011), South Africa has a large degree of non-compliance of 
Bargaining Council agreements by employers – especially with respect to the prescribed 
minimum wage. The authors utilise 2007 South African labour force data and estimate that, on 
average, 44% of workers covered by a bargaining agreement are paid a wage below the 
minimum50; furthermore, the authors estimate that the average shortfall was approximately 35% 
of the prescribed minimum wage. These figures are extremely high and give reason for alarm. 
However, it is likely that these numbers have been over-estimated; upon inspection of Bhorat 
at al. (2011), this chapter has identified three elements that could be influencing this potential 
over-estimation. 
 
The first element is that of the matching procedure. Bhorat et al. (2011), mention that employees 
are matched with minimum wages, however, no further discussion is offered as to how this is 
carried out– this in and of itself could be leading to an overstatement of the level of non-
compliance. Rigorous matching is essential to ensure that the worker under consideration from 
employment data is actually entitled to the prescribed minimum wage that said worker has been 
matched with. Inability to do so accurately could lead to a situation whereby the level of non-
compliance is either over or under-estimated. 
                                                 
 
49 Anecdotal evidence suggests that a key element in the Bargaining Councils’ decision-making process is the 
profitability of the firm – if the firm is shown to be profitable, the request for exemption is often denied. 
50 44% is the average percentage of employees that work below minimum wage, whilst covered by a Bargaining 
Council agreement; when considering each sector individually, this percentage varied between 8 and 70 percent.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 




The second element is one that all researchers have to be aware of when utilising surveyed wage 
data - the issue of systematic underreporting. Underreporting can be caused by a variety of 
factors, including (but not limited to) an employee not taking taxation and benefits into account 
when reporting wages, an employee’s inability to remember their actual earnings accurately, as 
well as “motivated mis-remembering” whereby individuals underreport their wage in order to 
ensure a continuation of any monetary support by the state (Moore et al., 1997; Finn, 2015). 
Taking both of these aforementioned elements into account, it is possible that what is reported 
by Bhorat et al. (2011) is an overestimation of non-compliance.  
 
The final element is that of exemptions – without being able to accurately identify how many 
employers (and consequently their employees) are exempt from the minimum wage, it is 
difficult to categorically state that the reason for the observed gap between reported earnings 
and the minimum wage is due to non-compliance. 
 
While this chapter has been circumspect with regard to matching, attempting to limit this over-
estimation by utilising the new, standardised grade structure upon which workers were matched 
with their respective, prescribed minimum wage, there is still a distinct possibility that 
underreporting of wages in the PALMS dataset does exist. This chapter does attempt to control 
for a variety of factors to limit the effect of this potential underreporting. However, there is no 
perfect set of controls that can completely offset the effects of this potential underreporting.  
 
Ultimately, to truly untangle the issue of non-compliance from matching issues, under-
reporting, and lack of data of exemptions, more complete data are required. It is for these 
reasons that this chapter focuses on the gap between reported earnings and the prescribed 
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minimum wage and is excessively circumspect when making claims that this gap could stem 
from non-compliance. 
 
The rest of this section unpacks this wage gap via three methods, the first being that of a 
graphical approach whereby kernel density functions are estimated to illustrate the distribution 
of wages relative to the prescribed minimum wage. The second approach follows a family of 
indices measuring differences between prescribed minima and reported wages51. Lastly, this 
chapter utilises regressions with a variety of controls to attempt to reduce the potential levels of 
underreporting.  
4.4.2.1 KERNEL DENSITY ESTIMATES OF THE GAP BETWEEN REPORTED 
EARNINGS AND PRESCRIBED MINIMA 
To begin analysis, a graphical approach is utilised in order to investigate the distribution of 
reported earnings by employees relative to the prescribed minimum wages – this is done across 
all three sectors, for all five grades, and for the time period: 2010 – 2014. This graphical 
approach takes the form of kernel density plot, whereby (x1, x2,… , xn) is an independent and 
identically distributed sample drawn from some distribution with an unknown density, f. To 

























)(ˆ        (4.4) 
 
where function K refers to the kernel, which determines the weights of the estimation, and h is 
the smoothing parameter (also known as the scale parameter) (Lancaster University, 2017). To 
                                                 
 
51 As outlined in Bhorat et al., (2011). 
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ensure smooth estimates, this chapter utilised an Epanechnikov kernel for K, where K(u) takes 
a value of )1(
4

















    (4.5) 
 
The results of these approximations are shown in figures 4.1 – 4.3, where the imposed vertical 
line represents the prescribed minimum wage relevant to each combination of sector, grade, and 
year. If workers received the minimum wage prescribed, it would be expected that there would 
be a spike in density around the vertical line, with no part of said density lying to the left of the 
minimum wage line52.  
 
Figure 4-1: Kernel density estimates of real earnings, clothing sector, (2010-2014) 
 
                                                 
 
52 For a more detailed discussion on Kernel Density Estimation please see Lancaster University (2017). 
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As can be seen from the preceding figures, a large degree of the considered combinations of 
sector, grade, and year show a density that peaks below the minimum wage line. This implies 
that there are a large number of employees across the considered sample that are earning below 
their prescribed minimum wage. As discussed in the previous section, this could be reflective 
of non-compliance by employers with minimum wage agreements; however, it is also likely 
that a degree of over-estimation is also reflected via these results. 
 
While this graphical approach affords meaningful insight into the story of the wage gap between 
reported earnings and their relevant prescribed minima, due to the variation of this gap between 
different grades and sectors, a more numerical approach may prove beneficial. 
 
4.4.2.2 MINIMUM WAGE SHORTFALL INDICES 
To investigate the gap between reported earnings and prescribed minima in more quantitative 
terms, this chapter follows a methodology laid out by Bhorat et al., (2011). This approach 
utilises a family of indices which are analogous to the family of poverty indices introduced in 
1984 by Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke. The approach allows for the calculation of the 
percentage of those who report earnings which are below the prescribed minimum wage, the 
normalised gap between the reported wage and minimum wage, as well as the normalised 


























                     (4.6) 
 
where w is the reported wage received by individual i, wmin is the minimum wage relevant to 
individual i, α is an index that emphasises concern about the size of the gap between reported 
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earnings and the relevant minima, and E is the expectation operator with respect to the wage 
distribution in the sector to which wmin applies (Bhorat et al., 2011). When α=0, the index 
collapses to a standard measure of the percentage of workers covered by a Bargaining Council 
agreement with reported wages below the prescribed minimum wage. When α=1, the index 
captures the size of the gap – more weight is placed on larger gaps as α increases. Lastly, when 
α=2, the square of the size of the gap is received. Table 4.3 depicts the weighted results of this 
analysis including the ratio, V1/ V0, which illustrates the average wage shortfall below the 
respective minima. 
 
Table 4.3: Estimates of minimum wage shortfall indices (by grade and sector) 
 V0 V1 V2 V1/ V0 
Clothing 0.67 0.27 0.14          0.40  
Least skilled 0.67 0.27 0.15          0.40  
Less skilled 0.69 0.27 0.14          0.39  
Average skill 0.40 0.16 0.09          0.40  
More skilled 0.54 0.22 0.13          0.41  
Most skilled 0.60 0.22 0.11          0.37  
Metal and Engineering 0.72 0.33 0.20          0.46  
Least skilled 0.84 0.43 0.27          0.51  
Less skilled 0.80 0.37 0.22          0.46  
Average skill 0.74 0.34 0.20          0.46  
More skilled 0.62 0.28 0.17          0.45  
Most skilled 0.60 0.29 0.18          0.48  
Textiles 0.55 0.23 0.13          0.42  
Least skilled 0.65 0.24 0.13          0.37  
Less skilled 0.61 0.28 0.17          0.46  
Average skill 0.43 0.19 0.10          0.44  
More skilled 0.37 0.17 0.10          0.46  
Most skilled 0.31 0.16 0.10          0.52  
Total 0.69 0.31 0.18          0.45 
Source: PALMS (2010-2014) and BCMWD, authors’ own calculations. 
 
 
Following the method laid out by Bhorat et al. (2011), it can be seen that the total share of 
employees below the minimum wage is close to 70%, while the average wage shortfall per 
employee (V1/ V0) is approximately 45%. Employees in the “more skilled”, and “most skilled” 
classification have the lowest incidence of being paid below the prescribed minimum, while 
employees in “less skilled” and “least skilled” have a significantly higher probability of being 
paid below the minimum wage. At 72% of employees paid under the relevant minima, and an 
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average of the wage being 46% less than the prescribed minima, the metal and engineering 
sector seems to be representative of the largest gap between reported real earnings and the 
prescribed minimum wage.  
 
These results are congruent with the findings of Bhorat et al. (2011) and fall within a similar 
range to that of other developing countries53. These findings promote the idea that non-
compliance is evidently very present, and that it is contributing to the gap between reported real 
earnings and the legislative minima. As stated previously, there is likely to be a degree of 
overestimation present in these findings; however, it is unlikely that this potential 
overestimation can override the conclusion that there is a large degree of non-compliance 
amongst employers with regard to the minimum wages in the sectors that this chapter considers. 
Irrespective, the chapter will proceed with a series of regressions to control for underreporting 
of wages in the following section. 
 
4.4.2.3 REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE WAGE SHORTFALL 
In this chapter’s final attempt to unpack the gap between reported earnings, and prescribed 
minimum wages, a series of regressions are used. These regressions control for various factors 
which should limit the effect of underreporting on results, allowing the chapter to make a more 
substantial comment on the topic of non-compliance. This chapter utilises both Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regressions and quantile regressions; OLS is completed with multiple 
specifications in order to ensure robust results, and quantile regressions are based on the 
subsequent preferred specification.  
 
                                                 
 
53 See Andalόn & Pages, 2008; Lemos, 2009; and Maloney & Nuňes, 2003; Murahwa, 2016. 
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The OLS regression takes the form of: 
 
ikiii XRMWRRE  ++=− 1)ln()ln(      (4.7) 
 
where ln(RRE)i  is the reported real earnings of an individual, and ln(RMW)i is the real minimum 
wage applicable to the same individual. Xki is a vector containing control variables such as 
sector of employment of the individual, grade of individual, age and experience of the 
individual, province, firm size, gender, and race. The constant and disturbance term are 
provided by α and ε respectively.  
 
Quantile regressions are utilised in order to investigate effects of explanatory variables at 
different points in the distribution of the difference between reported earnings, and the 
respective minimum wage. While through OLS estimation, a sample mean is derived through 
the minimising of the sum of squared residuals, quantile regressions derive the sample median 
through the minimisation of the sum of absolute residuals. The quantile regression estimator 
















' )1()(   (4.8) 
 
The above function provides the solution for the qth quantile, where 0 < q < 1 54, facilitating the 
estimation of Q at any point in the distribution of the variable of interest (i.e. the dependent 
                                                 
 
54 Where q=0.5, estimation is conducted at the median, whereas OLS provides estimation at the mean. 
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variable). yi is the difference between real reported earnings and the real minimum wage, while 
xi is a vector of control variables (Baum, 2013).  
 
4.4.2.3.1 ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES 
As mentioned in the previous section, OLS is run under multiple specifications, namely: (i) firm 
characteristics only, (ii) firm and employee characteristics, and (iii) firm and employee 
characteristics including year dummies. The results of these specifications are shown in table 
4.4. 
 
Table 4.4: Ordinary Least Squares estimation of the logged difference between reported real 
earnings, and real minimum wage, under multiple specifications 







Sector (Clothing=Base)    
Metal and Engineering -0.240*** -0.464*** -0.467*** 
 (0.024) (0.032) (0.032) 
Textiles 0.097*** 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
Firm size (Small=Base)    
Medium/Large 0.050** 0.080*** 0.088*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Province (Gauteng=Base)    
Western Cape -0.106*** -0.092* -0.082* 
 (0.029) (0.040) (0.040) 
Eastern Cape -0.020 -0.072 -0.071 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Northern Cape -0.370*** -0.350** -0.347** 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.106) 
Free State -0.290*** -0.242*** -0.240*** 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) 
KwaZulu-Natal -0.123*** -0.172*** -0.169*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
North West 0.014 0.041 0.041 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
Mpumalanga 0.333*** 0.309*** 0.302*** 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) 
Limpopo -0.495*** -0.425*** -0.378*** 
 (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) 
Race (Black=Base)    
Coloured  0.074* 0.067 
  (0.037) (0.037) 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
Chapter 4: Employment Effects of Bargaining Council Decisions: An Analysis of Minimum Wages in South Africa 
  
115 
Indian/Asian  0.354*** 0.345*** 
  (0.044) (0.044) 
White  0.570*** 0.564*** 
  (0.043) (0.043) 
Grade ((5) - Most skilled = Base)    
(1) - Least skilled  0.004 0.002 
  (0.042) (0.042) 
(2) - Less skilled  -0.074* -0.071 
  (0.038) (0.038) 
(3) - Average skilled  -0.009 -0.005 
  (0.037) (0.037) 
(4) - More skilled  0.113** 0.111** 
  (0.041) (0.040) 
Experience  0.004** 0.004** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Gender (Male=Base)    
Female  -0.249*** -0.251*** 
  (0.025) (0.024) 
Years of education  0.047*** 0.047*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Hours worked in last 7 days  -0.001 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Year (Base=2010)    
2011   -0.018 
   (0.029) 
2012   -0.077* 
   (0.030) 
2013   -0.154*** 
   (0.030) 
2014   -0.216*** 
   (0.030) 
Constant -0.175*** -0.504*** -0.421*** 
 (0.033) (0.085) (0.087) 
Observations 8924 8831 8831 
Source: PALMS (2010-2014) and BCMWD, authors’ own calculations. 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses 
  *p<0.05   ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001 
 
Across all three specifications, certain commonalities emerge – the first being that of a 
significant, negative constant55. This implies a negative difference between real reported 
earnings and the real minimum wage, indicating that a significant portion of individuals are 
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earning less than the prescribed minima. Secondly, individuals employed by medium or large 
firms56 are shown to have an approximately 5% larger differential (i.e. more likely to pay above 
minimum wage) than those employed by small firms57, implying that these employees are more 
likely to be paid above the minimum wage 
 
The third finding is that relative to the clothing sector, textiles are not significantly different, 
and the coefficient indicates almost no change when switching from clothing to textiles. 
However, metal and engineering indicate a much larger, significant difference when switching 
from clothing. This difference indicates that individuals in metal and engineering have a 24% 
larger wage gap58 than those individuals in clothing. These findings reiterate what was shown 
in table 4.3, whereby clothing and textiles were shown to have similar wage gaps and metal and 
engineering had the highest wage gap of the considered sectors. The final commonality 
indicates that all provinces (except for Mpumalanga) characterise a larger wage gap relative to 
individuals employed within Gauteng.  
 
The inclusion of individual characteristics illustrates effects that are to be expected within the 
South African context. Females demonstrate a significant, larger wage gap relative to males 
(25% larger); years of education, and years of experience are shown to have a significant 
positive effect, thus reducing the gap between reported real earnings and real minima by 
approximately 4.7%, and 4% respectively. All races are shown to have a smaller wage gap 
relative to the one experienced by black workers, with white workers having a gap that is 
approximately half that of black workers. 
                                                 
 
56 Firm size specification is based on the National Small Business Act 102 of 1996, whereby small firms have less 
than 50 employees, medium firms have less than 100 employees, and large firms have in excess of 100 employees. 
57 When looking at specification (i). 
58 When looking at specification (i). 
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Over time, there appears to be a widening of the wage gap. This could be reflective of economy 
wide factors, including the economic slowdown in South Africa, which had a pronounced effect 
on the manufacturing sector (under which all three of these considered sub-sectors fall). Chapter 
2 has already shown South Africa to be an economy which is very adept at switching between 
capital and labour when costs are exacerbated in terms of labour. With decreasing economic 
returns due to slowed growth (World Bank, 2015), it is possible that firms did not keep up with 
wage updating, allowing for the widening of the wage gap over time. 
 
Grade is shown to have an ambiguous effect on the wage gap experienced by workers. When 
compared to the most skilled workers, it is seen that those falling into group (2) and (3), less 
skilled, and average skilled respectively, have a larger wage gap than that of the most skilled 
workers. However, employees falling into the least skilled (1) and more skilled (4) categories 
are shown to have a smaller wage gap than employees in the most skilled category. Barring the 
effect on group (4), the rest of the coefficients are insignificant, implying that the grade or 
occupation of an employee may not have a significant bearing on how likely they are to be paid 
above or below the prescribed minimum wage.  
 
Strangely, as individual level controls are introduced, the wage gap grows in magnitude (i.e.  
the constant becomes larger in absolute value). This is contrary to expectations, as these 
covariates should proxy for groups who systematically under-report wages. As a result, it does 
not seem that these controls are capturing systematic patterns of under-reporting in wages. As 
a result, specification (i) is the preferred specification of the model, combining firm and 
individual characteristics, as well as a time component; as a result, all subsequent discussion 
will centre on this specification. 
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4.4.2.3.2 QUANTILE REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
Building on specification (i) as discussed in the previous section, the quantile regression 
estimates of the model are shown in table 4.5. 
 
Similar findings emerge through the quantile regressions as to what was shown vis-à-vis the 
OLS estimation. In almost all quantiles, metal and engineering employees are shown to have a 
larger incidence of a negative wage gap relative to the clothing industry. The textile industry 
now exhibits a significant difference relative to the clothing industry above the 50th quantile.  
 
Firm size emerges as a significant determinant for the wage gap; those employed by medium 
or large firms experience a larger wage gap (i.e. more likely to pay above minimum wage) than 
those employed by small firms, but only at the upper end of the distribution. This result could 
speak to what was expressed by Moll’s (1996) model, where it was shown that small firms are 
less likely to be able to absorb the prescribed minimum wage costs assigned by Bargaining 
Councils. Thus, what these results seem to reflect is that smaller firms are more likely to pay 
employees beneath the minimum wage, as they cannot keep up with the wage as easily as their 
medium and large counterparts. 
 
Table 4.5: Quantile estimation of the logged difference between reported real earnings, and 













     
Metal and Engineering -0.464*** -0.310*** -0.197*** -0.0736** -0.0198  
(0.054) (0.029) (0.022) (0.025) (0.042) 
Textiles 0.00682 0.0596 0.137*** 0.254*** 0.215***  
(0.080) (0.043) (0.032) (0.037) (0.063) 
Province (Gauteng=Base) 
   
Western Cape -0.226*** -0.0907* -0.104*** -0.118*** -0.121*    
(0.065) (0.036) (0.027) (0.030) (0.052) 
Eastern Cape -0.0794 -0.0825 -0.06 -0.00703 -0.0736  
(0.093) (0.050) (0.038) (0.043) (0.073) 
Northern Cape -0.239 -0.141 -0.238* -0.144 -0.286 
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(0.238) (0.129) (0.097) (0.109) (0.188) 
Free State -0.151 -0.323*** -0.399*** -0.375*** -0.516***  
(0.099) (0.054) (0.040) (0.045) (0.078) 
KwaZulu-Natal -0.143* -0.196*** -0.223*** -0.164*** -0.159**   
(0.066) (0.036) (0.027) (0.030) (0.052) 
North West 0.077 -0.0395 -0.0431 -0.111* -0.232*    
(0.115) (0.063) (0.047) (0.053) (0.091) 
Mpumalanga -0.0726 0.0624 0.222*** 0.363*** 0.573***  
(0.129) (0.070) (0.052) (0.059) (0.102) 
Limpopo -0.314 -0.579*** -0.629*** -0.570*** -0.444**   
(0.210) (0.114) (0.085) (0.096) (0.166) 
Firm size (Small=Base) 
   
Medium/Large 0.021 0.044* 0.053** 0.064** 0.081*    
(0.047) (0.025) (0.019) (0.021) (0.037) 
Constant -0.958*** -0.513*** -0.104*** 0.212*** 0.654***  
(0.072) (0.039) (0.029) (0.033) (0.057) 
Observations 8831 8831 8831 8831 8831 
Source: PALMS (2010-2014) and BCMWD, authors’ own calculations. 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses 
  *p<0.05   ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001 
 
4.4.2.4 CONCLUSIONS ON THE GAP BETWEEN REPORTED EARNINGS AND 
PRESCRIBED MINIMA 
From all of the preceding sets of results, it is clear that there is a wage gap between the real 
reported earnings of an employee, and the prescribed minimum wage that should be received. 
As this chapter has stated before, there are numerous factors that could lead to an over-
estimation of this result. However, even when controlling for these factors (as best as this 
chapter can without having richer data), the wage gap is still present. It appeared that that these 
control variables (and in fact any variables within the PALMS dataset) are incapable of 
capturing systematic underreporting of wages – if the underreporting of wages could even be 
considered systematic at all. 
 
The omnipresent wage gap that reveals itself reinforces the findings of Bhorat et al. (2011), 
whereby the authors claim that there is a significant amount of non-compliance with these 
Bargaining Council agreements by employers. This chapter has found that even when 
controlling for factors that influence the underreporting of real wages, this wage gap still exists. 
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While it is possible that this is purely indicative of non-compliance with minimum wages, it is 
also plausible that if each worker systematically under-reported wages in the same way, that a 
similar result may be obtained. However, without easily accessible administrative data59 – 
particularly at a worker level - this thesis is unable to unpack this any further, leaving this to be 
considered for future work. 
 
This non-compliance could be indicative of a firm’s inability to keep up with minimum wages, 
especially in an increasingly competitive time frame in the South African economy. Results 
revealed that it is small firms that have employees that are most critically underpaid with respect 
to the prescribed minimum wage, reinforcing Moll’s (1996) model and illustrating that these 
firms are potentially the hardest hit by increasing labour legislation. 
 
4.4.3 EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT 
This chapter’s analysis of employment differs from past studies in one fundamental way – rather 
than utilising Bargaining Council coverage as an independent variable, it instead utilises 
whether or not there was a new Bargaining Council agreement issued60.  
 
Conceptually the terms sound similar, thus digression is necessary. Bargaining Council 
coverage is an estimate of how many individuals fall within the criterion that defines the 
coverage of a particular Bargaining Council. A Bargaining Council agreement, on the other 
hand, can only exist for those who are covered by a Bargaining Council. These agreements are 
typically issued periodically and contain updated conditions which must be met by an employer 
                                                 
 
59 Through the form of payslips, financial statements, etc. 
60 This is done, because as it was explained earlier on in this paper, every individual within the matched dataset 
is assumed to be covered by a Bargaining Council. 
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with respect to employees. Not all conditions of employment change with each new agreement; 
however, minimum wages are always part of the conditions that are updated.  
 
Employers and firms are likely to react negatively to changes that increase operating costs, such 
as increased wages or increased labour regulation. Firms and employers are more likely to 
restructure operations and switch to more capital-intensive measures when labour regulations 
are changed (or increased) to better the conditions of an individual’s employment. Thus, it is 
crucial to unpack the effects that Bargaining Councils have had on South African employment. 
 
This chapter will now proceed to analyse the effect on employment when a new bargaining 
agreement is extended to employers and employees.  
 
This section follows a similar methodology to section 4.4.2.3, except that the OLS regression 
for this section is stated as: 
 
ikiii XBCAL  +++= 21)log(   (4.9) 
 
where ln(L)i  is the log of employment. BCAi is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a 
new Bargaining Council agreement had been issued that was applicable to individual i. Xki is a 
vector containing control variables such as sector of employment of the individual, grade of 
individual, union status of an individual, province, firm size, gender, and race. The constant and 
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After selection of the preferred specification, quantile regressions are utilised in order to 
investigate effects of explanatory variables at different points in the distribution of the log of 
employment. The mathematical representation of these quantile regressions is expressed in 
equation (4.8). 
 
4.4.3.1 ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES 
As mentioned in the previous section, OLS is run under multiple specifications. The differences 
in these specifications range from the inclusion of firm effects, to individual effects, and the 
inclusion of different interaction terms. These results are shown in table 4.6. 
 
Across all specifications, the effect of a new agreement being present is shown to be significant 
and negative, implying that the presence of new agreements results in a decrease in the log of 
employment. This is congruent with the findings of Magruder (2012), which stated that the 
presence of Bargaining Council agreements can be shown to cause a reduction in the levels of 
employment within a labour force. Furthermore, under all specifications, where the coefficient 
of sector is shown to be significant, the coefficient is also positive, implying that out of the three 
sectors of interest in this chapter, the clothing sector shows the greatest negative change in the 
log of employment. 
 
Grade is shown to have a positive, significant effect on the log of employment for every grade 
relative to those individuals that are least skilled; however, this relationship only holds under 
specification (1). As more covariates are added the regression, the significance of this 
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This chapter considers specification (5) as the preferred specification of the model. The 
variables included match those of Bhorat et al. (2009), and this specification exhibits the largest 
explanatory power, whilst avoiding over-fitting. The rest of this discussion on these results will 
rest on specification (5). 
 
Union status, gender, race, province, and firm size are all shown to be significant determinates 
of the log of employment. The effect of unions is shown to have a negative effect on the log of 
employment when switching from individuals that are not part of a union, to individuals that 
are. Gender and race both exhibit results that are in accordance with a priori expectation – being 
female has a negative impact on the employment, whilst only white individuals relative to black 
workers show higher employment – this can be attributed to the larger presence of black 
workers in the South African labour force relative to coloureds, and Indians/Asians (SARB, 
2016). White individuals still show higher employment, as they represent the race with the 
lowest incidence of unemployment within the South African labour market (SARB, 2016).  
 
Firm size shows a significant negative coefficient, implying that medium or large firms are 
absorbing 3% less of the log of employment, relative to small firms. This fact is not too 
surprising since according to Abor and Quartey (2010), small businesses contribute 
approximately 57% to the South African GDP and are responsible for approximately 61% of 
South African employment. Looking at the interaction of new agreements and firm size, it is 
noticeable that an insignificant effect is experienced, implying that the effect of the presence of 
a new Bargaining Council agreement does not rely on firm size. 
 
Considering the effects of other interaction terms included in the model leads to some 
interesting results. It is immediately noticeable that the interaction between an employee’s grade 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
Chapter 4: Employment Effects of Bargaining Council Decisions: An Analysis of Minimum Wages in South Africa 
 
124 
and the presence of a new bargaining agreement is shown to have no significant effect. This 
implies that any effect induced by new bargaining agreements does not differentiate between 
the grade or occupation of an individual, and that effects are more likely to be seen at a sectoral 
level. This is confirmed via the interaction between sector and new bargaining agreements. The 
result indicates that the metal and engineering sector is likely to have higher employment 
(relative to the clothing sector), when a new Bargaining Council agreement is introduced. The 
effect is the opposite for the textile sector, which indicates a more adverse effect on the log of 
employment when compared with the clothing sector. 
 
Having unpacked these effects at the aggregated mean level, this chapter now moves to its final 
set of estimations, whereby specification (5) is estimated via a series of quantile regressions. 
 













New Agreement (New.Agr) 
(Base=No) -0.037** -0.131*** -0.026* -0.090*** -0.084** 
 (0.014) (0.024) (0.012) (0.022) (0.0312) 
Sector      
Metal and engineering 0.207*** 0.063* 0.067*** -0.030 -0.047 
 (0.016) (0.029) (0.016) (0.027) (0.034) 
Textiles 0.092*** 0.223*** 0.009 0.103* 0.094* 
 (0.020) (0.048) (0.018) (0.042) (0.044) 
Grade ((1) - Least skilled = Base)      
(2) - Less skilled 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.045** 0.044** 0.096** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.035) 
(3) - Average skilled 0.040* 0.038* -0.002 -0.003 0.029 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.041) 
(4) - More skilled 0.070** 0.068** 0.040* 0.038 0.025 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.044) 
(5) - Most skilled 0.056* 0.056* 0.043* 0.043* 0.085 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.045) 
Union (Base=No) -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Total formal employment 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Firm size (Small=Base)      
Medium/Large -0.035** -0.036** -0.023* -0.024* -0.0377* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) 
Sector x New.Agr (Clothing x 
New.Agr = Base)      
Metal and Engineering x 
New.Agr  0.180***  0.122*** 0.144*** 
  (0.030)  (0.027) (0.037) 
Textiles x New.Agr  -0.149**  -0.106* -0.096* 
  (0.052)  (0.046) (0.048) 
Gender (Base=male)      
Female   -0.139*** -0.140*** -0.140*** 
   (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Race (Black=Base)      
Coloured   -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.107*** 
   (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Indian/Asian   -0.212*** -0.211*** -0.210*** 
   (0.021) (0.0210) (0.021) 
White   0.026 0.028 0.028 
   (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Province (Gauteng=Base)      
Western Cape   -0.373*** -0.371*** -0.370*** 
   (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Eastern Cape   -0.374*** -0.368*** -0.368*** 
   (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Northern Cape   -1.235*** -1.227*** -1.227*** 
   (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Free State   -0.724*** -0.715*** -0.714*** 
   (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
KwaZulu-Natal   -0.139*** -0.135*** -0.134*** 
   (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
North West   -0.454*** -0.451*** -0.452*** 
   (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Mpumalanga   -0.517*** -0.513*** -0.513*** 
   (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
Limpopo   -0.382*** -0.380*** -0.379*** 
   (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Firm Size x New.Agr 
(Small x New.Agr = Base)       
Medium/Large x New.Agr     0.0159 
     (0.0258) 
Grade x New.Agr ((1) x New.Agr  
= Base)      
(2) x New.Agr     -0.063 
     (0.039) 
(3) x New.Agr     -0.041 
     (0.045) 
(4) x New.Agr     0.0186 
     (0.0487) 
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(5) x New.Agr     -0.052 
     (0.050) 
Constant 5.760*** 5.914*** 6.255*** 6.357*** 6.342*** 
 (0.066) (0.069) (0.061) (0.064) (0.064) 
Observations 9468 9468 9140 9140 9140 
Adjusted R-squared 0.057 0.063 0.266 0.268 0.267 
Source: PALMS (2010-2014) and BCMWD, authors’ own calculations. 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses 
  *p<0.05   ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001 
 
 
4.4.3.2 QUANTILE REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
The quantile regression estimations help to confirm some of the findings from the previous 
analysis. 
 
Firstly, union status, gender, race, province, and firm size enter the specification in a similar 
way to OLS for the majority of the considered quantiles. Secondly, the presence of a new 
Bargaining Council agreement is still shown to have a significant effect, but only at the lower 
end of the distribution; the effect is still negative, implying that a presence of a new agreement 
reduces the log of employment, specifically including, and below the 50th percentile. 
 
Grade and the presence of a new Bargaining Council agreement interacted with grade show an 
insignificant impact on employment than what was seen under the OLS specification, and the 
same can be said for the interaction between firm size and the presence of a new agreement. 
However, the interaction of sector and the presence of a new agreement is still shown to have a 
significant impact. This impact, when considering metal and engineering relative to clothing, is 
still shown to be positive, specifically at the lower end of the distribution, whilst textiles show 
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New Agreement (New.Agr)      
(Base=No) -0.131** -0.076* -0.075* -0.077 -0.075 
 
(0.050) (0.036) (0.034) (0.040) (0.058) 
Sector      
Metal and engineering -0.153** -0.057 -0.089* -0.049 0.118 
 
(0.054) (0.039) (0.037) (0.043) (0.063) 
Textiles 0.016 0.090 0.085 0.067 0.199* 
 
(0.070) (0.050) (0.048) (0.056) (0.081) 
Firm size (Small=Base)      
Medium/Large -0.022 -0.028 -0.050* -0.084** -0.018 
 
(0.038) (0.027) (0.025) (0.030) (0.043) 
Sector#NAgr (Clothing x New.Agr = Base)      
Metal and Engineering x New.Agr 0.222*** 0.133** 0.146*** 0.120* 0.052 
 
(0.054) (0.042) (0.040) (0.047) (0.069) 
Textiles x New.Agr -0.021 -0.099 -0.078 -0.087 -0.214* 
 
(0.077) (0.055) (0.052) (0.061) (0.089) 
Grade ((1) - Least skilled = Base)      
(2) - Less skilled 0.087 0.043 0.113** 0.115** 0.005 
 
(0.056) (0.040) (0.038) (0.044) (0.065) 
(3) - Average skilled 0.085 0.034 0.041 0.039 -0.023 
 
(0.065) (0.046) (0.044) (0.052) (0.075) 
(4) - More skilled 0.093 0.062 0.067 0.030 -0.132 
 
(0.070) (0.050) (0.048) (0.056) (0.081) 
(5) - Most skilled 0.171* 0.080 0.149** 0.063 -0.016 
 
(0.072) (0.051) (0.049) (0.057) (0.083) 
Grade x New.Agr ((1) x New.Agr = Base)      
(2) x New.Agr -0.048 -0.036 -0.084* -0.079 0.032 
 
(0.062) (0.044) (0.042) (0.049) (0.072) 
(3) x New.Agr -0.084 -0.040 -0.027 -0.039 -0.022 
 
(0.072) (0.051) (0.048) (0.057) (0.083) 
(4) x New.Agr -0.088 -0.053 -0.045 -0.012 0.189* 
 
(0.078) (0.056) (0.053) (0.062) (0.090) 
(5) x New.Agr -0.140 -0.064 -0.110* -0.058 -0.021 
 
(0.080) (0.057) (0.054) (0.063) (0.092) 
Firm Size x New.Agr 
(Small x New.Agr  = Base)       
Medium/Large x New.Agr 0.008 0.021 0.031 0.042 -0.005 
 
(0.041) (0.030) (0.028) (0.033) (0.048) 
Union (Base=No) -0.013 -0.033** -0.037*** -0.026* -0.035 
 
(0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.0189) 
Gender (Base=male)      
Female -0.189*** -0.129*** -0.121*** -0.127*** -0.154*** 
 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022) 
Race (Black=Base)      
Coloured -0.078** -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.086*** -0.165*** 
 
(0.029) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.034) 
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Indian/Asian -0.385*** -0.231*** -0.103*** -0.062* -0.090* 
 
(0.034) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.039) 
White -0.087** -0.011 0.079*** 0.153*** 0.090* 
 
(0.033) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.038) 
Province (Gauteng=Base)      
Western Cape -0.368*** -0.359*** -0.352*** -0.369*** -0.398*** 
 
(0.031) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.036) 
Eastern Cape -0.408*** -0.313*** -0.271*** -0.310*** -0.384*** 
 
(0.032) (0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.037) 
Northern Cape -1.394*** -1.248*** -1.112*** -1.167*** -1.282*** 
 
(0.076) (0.054) (0.052) (0.060) (0.088) 
Free State -0.686*** -0.667*** -0.704*** -0.736*** -0.738*** 
 
(0.036) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.041) 
KwaZulu-Natal -0.172*** -0.147*** -0.096*** -0.102*** -0.144*** 
 
(0.024) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.028) 
North West -0.522*** -0.481*** -0.410*** -0.370*** -0.378*** 
 
(0.040) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.046) 
Mpumalanga -0.520*** -0.529*** -0.450*** -0.453*** -0.597*** 
 
(0.046) (0.033) (0.031) (0.036) (0.053) 
Limpopo -0.426*** -0.333*** -0.313*** -0.338*** -0.449*** 
 
(0.071) (0.051) (0.048) (0.056) (0.082) 
Total formal employment 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 5.663*** 5.853*** 6.220*** 6.730*** 7.398*** 
 
(0.106) (0.076) (0.072) (0.084) (0.123) 
Observations 9140 9140 9140 9140 9140 
Source: PALMS (2010-2014) and BCMWD, authors’ own calculations. 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses 
  *p<0.05   ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001 
 
4.4.3.3 CONCLUSIONS ON THE EFFECTS OF BARGAINING COUNCILS ON 
EMPLOYMENT 
The estimation of employment effects induced by new Bargaining Council agreements has 
added to the existing literature by exploring the topic of employment and its relationship with 
Bargaining Councils in a way that has not been done with regard to the South African labour 
market before. Rather than estimating the effects on employment by whether or not an employee 
is covered by a Bargaining Council, this chapter utilised a sample whereby all individuals are 
members of a Bargaining Council already and estimated the impact of updated Bargaining 
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The results speak to the idea that the introduction of new agreements does decrease 
employment, thus having a negative effect on employment within the South African labour 
market. This magnitude of this effect has a sectoral component to it, but it does not seem to be 
influence by the grade (occupation) of an employee, nor by the size of the firm where an 
employee is hired. Conventional covariates exhibit the expected signs and magnitudes, whereby 
employment is directly affected by the race, gender, location, union status, years of experience, 
and years of education of employee. 
 
On a holistic level, these results reinforce the finding of Magruder (2012), which stated that the 
existence of Bargaining Council agreements had a detrimental effect on South African labour 
market outcomes, especially that of employment. Magruder (2012) also found that this effect is 




Bargaining Council agreements are the outcome of a complex bargaining process. This chapter 
set out to explore the relationship between Bargaining Council agreements and labour market 
outcomes in South Africa. By exploiting different forms of variation within the way Bargaining 
Councils assign minimum wages in their agreements, this chapter was able to unpack the effects 
of these agreements in terms of wages and employment in the South African labour market. 
 
Focusing on three sub-sectors (clothing, metal and engineering, and textiles), this chapter 
utilised a dataset which is comprised of the minimum wages prescribed by each of the respective 
Bargaining Councils at different points in time. Matching this data with employment and 
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earnings data from the PALMS dataset, this chapter was able to estimate effects associated with 
Bargaining Council agreements. 
 
The introduction of new Bargaining Council agreements is associated with decreased 
employment, which was shown to be around 8%. This size of this decrease is lowest in the 
metal and engineering industry, while clothing and textiles exhibit a similar level to each other. 
When interacting the grade (occupation) of an employee and the size of the firm in which they 
are employed with an indicator for whether or not a new Bargaining Council agreement was 
present, the effect was shown to be insignificant – implying that the effect of the introduction 
of new Bargaining Council agreements exists only at a sectoral level, and does not differentiate 
between firm size, or the occupation of an employee. 
 
This chapter studied the effect of Bargaining Council agreements on wages in a unique way by 
looking at the relationship between Bargaining Council agreements, and the wage received by 
employees. This effect was estimated by regressing the difference between the reported real 
earnings of an employee and the prescribed minimum wage that said employee should have 
received on a number of covariates. This chapter concludes that even when controlling for 
factors that influence the underreporting of real wages this gap is large, standing at an 
approximate value of 42% - that is, the average employee reports earnings 42% below their 
prescribed minimum wage. 
 
These conclusions spark concern surrounding South African labour market regulation. 
Bargaining Councils seem to be associated with the opposite of the outcomes that they aim to 
achieve – instead of promoting employment, the introduction of a new Bargaining Council 
agreement is shown to actually decrease employment. Furthermore, rather than having 
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employees earn above a prescribed minimum wage, most workers still appear to be earning 
below their prescribed minima – inspiring the idea that the enforcement of this particular branch 
of labour legislation is perhaps not effective enough. 
 
Bargaining Councils are an integral part of the complex South African labour system, and they 
have a significant role to play in the transformation of the post-apartheid landscape that the 
country finds itself in. The results from this chapter illustrate that the effects of Bargaining 
Councils in their current format are not achieving their goals of increasing wages and 
employment for those in the labour market who remain most vulnerable. If South Africa is to 
truly achieve its goals of reducing unemployment and inequality, then perhaps the Bargaining 
Council system needs to be revisited and adjusted in a way that it can truly benefit the 
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 South African Labour Productivity 
and the Impact of Bargaining 
Councils: An Analysis of Labour 
Productivity in South Africa’s 
Manufacturing Sector 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Labour productivity61 is one of the most essential determinants of a country’s income level, yet 
it is a measure that is often misunderstood. In its simplest state, labour productivity is measured 
as output, either by gross output or value-added, per unit of labour. At an aggregated level, 
comparisons of labour productivity levels are easy to make because estimates of GDP, 
population and employment are available for most countries. However, estimates of labour 
productivity levels for the economy as a whole do not provide insights in the sectoral 
composition of productivity, nor do they provide insights into the relationship with firm size. 
 
Rising aggregate labour productivity is often thought to be a good thing. But this is not 
necessarily always the case, especially in a high unemployment economy such as South 
Africa’s. Higher aggregate levels of labour productivity may be triggered by employees actually 
becoming more productive, or it may be due to a reallocation of the labour profile away from 
less productive workers. Advances in technology and an increase in capital intensity of a firm 
can also lead to an increase in labour productivity. If this increase in labour productivity is 
coming at the expense of increased employment rates, this should be considered a negative 
policy outcome. 
                                                 
 
61 For the purposes of this paper, labour productivity refers to output per full-time employee. 
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Despite the agreed-upon importance of labour productivity within the realms of South African 
economic policy debate, to date very little is known about the evolution of labour productivity 
in post-apartheid South Africa. This research becomes sparser when one considers the 
relationship between labour productivity and Bargaining Councils. According to Nattrass & 
Seekings (2012) “Bargaining Councils push some employers to restructure production in more 
capital and skill intensive directions. The result is job destruction (sic)”, creating a situation 
whereby this restructuring could lead to variations within labour productivity. 
 
Existing work on labour productivity in South Africa has mostly focused on aggregate figures 
and generally portrayed the observed increase in labour productivity levels as a positive 
outcome. In a country that is grappling with glaring unemployment issues, while trying to 
navigate an effective policy mix to remedy this issue, the study of labour productivity and its 
relation to Bargaining Councils should be considered vital. 
 
This chapter aims to unpack the effects of Bargaining Council agreements on labour 
productivity in two distinct ways: (i) at a sectoral level – utilising the created Bargaining 
Council Minimum Wage Dataset (BCMWD) it will be possible to match this with sectoral-level 
data and conduct an impact evaluation of these councils; (ii) at a firm-level – relying on firm 
level data, this chapter will unpack which firms (by way of firm characteristics) are most 
affected by Bargaining Council decisions. To examine these phenomena in South Africa focus 
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is placed only on the manufacturing sector, and consequently abstract from aggregate labour 
productivity changes that may be driven by shifts between broader sectors62. 
 
The results from this analysis can better inform ongoing discussions on collective bargaining in 
South Africa – especially in the more recent context whereby the Labour Relations Amendment 
Act (LRAA) (No.6 of 2014) (which came into effect on the 
1st January 2015) imposed changes on the South African labour market which sought to 
strengthen the influence and scope of these institutions. 
5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.2.1 LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND BARGAINING COUNCILS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
As previously mentioned, this chapter’s area of focus will be South Africa’s manufacturing 
sector. Figure 5.1 shows that aggregate labour productivity has been growing in South Africa 
since the start of democracy in 1994. Showcasing a relatively consistent rise in labour 
productivity year-on-year, apart from the period of the global financial crisis of 2008, the 
productivity index indicates a healthy (albeit decelerating) growth-rate of labour productivity 
for the time period in question. This is a finding that has been reiterated multiple times by 
various authors such as Klein (2012), Rankin (2016), Wittenberg (2014), Burger (2015), 
Manamela (2017), Statistics South Africa (2018), and the World Bank (2017). 
 
                                                 
 
62 This simplifying assumption is driven by the availability of data at (i) a sector level, (ii) a firm level, and (iii) a 
Bargaining Council level. A more in-depth discussion of this will be offered later in this paper. 
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Figure 5-1: Manufacturing labour productivity in South Africa (1994-2018) 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank series KBP7079L 
 
 
By comparing the growth of labour productivity in the manufacturing sector versus other sectors 
of the South African economy between 2011 and 2015 (see World Bank, 2017), it can be seen 
that manufacturing is the only sector within the economy to have maintained positive labour 
productivity growth (World Bank, 2017) throughout the five-year period. Consequently, 
through rigorous TFP analysis in 2018, the World Bank (2018) confirmed that this trend held 
until the end of the 2018 period. Harding & Rattsø (2010) attempted a comparison of labour 
productivity between the United States of America and South Africa for disaggregated sub-
sectors of manufacturing. It emerged that South Africa has positive labour productivity growth 
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The World Bank (2018) cites the restructuring of the manufacturing sector as the primary reason 
for the observed trend. This fact was reiterated by Rankin (2016), whereby it was noted that 
increases in labour productivity within the South African manufacturing sector are not driven 
by reallocation across industries, but rather by reallocations within them; this implies that these 
changes exist either between or within firms. Rankin (2016) goes further to state that these 
effects seem to differ with firm size, whereby smaller/medium firms become more labour 
productive relative to their larger counterparts. Rankin (2016) states that this effect does not 
seem to be driven by differences in capital intensity across differently sized firms, but rather is 
associated with changes in real labour costs. Part of the change in these real labour costs could 
be the presence of Bargaining Council agreements within the sub-sectors of the manufacturing 
sector. 
 
Klein (2012) studies labour productivity trends in South Africa over a long timeframe, using 
both macro and sector-level data. It is suggested that excessive real wage increases were 
associated with lower employment creation, and although real wages and labour productivity 
have a positive correlation in the long-term, substantial deviations from equilibrium do occur. 
Furthermore, South Africa’s relationship between real wages and labour productivity is weaker 
than in competitor countries, even when controlling for labour market tightness. South Africa’s 
real wage growth is also driven by other factors, which may include the presence of Bargaining 
Councils. 
 
South Africa’s Bargaining Councils are made up of the employer and employee representatives, 
and the decisions made by them, if these councils are deemed to be sufficiently representative 
of the sector, are assumed to operate “ergo omnes” – which means that these decisions are 
extended to all workers and firms in the sector, even those who were not part of the decision-
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making process. These Bargaining Councils set minimum wages for different employee levels 
and skillsets, which may differ by region. Typically, employees and employers of larger firms 
fill the positions of the representatives within the Bargaining Council structures. Borrowing 
from Moll (1996), in the absence of a Bargaining Council, large unionised firms would pay a 
privately bargained wage (wLU), while non-unionised firms and small firms would pay a wage 
dictated by market forces, (wMF). Since Bargaining Council agreements do exist in this context, 
there is a third wage possibility, (wBC). Due to the ergo omnes nature of Bargaining Councils, 
all firms within the sector would have to comply with the prescribed wage, wBC. It is presumed 
that wLU  > wBC > wMF, making it readily apparent that under a Bargaining Council agreement 
the wages for large unionised firms decrease, while the wages for small firms and large non-
unionised firms increase. The net result is that larger wages are forced onto smaller firms, 
compelling them to either restructure their labour force composition in favour of more skilled 
employees, or to exit the market (Rankin, 2016). 
 
Advocates for the existence of these Bargaining Councils make substantiated claims that their 
existence in South Africa is vital, particularly in a transformation context; minimum wages set 
by these Bargaining Councils have been argued to be necessary for supporting not only the 
employee, but said worker’s extended family due to the lingering effects of the apartheid 
regime63. Advocates further argue that the existence of Bargaining Councils and the extension 
of their decisions protects workers from low wages, long hours, and unhygienic conditions 
(Finnemore & van der Merwe, 1987).  
                                                 
 
63 These effects include (but are not limited to): an individual’s lack of skills; insufficient work experience of an 
individual due to being excluded from the workforce during apartheid. 
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However, critics of the collective bargaining system have shown the deleterious effects of the 
system, arguing that it places a special burden on small firms, increases business failures and 
discourages start-ups, and contributes to South Africa’s high unemployment rate. Magruder 
(2012) employed a spatial regression discontinuity and spatial fixed effects to show that 
Bargaining Councils in South Africa are associated with higher wages and lower employment 
in small firms, and that the employment per industry decreased by an estimated 8-13% due to 
Bargaining Council agreements. The loss in employment was largely concentrated in small 
firms – a finding which was further confirmed in chapter 4. 
As shown in the preceding discussion, the effects of Bargaining Councils in South Africa have 
been widely discussed in the past two decades64; however, what has yet to be unpacked is the 
effect of these Bargaining Councils on labour productivity, and consequently the effect of 
Bargaining Councils on the labour productivity of firms. 
 
5.2.2 MECHANISMS THROUGH WHICH LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY CAN 
CHANGE 
Starting with a simple production function, it is easy to illustrate and understand the 
mechanisms that may drive changes in labour productivity. Using gross output as the dependent 
variable, the production function can be represented as: 
 
);;;;( itititititit OMLKAfY =                        (5.1) 
 
                                                 
 
64 See Godfrey & Macun, 1991; Godfrey, 1992; Moll, 1996; Schultz & Mwabu, 1998; Butcher & Rouse, 2001; 
Bhorat et al., 2009; Magruder, 2012.  
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Where Yit is gross output, Ait is the level of technology in the economy, Kit is capital stock, Lit 
is the level of employment, Mit is the level of raw materials used in the production process, and 
Oit accounts for other indirect costs such as water, electricity, and transport. Maintaining a 
standard assumption of production functions, it is assumed that output strictly increases with 
the addition of any input. 
 
The first mechanism through which labour productivity can change can be seen by keeping the 
level of employment (Lit) fixed, and then raising either Kit, Mit, or Oit. Increases in any of these 
variables will lead to a rise in gross output (Yit), and as a consequence represent a higher level 
of labour productivity. 
 
The second mechanism through which labour productivity would rise could be triggered by a 
rise in the level of technology in the economy (Ait). A rise in this level of technology would 
imply that firms would produce more output with the same level of inputs (Lit, Kit, Mit, and Oit). 
This is typically an unobserved characteristic, and is thus captured within either the residual, or 
the error term of the model. 
 
The final mechanism through which a rise in labour productivity could be observed has to do 
with measurement, particularly for the measurement of inputs and outputs. Equation (5.1) treats 
labour as homogenous and does not account for the quality or productivity of the labourer in 
question – switching from unskilled employees to more skilled employees would result in a 
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Baseline theory dictates that an increase in labour productivity will typically stimulate the 
demand for labour, as each worker has the potential to produce more. However, according to 
Rankin (2016), the analysis of broad labour productivity trends has the potential to miss three 
fundamental concepts. The first is that rising labour productivity can be driven by changes in 
the factor intensity of other inputs – while this could increase labour utilised if higher levels of 
employment are required in the production process, it is also equally likely that employment 
levels would drop, especially if these inputs are strong substitutes for labour inputs. The second 
is the homogenous treatment of labour, neglecting within-employment changes – labour 
productivity will increase as individuals become more skilled, or if production is substituted 
towards employees with more education. The third is that the analysis of labour productivity 
typically misses the impact of the level of technology on the economy. 
5.3 DATA 
To examine labour productivity in South Africa, this chapter focuses exclusively on the 
manufacturing sector, abstracting from labour productivity changes that may be driven by shifts 
between broader sectors. A further reason for this restriction is that the bulk of Bargaining 
Councils exist within the manufacturing sector, as discussed in chapter 4, making the 
manufacturing sector a natural selection for the type of analysis that is being carried out. 
 
To conduct the sectoral analysis, a panel of data was drawn from EasyData by Quantec. 
EasyData is a service by offered by Quantec that offers a comprehensive collection of South 
African socio-economic and market indicators. For the purposes of this chapter data on capital, 
labour, output and employee remuneration was extracted by Quantec at a sub-sector level for 
the period of 1994 – 2018. This data was collated by Quantec from sources such as Statistics 
South Africa and the South African Reserve Bank. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
Chapter 5: South African Labour Productivity and the Impact of Bargaining Councils: An Analysis of Labour Productivity 




For the firm analysis conducted within this chapter, data is drawn from Statistics South Africa’s 
(Stats SA) Large Sample Survey (LSS), which was carried out in 2005 and 200865. The survey 
collects detailed firm-level information on output, employment, wages, and other financial 
statement line items. Since this survey is used as a component of South Africa’s National 
Account calculations, larger firms tend to be oversampled. To combat this, weights provided 
by Stats SA are imposed on the sample. 
 
To capture effects linked to Bargaining Councils for both the sectoral and firm-level analysis, 
the aforementioned dataset was matched with a Bargaining Council indicator from the 
Bargaining Council Minimum Wage Dataset66 (BCMWD). This indicator is structured in such 
a way that it is assigned a value of 1 if a Bargaining Council agreement exists for a particular 
sub-sector, in a particular year; if no such agreement exists then the indicator is assigned a value 
of 0. Since each indicator is disaggregated to a sub-sectoral level, matching of this indicator to 
Quantec data and the LSS was conducted on International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC) codes67. 
 
5.4 SECTOR LEVEL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
5.4.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Between 1995 and 2015, all manufacturing sub-sectors have shown positive growth over the 
20-year period, albeit it with extremely pronounced heterogeneity. The most productive sub-
                                                 
 
65 Naturally a longer time period would be preferred, but given the unavailability of good firm-level data in 
South Africa, this paper has to make concessions and choose the best option available. The best option available 
in this instance is the LSS for 2005 and 2008. 
66 A full discussion of the creation, cleaning, and descriptives of this dataset is available in chapter 3. 
67 Based on ISIC Revision 4. 
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sector in 2015, coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel, outstripped the labour productivity of wearing 
apparel (the least productive manufacturing sub-sector) by 10.5 times. The basic iron and steel 
products; casting of metal sub-sector was the best performer, illustrating a 4.55% increase over 
the period. 
Table 5.1: Industry Level Labour Productivity (R’000) 




R&D intensive industries 
Printing, recorded media 324-326 573 544 532 637 694 0.21 
Coke, petroleum and nuclear 
fuel 
331-333 2 823 6 827 4 511 4 300 4 456 0.58 
Basic chemicals 334 1 920 3 347 4 138 4 100 3 480 0.81 
Other chemical products 335-336 1 601 2 358 2 073 2 081 1 744 0.09 
Plastic products 338 556 561 691 754 614 0.10 
Basic iron and steel products; 
casting of metal 
351, 353 665 1 484 2 049 2 251 3 693 4.55 
Non-ferrous metal products 352 840 2 079 2 046 1 697 1 978 1.35 
Structural metal products 354 773 1 022 820 716 846 0.09 
Machinery and equipment 356-359 395 504 548 637 656 0.66 
Electrical machinery 361-366 606 887 948 1 110 1 024 0.69 
Radio, television and 
communication apparatus 
371-373 688 751 1 348 1 668 1 849 1.69 
Professional equipment 374-376 398 442 579 629 657 0.65 
Motor vehicles, parts and 
accessories 
381-383 639 1 104 1 534 1 835 1 723 1.70 
Other transport equipment 384-387 280 375 967 889 1 021 2.64 
        
Non-R&D intensive industries 
Food 301-304 579 724 993 1 228 1 186 1.05 
Beverages and tobacco 305-306 1 207 1 531 2 070 2 055 1 853 0.53 
Textiles 311-312 296 379 502 666 675 1.27 
Wearing apparel 313-315 174 175 184 342 422 1.42 
Leather and leather products 316 284 391 881 967 1 049 2.70 
Footwear 317 198 354 729 915 839 3.23 
Wood and wood products 321-322 436 454 567 772 747 0.71 
Paper and Paper Products 323 1 363 1 987 2 170 1 745 1 546 0.13 
Rubber products 337 454 764 918 1 234 1 196 1.63 
Glass and glass products 341 348 464 803 842 886 1.54 
Non-metallic mineral products 342 296 523 586 818 772 1.61 
Other fabricated metal 
products 
355 
329 434 458 644 622 0.89 
Furniture 381 233 334 407 606 537 1.31 
Other manufacturing groups 392, 395 579 812 954 1 315 1 406 1.43 
Manufacturing total       1.177 
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Within sector productivity growth68 1.170 
Between sector productivity growth 0.007 
Source: Quantec EasyData, Calculations by author 
 
Noting the heterogeneity present in the labour productivity growth of the sub-sectors, it is 
interesting to observe that almost all of the increases within manufacturing labour productivity 
have been driven by within-industry growth, with very little of the growth being driven by 
cross-industry reallocation. Rankin (2016) states that the reason for this observation may be due 
to higher labour productivity firms growing relative to lower productivity firms within these 
sub-sectors, or that there were compositional changes with a relatively higher level of exit rates 
for lower labour productivity firms. 
 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the growth of real labour productivity69 against 1995 labour productivity. 
The negative relationship between these two components indicates a “catching-up” behaviour 
by lower labour productivity sub-sectors - sub-sectors with lower initial labour productivity 
exhibited more labour productivity growth relative to sub-sectors with higher initial labour 
productivity, over the 20-year period;this finding is reiterated in Rankin (2016). Another 
possibility for this observed relationship could potentially be the restructuring that smaller firms 
are forced to take on due to higher wages brought on by Bargaining Council premia, causing 
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The systematic difference between sub-sectors with Bargaining Councils and those without 
starts to emerge when considering the difference in growth of various skill profiles in each of 
the two cohorts. Figure 5.3 illustrates the difference70 in growth rates of three skill compositions 
between sub-sectors with Bargaining Councils and those without. From this graph, it is apparent 
that sub-sectors with Bargaining Councils have been showing growth in skilled employees that 
has consistently outstripped the growth of sub-sectors without Bargaining Councils. Similarly, 
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it can be seen that sub-sectors without Bargaining Councils have a growing unskilled employee 
base, when compared with sub-sectors that have Bargaining Councils.  
Figure 5-3: Difference in growth rates of various skill profiles between sub-sectors with 




Figure 5.4 examines the relationship between real wage growth, and initial 1995 wages per sub-
sector. From this figure, it would appear that sub-sectors with lower initial wages show the 
highest wage growth. This coincides with the sentiment that sub-sectors with lower labour 
productivity are “catching up” with their higher labour productivity counterparts, utilising 
within-sub-sector restructuring and higher wages as the transmission mechanism to achieve 
higher growth.  
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Figure 5-4: Real wage growth (1995 to 2015) and 1995 real wages 
 
 
Figure 5.5 explores the relationship between labour productivity growth and wage growth. The 
positive relationship exhibited is well anchored within traditional economic theory. With all 
things being equal, higher labour productivity should increase demand for workers and result 
in an increase in wages as long as the labour supply curve is not perfectly elastic (Klein, 2012). 
Akerlof (1982) added to the argument for this positive relationship by suggesting higher real 
wages could lead to greater effort from workers, while Wakeford (2004) posited that it is these 
higher real wages that put upward pressure on labour costs, causing firms to substitute capital 
for labour, consequently increasing the marginal productivity of labour. 
 
Empirical evidence typically supports the theory of a long-term co-integrating link between 
growth in labour productivity and growth in the real wage and has been demonstrated in 
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States of America (Strauss & Wohar, 2004); and South Africa (Wakeford, 2004), (Klein, 2012), 
(Rankin, 2016).  
 




In summary, these results indicate: (i) That much of labour productivity growth happened 
within sub-sectors, rather than between them; (ii) There exists a negative relationship between 
initial labour productivity and labour productivity growth – that is to say that sub-sectors with 
lower initial labour productivity exhibited more labour productivity growth relative to their 
counterparts with a higher initial labour productivity, and these lower productivity sub-sectors 
are in a sense, “catching up”; (iii) Lower initial average wage sub-sectors had higher subsequent 
levels of labour productivity growth; and (iv) Wage growth and labour productivity growth 
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Bearing these relationships and descriptives in mind, attention is turned to a series of regressions 
to unpack the effects that Bargaining Councils may have on labour productivity within a 
sectoral context. 
 
5.4.2 SECTOR LEVEL FIXED EFFECTS 
In order to unpack the relationship between labour productivity and Bargaining Councils, a 
series of regressions are used. These regressions control for various factors which should limit 
extraneous effects on results, allowing the chapter to make a more substantial comment on the 
topic of Bargaining Council effects. This chapter utilises both fixed effects (FE) at a sub-
sectoral level, and quantile regressions; FE is completed with multiple specifications in order 
to ensure robust results, and quantile regressions are based on the subsequent preferred 
specification.  
 





+++= 210)log(       (5.2) 
 
where ln(Y/L)i  is the log of labour productivity, and Xit is a vector containing control variables 
such as the log of real wages, log of capital, log of number of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled 
employees, across sub-sectors. BCA is a dummy variable representing whether or not a 
Bargaining Council wage agreement exists within the sub-sector for a particular time-period (1 
= yes, a Bargaining Council agreement was present for the sub-sector in particular period; 0 = 
no Bargaining Council agreement present). The constant and disturbance term are provided by 
a0 and u  respectively.  
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Table 5.2: Fixed effects regressions under different specifications 
Log of labour productivity 
    Spec.           
……(1) 
   Spec.     
……(2) 
    Spec.              
……(3) 
Spec.               
……(4) 
    Spec.               
……(5) 
BCAt (0 omitted)      
BCAt=1 0.435*** 0.325*** 0.173** 0.127** 0.359*** 
 (0.0453) (0.0426) (0.0527) (0.0428) (0.0553) 
BCAt-1 (0 omitted)      
BCAt-1=1   0.223*** 0.161*** 0.130** 
   (0.0540) (0.0439) (0.0429) 
Ln(capital) 1.448*** 1.277*** 1.226*** 0.816*** 0.823*** 
 (0.110) (0.102) (0.108) (0.0907) (0.0881) 
Ln(real wage)  0.406*** 0.378*** 0.306*** 0.327*** 
  (0.0360) (0.0362) (0.0311) (0.0304) 
Ln(proportion of skilled 
employees 
   0.0182 0.0167 
   (0.0113) (0.0110) 
Ln(proportion of semi-
skilled employees 
   -0.0299*** -0.0302*** 
   (0.00273) (0.00265) 
BCA x Ln(proportion of 
skilled employees 
    0.000* 
    (0.000) 
BCA x Ln(proportion of 
semi-skilled employees 
    -0.000*** 
    (0.000) 
Constant -6.901*** -8.651*** -7.930*** -2.767** -2.980*** 
 (1.027) (0.955) (1.027) (0.878) (0.853) 
Observations 700 700 672 672 672 
Adjusted R-squared 0.283 0.397 0.385 0.597 0.620 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses 
  *p<0.05   ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001 
 
Results from the FE regressions follow traditional economic theory. Holding all else constant, 
an increase in capital will increase labour productivity across all specifications, and an increase 
in employment (particularly unskilled employment) drags down labour productivity (ceteris 
paribus). Echoing findings from earlier in this chapter, specifications (2), (3), (4), and (5) 
illustrate that growth in the real wage is accompanied by labour productivity growth. The 
inclusion of a Bargaining Council dummy variable (BCA) reveals that in sub-sectors with 
Bargaining Council agreements, the presence of said agreements is correlated with higher 
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Furthermore, when including controls for the proportion of skilled and semi-skilled employees 
with sub-sectors, it emerges that sub-sectors with skilled employees have a higher labour 
productivity when compared to unskilled employees. In considering the interaction of the BCA 
indicator with the proportion of skills controls, it can be seen that sub-sectors with both more 
skilled employees and BCAs are more productive than their unskilled, non-BCA counterparts. 
 
Having unpacked these effects at an aggregated level, this chapter now moves to explore these 
relationships through a series of quantile regressions based on specification (5). 
 
5.4.3 SECTOR LEVEL QUANTILE REGRESSIONS 
Quantile regressions are utilised in order to investigate effects of explanatory variables at 
different points in the distribution of the difference between reported earnings, and the 
respective minimum wage. While through OLS estimation, a sample mean is derived through 
the minimising of the sum of squared residuals, quantile regressions derive the sample median 
through the minimisation of the sum of absolute residuals. The quantile regression estimator 






















' )1()(   (5.3) 
 
The above function provides the solution for the qth quantile, where 0<q<172, facilitating the 
estimation of Q at any point in the distribution of the variable of interest (i.e. the dependent 
variable). Y/Li is labour productivity, while xi is a vector of control variables (Baum, 2013).  
                                                 
 
72 Where q=0.5, estimation is conducted at the median, whereas OLS provides estimation at the mean. 
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Following specification (5), and still making use of the Quantec sub-sectoral data, the QLS 
regressions produce the results shown in table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: QLS under specification (3) 
Log of labour productivity 
Quantile  
     0.1 
Quantile 
     0.25 
Quantile 
     0.5 
Quantile 
     0.75 
Quantile 
      0.9 
BCAt (0 omitted)      
BCAt=1 0.584*** 0.528*** 0.410*** 0.151*** 0.126** 
 (0.0820) (0.0847) (0.0615) (0.0448) (0.0488) 
BCAt-1 (0 omitted)      
BCAt-1=1 0.0745 0.0801 0.105* 0.0505 -0.00804 
 (0.0636) (0.0657) (0.0477) (0.0348) (0.0379) 
Ln(capital) 0.964*** 0.956*** 0.850*** 0.817*** 0.712*** 
 (0.131) (0.135) (0.0979) (0.0714) (0.0777) 
Sector (Food is omitted)      
Beverages and tobacco -0.315 -0.417 -0.689*** -1.140*** -1.241*** 
 (0.218) (0.225) (0.163) (0.119) (0.129) 
Textiles 0.820* 0.660 -0.0367 -0.492* -0.793*** 
 (0.390) (0.403) (0.293) (0.213) (0.232) 
Wearing apparel 1.773*** 1.500** 0.785* 0.497 -0.0818 
 (0.473) (0.488) (0.354) (0.258) (0.281) 
Leather 3.293*** 2.980*** 2.116*** 1.526*** 1.039* 
 (0.688) (0.711) (0.516) (0.376) (0.410) 
Footwear 2.785*** 2.605*** 1.813*** 1.246*** 0.660 
 (0.679) (0.702) (0.509) (0.371) (0.404) 
Wood and wood 
products 
0.405 0.171 -0.269 -0.720*** -1.012*** 
(0.341) (0.352) (0.256) (0.186) (0.203) 
Paper and Paper 
Products 
0.106 0.153 -0.114 -0.571*** -0.747*** 
(0.277) (0.286) (0.208) (0.151) (0.165) 
Printing and recorded 
media 
0.114 0.0964 -0.296 -0.722*** -0.915*** 
(0.334) (0.345) (0.250) (0.183) (0.199) 
Coke, petroleum and 
nuclear fuel 
0.484 0.695** 0.319 -0.212 -0.203 
(0.250) (0.258) (0.187) (0.137) (0.149) 
Basic chemicals 0.240 0.125 -0.170 -0.529*** -0.648*** 
 (0.242) (0.250) (0.181) (0.132) (0.144) 
Other chemical 
products 0.176 0.143 -0.0565 -0.451** -0.571*** 
 (0.258) (0.266) (0.193) (0.141) (0.153) 
Rubber products 1.231** 1.165* 0.513 0.00781 -0.306 
 (0.453) (0.468) (0.340) (0.248) (0.270) 
Plastic products 0.341 0.183 -0.204 -0.618** -0.943*** 
 (0.353) (0.365) (0.265) (0.193) (0.210) 
Glass and glass products 0.198 -0.00437 -0.628* -0.952*** -1.234*** 
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 (0.385) (0.397) (0.288) (0.210) (0.229) 
Non-metallic mineral 
products 
0.0517 -0.125 -0.472* -0.978*** -1.195*** 
(0.268) (0.276) (0.201) (0.146) (0.159) 
Non-ferrous metal 
products 
0.499 0.351 -0.138 -0.583*** -0.807*** 
(0.284) (0.293) (0.213) (0.155) (0.169) 
Basic iron and steel 0.668** 0.473 0.246 -0.114 -0.233 
 (0.250) (0.258) (0.187) (0.137) (0.149) 
Structural metal 
products 
1.634*** 1.490** 0.935** 0.343 -0.0313 
(0.457) (0.472) (0.343) (0.250) (0.272) 
Other metal products 0.839* 0.710 0.277 -0.0861 -0.464* 
 (0.355) (0.367) (0.266) (0.194) (0.211) 
Machinery and 
equipment 
0.562 0.603 0.0949 0.0635 0.0595 
(0.372) (0.385) (0.279) (0.204) (0.222) 
Electrical machinery 1.789*** 1.705*** 1.101** 0.545* 0.153 
 (0.475) (0.490) (0.356) (0.260) (0.283) 
Radio, television and 
communication 
apparatus 
1.798*** 1.661** 0.851* 0.586* 0.312 
(0.528) (0.545) (0.396) (0.289) (0.314) 
Professional equipment 2.663*** 2.524*** 1.526** 0.786* 0.280 
 (0.642) (0.663) (0.481) (0.351) (0.382) 
Motor vehicles, parts 
and accessories 
0.693** 1.057*** 0.849*** 0.590*** 0.370** 
(0.228) (0.235) (0.171) (0.125) (0.136) 
Other transport 
equipment 0.571 0.544 0.390 -0.223 -0.527* 
 (0.446) (0.460) (0.334) (0.244) (0.265) 
Furniture 2.010*** 1.778** 0.948* 0.384 -0.127 
 (0.549) (0.567) (0.411) (0.300) (0.326) 
Other manufacturing 0.543 0.390 -0.116 -0.613*** -0.841*** 
 (0.288) (0.297) (0.216) (0.157) (0.171) 
Ln(real wage) 0.431*** 0.386*** 0.230*** 0.159*** 0.154*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0466) (0.0338) (0.0247) (0.0268) 
Ln(proportion of skilled 
employees 
0.0361* 0.0219 0.0127 0.0119 -0.00459 
(0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0122) (0.00892) (0.00971) 
Ln(proportion of semi-
skilled employees 
-0.0295*** -0.0273*** -0.0267*** -0.0306*** -0.0259*** 
(0.00393) (0.00406) (0.00295) (0.00215) (0.00234) 
BCA x Ln(proportion of 
skilled employees 
0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BCA x Ln(proportion of 
semi-skilled employees 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -6.532*** -5.804*** -2.807* -1.231 0.153 
 (1.594) (1.646) (1.195) (0.871) (0.948) 
Observations 672 672 672 672 672 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses 
  *p<0.05   ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001 
 
Congruent with the fixed effects analysis, it can immediately be seen that higher capital and 
higher real wages lead to higher labour productivity – again, reinforcing traditional economic 
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theory. The proportion of different skill types, and its consequent interaction with the BCA 
dummy, also reveals a similar effect to that of the fixed effects analysis.  
 
The presence of the BCA dummy within the regression is positive and significant, indicating 
that the presence of Bargaining Councils is correlated with sub-sectors being more productive. 
That is to say that sub-sectors with Bargaining Councils tend to have higher labour productivity 
when compared with sub-sectors that do not have Bargaining Councils. This effect tapers off 
as one moves from the lower labour productivity quantiles to the higher end of the labour 
productivity distribution. This result reinforces a notion that was mentioned in Rankin (2016): 
that Bargaining Council agreements force less productive firms to restructure to become more 
productive, likely favouring more skilled employees over their less skilled counterparts. The 
tapering off of the Bargaining Council effect across the labour productivity distribution also 
reinforces this narrative. 
 
In summary, through the analysis at a sectoral level, a few distinct findings have been 
demonstrated. Firstly, it was shown that labour productivity has grown over the period since 
South Africa’s transition to democracy, and that most of this growth was driven by within-sub-
sector changes, rather than between sub-sectors. Secondly, lower productivity sub-sectors have 
been growing faster than highly productive sub-sectors, alluding to the idea that these sub-
sectors are “catching up” over time. This growth was also accompanied by a rise in the real 
wage paid by sub-sectors. Thirdly, it was shown that the presence of Bargaining Councils and 
their agreements is correlated with higher labour productivity, especially in the lower end of 
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Considering the dominance of the within-sub-sector growth that was established in this section 
of the chapter, it is crucial that a firm-level analysis is now conducted in order to gain a more 
complete understanding of the effects in play. 
 
5.5 FIRM LEVEL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
To begin the firm analysis, one must first ensure the same relationships that were demonstrated 
during the sectoral analysis hold at the firm-level. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the 
analysis for this section rests upon the large sample survey data from Stats SA, particularly for 
the years of 2005 and 2008. 
 
Similar to the relationship exhibited in figure 5.2, figure 5.6 illustrates the negative relationship 
between real labour productivity growth, and 2005 labour productivity73 – again, speaking to 
the notion of a “catching up” behaviour being exhibited by lower labour productivity firms. It 
is worth reiterating that a possibility for this observed relationship could potentially be the 
restructuring that smaller firms are forced to take on due to higher wages brought on by 
Bargaining Council premia, causing smaller, less productive firms to favour more skilled 
employees at the expense of their less skilled counterparts. 
 
                                                 
 
73 A breakdown of this relationship by firm-size cohort is illustrated in figure B1. 
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Figure 5-6: Real labour productivity growth (2005 to 2008) and 2005 labour productivity 
 
 
Figure 5.7 examines the relationship between real wage growth and initial 2005 wages per firm. 
Similar to the sectoral analysis of this shown in figure 5.4, firms with lower initial wages 
showed the highest wage growth74. Again, this coincides with the sentiment that sub-sectors 
with lower labour productivity are “catching up” with their higher labour productivity 
counterparts, utilising within-sub-sector restructuring and higher wages as the transmission 
mechanism to achieve higher growth. 
                                                 
 
74 A breakdown of this relationship by firm-size cohort is illustrated in figure B2. 
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Figure 5-7: Real wage growth (2005 to 2008) and 2005 real wages 
 
 
Finally, figure 5.8 explores the relationship between labour productivity growth and wage 
growth. The positive relationship is the same as the one exhibited in figure 5.5 of the sectoral 
analysis and is still well-rooted within traditional economic theory. With all things being equal, 
higher labour productivity should increase demand for workers and result in an increase in 
wages as long as the labour supply curve is not perfectly elastic (Klein, 2012), as seems to be 
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Figure 5-8: Wage and productivity growth (2005 to 2008) 
 
 
This firm level analysis shows a very similar pattern to the previous sectoral-analysis. Again, 
there exists a negative relationship between initial labour productivity and labour productivity 
growth – reinforcing the notion of a “catching up” behaviour. Lower initial average wage firms 
had higher subsequent levels of labour productivity growth; and wage growth and labour 
productivity growth had a positive correlation, as was confirmed in the previous section of this 
chapter. 
 
As this chapter did for its sectoral analysis, it now moves to a series of regressions to unpack 
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5.5.1 FIRM LEVEL ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSIONS 
In this section, regressions are run as close as possible to match the earlier specifications shown 
within the sectoral analysis section. However, since a different dataset is being utilised for the 
firm-level analysis, some concessions must be made.  
 
Firstly, the LSS 2005 & 2008 does not contain measures of the proportion of skilled, versus 
semi-skilled, versus unskilled employment – thus, it cannot be controlled for. Secondly, with 
this dataset only containing two periods, utilisation of a lag of the Bargaining Council dummy 
variable is ill-advised. However, what can now be controlled for is the effect that firm size, and 
its consequent interaction with the Bargaining Council dummy variable, may introduce. 
 
Specification (1) is run to replicate the earlier sectoral analysis, while specification (2) takes 
firm size into account. 
 
Table 5.4: OLS Results under different specifications 
Log of labour productivity Specification (1) Specification (2) 
BCAt (0 omitted)   
BCAt=1 0.518*** 0.0317*** 
 (0.0970) (0.00825) 
Ln(capital) 0.0944*** 0.0990*** 
 (0.00680) (0.00452) 
Ln(real wage) 0.707*** 0.702*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0128) 
Sector (Food is omitted)   
Beverages and tobacco 0.261* 0.266*** 
 (0.123) (0.0643) 
Textiles 0.611*** 0.611*** 
 (0.102) (0.0736) 
Wearing apparel 0.587*** 0.590*** 
 (0.111) (0.114) 
Leather -0.332*** -0.317*** 
 (0.0771) (0.0753) 
Footwear 0.432*** 0.425*** 
 (0.0879) (0.0489) 
Wood and wood products -0.534*** -0.501*** 
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 (0.118) (0.123) 
Paper and Paper Products -0.873*** -0.879*** 
 (0.156) (0.0719) 
Printing and recorded media -0.424** -0.397** 
 (0.145) (0.138) 
Coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel -0.160 -0.157 
 (0.161) (0.102) 
Basic chemicals 0.0987 0.106* 
 (0.0814) (0.0482) 
Other chemical products -0.267** -0.246*** 
 (0.0869) (0.0688) 
Rubber products 0.175 0.181* 
 (0.154) (0.0743) 
Plastic products 0.138 0.131* 
 (0.0837) (0.0569) 
Glass and glass products -0.203* -0.198** 
 (0.0960) (0.0699) 
Non-metallic mineral products 0.0242 0.0385 
 (0.0922) (0.0533) 
Non-ferrous metal products -0.157 -0.143** 
 (0.0896) (0.0488) 
Basic iron and steel 0.225* 0.237* 
 (0.102) (0.0955) 
Structural metal products 0.118 0.112 
 (0.133) (0.0697) 
Other metal products 0.0930 0.0897 
 (0.0851) (0.0536) 
Machinery and equipment -0.170 -0.157** 
 (0.0970) (0.0547) 
Electrical machinery -0.0709 -0.0555 
 (0.0915) (0.0818) 




Professional equipment 0.0194 0.0208 
 (0.117) (0.0859) 
Motor vehicles, parts and accessories 0.268** 0.274*** 
 (0.0911) (0.0588) 
Other transport equipment -0.614*** -0.591*** 
 (0.0936) (0.0741) 
Furniture -0.729*** -0.714*** 
 (0.162) (0.0742) 
Other manufacturing 0 0 
 (.) (.) 
Employment (10-19 omitted)  0 
20-49 Employees  0.146*** 
  (0.00363) 
50-99 Employees  0.219*** 
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  (0.00375) 
100+ Employees  0.335*** 
  (0.00361) 
BCA x Employment 
(BCA x 10-19 Employees omitted)   
BCA x 20-49 Employees  -0.0319*** 
  (0.00773) 
BC=1 x 50-99 Employees  -0.0392*** 
  (0.00798) 
BC=1 x 100+ Employees  -0.0404*** 
  (0.00753) 
Constant 2.252*** 2.195*** 
 (0.132) (0.0654) 
Observations 7468 7468 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses 
  *p<0.05   ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001 
 
From these results, it can be seen that the effects of capital and real wages still hold true to 
traditional economic theory. The effect of the Bargaining Council dummy variable is positive 
and significant, as it was for the sectoral analysis, showing again that there is a definite 
correlation between Bargaining Councils and labour productivity.  
 
The introduction of firm size and its subsequent interaction with the Bargaining Council dummy 
variable, as controls generates interesting results. As it would be expected a priori, larger firms 
are more productive than their smaller counterparts. What is interesting are the effects 
introduced by the interacted variables. When compared to the omitted category (BC x 10 – 19 
employees), all other interacted terms are negative – implying that while Bargaining Councils 
might be responsible for growth in labour productivity, it would appear that this effect is 
strongest in small, less productive firms i.e. these firms are “catching up”. Furthermore, this 
firm level data suggests that firm size is highly correlated with the BCA premium, thus the 
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explanation of a higher BCA coefficient in the sectoral analysis could potentially be due to 
different (and changing) firm size profiles i.e. fewer smaller firms.75 
 
In order to understand how this effect may hold through the distribution of labour productivity, 
a series of quantile regressions are utilised. 
 
5.5.2 FIRM LEVEL QUANTILE REGRESSIONS 
Basing the quantile regressions on specification (2) from the preceding section, table 5.5’s 
results are obtained. 
 
As has come to be expected in this chapter, capital and the Bargaining Council dummy variable 
exhibit are both positive and significant – however, no discernible pattern can be seen when 
looking at the Bargaining Council coefficient across the distribution. When looking at real 
wages, it can be seen that the effect an increase in real wages has on labour productivity is larger 
when looking at the lower end of the labour productivity distribution. 
 
When considering the interaction of the Bargaining Council dummy variable with firm size, a 
notable fact stands out. Firms with lower employment stand more to gain in terms of labour 
productivity when Bargaining Councils are present than when compared with their larger 
counterparts. This again points to the notion of “catching up”. It would appear that large firms 
receive the lowest increase of labour productivity when Bargaining Councils are present, versus 
any other firm size cohort, across the distribution of labour productivity. 
                                                 
 
75 This is confirmed via the regression estimates in Appendix F, whereby table F1 shows the regression without 
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Table 5.5: QLS under specification (2) 
Log of labour 
productivity 
Quantile  
     0.1 
Quantile 
     0.25 
Quantile 
     0.5 
Quantile 
     0.75 
Quantile 
      0.9 
BCAt (0 omitted)      
BCAt=1 0.415*** 0.667* 0.720*** 1.060*** 0.882*** 
 (0.0987) (0.327) (0.120) (0.188) (0.190) 
Employment (10-19 
omitted)      
20-49 Employees 0.124 0.0919* 0.166*** 0.0894 -0.169 
 (0.0879) (0.0359) (0.0376) (0.0652) (0.144) 
50-99 Employees 0.223* 0.139*** 0.151*** 0.0887 -0.169 
 (0.0885) (0.0235) (0.0403) (0.0572) (0.141) 
100+ Employees 0.166 0.0538* 0.168*** 0.104* -0.162 
 (0.0942) (0.0261) (0.0436) (0.0516) (0.140) 
BCA x Employment 
(BCA x 10-19 
Employees omitted)      
BCA x 20-49 
Employees 
-0.186 -0.228 -0.237* -0.312*** -0.0535 
(0.211) (0.310) (0.111) (0.0948) (0.188) 
BC=1 x 50-99 
Employees 
0.0263 -0.228 -0.302** -0.457*** -0.286 
(0.171) (0.295) (0.106) (0.0886) (0.147) 
BC=1 x 100+ 
Employees 
-0.242 -0.293 -0.335** -0.468*** -0.308* 
(0.183) (0.296) (0.109) (0.0761) (0.157) 
Ln(capital) 0.0828*** 0.101*** 0.0967*** 0.0969*** 0.102*** 
 (0.00774) (0.00409) (0.00362) (0.00835) (0.0120) 
Ln(real wage) 0.949*** 0.792*** 0.715*** 0.656*** 0.615*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0189) (0.0166) (0.0247) (0.0424) 
Sector (Food is 
omitted)      
Beverages and 
tobacco 
0.146 0.232 0.0770 0.538** 0.569 
(0.173) (0.157) (0.0437) (0.171) (0.295) 
Textiles 0.534* 0.590*** 0.504*** 0.771*** 0.834*** 
 (0.228) (0.155) (0.105) (0.128) (0.231) 
Wearing apparel 0.561*** 0.492*** 0.484*** 0.523*** 0.816*** 
 (0.133) (0.0961) (0.132) (0.130) (0.0657) 
Leather -0.107 -0.281*** -0.285*** -0.393** -0.544*** 
 (0.123) (0.0693) (0.0780) (0.130) (0.0890) 
Footwear 0.268*** 0.376* 0.363*** 0.570*** 0.754*** 
 (0.0456) (0.158) (0.0531) (0.143) (0.166) 
Wood and wood 
products 
-0.0586 -0.358*** -0.596*** -0.726** -0.676 
(0.133) (0.0712) (0.117) (0.268) (0.358) 
Paper and Paper 
Products 
-1.440** -0.658 -0.702*** -0.836*** -1.023*** 
(0.476) (0.413) (0.0809) (0.136) (0.0779) 
Printing and 
recorded media 
-0.368** -0.470*** -0.596*** -0.454 -0.501*** 
(0.125) (0.116) (0.133) (0.294) (0.0949) 
Coke, petroleum 
and nuclear fuel 
-0.506*** -0.161 -0.233*** 0.0498 0.119 
(0.0259) (0.181) (0.0517) (0.304) (0.327) 
Basic chemicals 0.0823 0.133 0.0319 0.190 0.172 
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 (0.0600) (0.156) (0.0324) (0.139) (0.181) 
Other chemical 
products 
-0.184 -0.337*** -0.376*** -0.248 0.0643 
(0.140) (0.0755) (0.0853) (0.200) (0.159) 
Rubber 
products 0.177*** -0.0566 -0.124*** 0.353 0.730 
 (0.0291) (0.158) (0.0316) (0.555) (0.844) 
Plastic products 0.137 0.158 0.0668 0.166 0.257 
 (0.117) (0.155) (0.0477) (0.147) (0.184) 
Glass and glass 
products 
-0.173 -0.156 -0.0980 -0.270 -0.255*** 




0.0364 0.0104 -0.0570 0.0804 0.279 
(0.0678) (0.165) (0.0381) (0.150) (0.288) 
Non-ferrous 
metal products 
-0.229 -0.195 -0.159* -0.0555 -0.151 
(0.126) (0.174) (0.0741) (0.150) (0.185) 
Basic iron and 
steel 
0.0151 0.0687 0.163** 0.441** 0.385* 
(0.0513) (0.174) (0.0511) (0.164) (0.190) 
Structural metal 
products 
-0.158*** 0.0855 -0.0320 0.242 0.408 
(0.0242) (0.158) (0.0888) (0.152) (0.248) 
Other metal 
products 
0.197 0.173 0.0236 0.171 -0.0625 
(0.120) (0.176) (0.0594) (0.147) (0.158) 
Machinery and 
equipment 
-0.0465 -0.102 -0.160 -0.0636 -0.240 
(0.0887) (0.157) (0.141) (0.134) (0.215) 
Electrical 
machinery 
0.0486 0.0325 -0.0799 0.0234 -0.293 





-0.244 -0.470*** -0.442** -0.315 -0.0828 
(0.180) (0.0756) (0.144) (0.194) (0.237) 
Professional 
equipment 
-0.0402 -0.0298 -0.0892 0.138 0.195 




0.284*** 0.295 0.144* 0.372* 0.309 
(0.0652) (0.187) (0.0673) (0.168) (0.216) 
Other transport 
equipment 
-0.451*** -0.522*** -0.587*** -0.686*** -0.571*** 
(0.102) (0.0744) (0.109) (0.137) (0.154) 
Furniture -0.524 -0.574* -0.791*** -0.765*** -0.435 
 (0.273) (0.226) (0.109) (0.183) (0.358) 
Other 
manufacturing 
0 0 0 0 0 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Constant 0.423** 1.367*** 2.061*** 2.620*** 3.470*** 
 (0.132) (0.180) (0.0838) (0.174) (0.268) 
Observations 7468 7468 7468 7468 7468 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses 
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Labour productivity is one of the most essential determinants of a country’s income level, yet 
it is a measure that has been understudied in South Africa. Existing work on labour productivity 
in South Africa has mostly focused on aggregate figures and generally portrayed the observed 
increase in labour productivity levels as a positive outcome. As South Africa is a country 
grappling with glaring unemployment issues, while trying to navigate an effective policy mix 
to remedy this issue, the study of labour productivity with its relation to Bargaining Councils is 
vital. 
 
This chapter extended the literature on labour productivity in South Africa in multiple ways. 
By utilising both sectoral and firm level data, this chapter was able to speak to the evolution of 
labour productivity in post-apartheid South Africa, as well as to investigate the effects that 
Bargaining Councils may have on labour productivity both at a sector and firm-level. 
 
This chapter confirms that aggregate labour productivity in South Africa has been growing. 
When comparing growth of labour productivity between 1995 and 2015, all manufacturing sub-
sectors have shown positive growth over the 20-year period, albeit it with extremely 
pronounced heterogeneity. Almost all of the growth within manufacturing labour productivity 
have been driven by within-industry growth, with very little of the growth being driven by 
cross-industry reallocation. This may be due to higher labour productivity firms growing 
relative to lower productivity firms within these sub-sectors, or because there were 
compositional changes with a relatively higher level of exit rates for lower labour productivity 
firms. Following Rankin’s (2016) suggestion, it seems that more attention in South African 
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industrial policy needs to be focused within industries, rather than the current industry-specific 
focus of South Africa’s Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP). 
 
By comparing labour productivity growth with initial levels of labour productivity, this chapter 
suggests that the negative relationship portrayed by these two components may speak to a 
“catching up” behaviour by lower labour productivity sub-sectors. Another possibility for this 
observed relationship could potentially be the restructuring that smaller firms are forced to take 
on due to higher wages brought on by Bargaining Council premia, causing smaller, less 
productive firms to favour more skilled employees at the expense of their less skilled 
counterparts – hampering those whom the South African government would consider to be the 
most vulnerable in terms of employment. This effect holds under both sectoral and firm-
analysis, as does the positive relationship between labour productivity growth and wage growth. 
 
In the sectoral regression analysis, the presence of the BCA dummy within the regression is 
positive and significant, indicating that the presence of Bargaining Councils is correlated with 
sub-sectors being more productive. This effect tapered off as one moved from the lower labour 
productivity quantiles to the higher end of the labour productivity distribution. This result 
reinforces a notion that Bargaining Council agreements force less productive firms to 
restructure to become more productive, likely favouring more skilled employees over their less 
skilled counterparts. The tapering off of the Bargaining Council effect across the labour 
productivity distribution also reinforces this narrative. 
 
The analysis at a firm level generated similar results; while the introduction of firm size and its 
subsequent interaction with the Bargaining Council dummy variable as controls generated 
interesting results. As it would be expected a priori, larger firms are more productive than their 
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smaller counterparts. The results imply that while Bargaining Councils might be responsible 
for some growth in labour productivity, it would appear that this effect is strongest in small, 
less productive firms i.e. these firms are “catching up”. Furthermore, this firm level data 
suggests that firm size is highly correlated with the BCA premium, thus the explanation of a 
higher BCA coefficient in the sectoral analysis could potentially be due to different (and 
changing) firm size profiles i.e. fewer smaller firms. 
 
Naturally, there are caveats to these findings. It is plausible that factors which could not be 
accounted for could also partially explain the findings from this chapter. Without adequate 
measures for levels of technology, and exporting behaviour, it is possible that the results would 
diminish if better controls could be instituted through the utilisation of more complete data. 











This thesis adds significantly to the discussion on the effects of government policy (particularly 
that of labour regulation) on firm dynamics. It does so through three key elements. Firstly, it is 
the first to conduct a thorough impact evaluation of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 – thus 
determining the effects the Act had on employment, be it intentional or unintentional. Secondly, 
this thesis utilises a new-to-the-world dataset, which was constructed purely to facilitate the 
research conducted within this thesis – the Bargaining Council Minimum Wage Dataset 
(BCMWD). Thirdly, by using this new dataset, this thesis unpacks the effects that collective 
bargaining in South Africa has on firm employment, workers’ wages, and labour productivity. 
 
Chapter 2 investigates the impact of the Employment Equity Act of 1998 on employment and 
production strategies of South African firms. Since the Act is a threshold policy, only 
demanding that firms with 50 or more employees comply with it, by using matched 1996 
Manufacturing Census and 2001 Large Sample Survey data this chapter could track changes in 
employment intensity and production strategies of firms that operated in 1996 with a workforce 
of around 50 employees. Analysis revealed that there is a high possibility that the introduction 
of the Act has created a distortion in employment which has resulted in an inefficient allocation 
of resources at a firm level. This results in a lower employment of labour, particularly at the 
small, medium enterprise level, showing a potential unintended consequence of the Act. This 
thesis was not able to conduct this analysis over a longer time period to see if this distortion 








Chapter 3 outlines the capturing, cleaning, and construction of the Bargaining Council 
Minimum Wage Dataset. This new-to-the-world dataset is then utilised to generate descriptive 
results, not only showcasing its usefulness as a dataset but also illustrating the evolution of 
minimum wages over time as well as providing up to date estimates of Bargaining Council 
coverage. 
 
Chapter 4 makes use of the aforementioned dataset to determine what effects the existence of 
Bargaining Councils, and their minimum wage agreements have on firm dynamics – 
particularly employment. The results of this chapter conclude that despite minimum wages 
prescribed by said Bargaining Councils, the average employee still reports a wage that is 42% 
below the stipulated minimum. Furthermore, the extension of updated Bargaining Council 
agreements is shown to have a detrimental effect on employment, whereby it decreases by 
approximately 8%. Yet again, this marks the intended effect of this area of policy as 
counterproductive. 
 
Lastly, chapter 5 unpacks the evolution of labour productivity in post-apartheid South Africa, 
especially with its relation to Bargaining Councils. The chapter concludes that aggregate labour 
productivity (in manufacturing) in South Africa has been growing and that almost all of this 
growth has been driven by within-industry growth, with little of the growth being driven by 
cross-industry reallocation. Furthermore, this chapter suggests that the negative relationship 
exhibited by initial labour productivity and labour productivity growth speaks to a “catching 
up” behaviour by lower labour productivity sub-sectors. An analysis of Bargaining Council 
effects, meanwhile, suggests that the presence of Bargaining Councils is correlated with sub-
sectors being more productive. This result reinforces a notion that Bargaining Council 
agreements force less productive firms to restructure to become more productive, likely 
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favouring more skilled employees over their less skilled counterparts. Again, this affects those 
in the more precarious portion of employment the most. 
 
6.2 POLICY 
Since the end of apartheid in 1994 the notions of increased employment, lower inequality, and 
poverty alleviation have remained central to the South African government’s mandate. With 
the ushering in of democracy South Africa implemented a set of new labour regulations. These 
regulations were intended to modernise existing regulations and extend protection and rights to 
workers who were not covered under apartheid-era regulations. A close relationship between 
government and organised labour meant that these regulations focused on the conditions of 
work, protection of employment, and institutionalised bargaining structures for those with jobs, 
rather than making it easier for companies to employ people (Edwards et al., 2014). These two 
broad policy changes thus were in tension: government was aiming to achieve transformation 
of the workplace, the generation of employment, and the improvement of worker welfare, while 
firms grappled with more restrictive employment regulations due to new labour regulations.  
 
Although the South African economy has created relatively large numbers of jobs in the last 20 
years, the rate of job creation and the types of jobs created have not been sufficient to reduce 
the absolute level of unemployment nor the unemployment rate substantially (Edwards et al., 
2014). The post-apartheid labour market has benefitted those at the top of the income and skills 
distribution the most and jobs and wages for those in high-skilled occupations have increased 
substantially relative to low-skilled occupations (Edwards et al., 2014).  This was showcased in 








Most of the observed change in labour demand has been driven by within-sector changes. 
Within sectors the labour-intensity of production has been decreasing and the skills-intensity 
increasing – this is only reinforced through the presence of Bargaining Councils, as well as Acts 
such as the Employment Equity Act of 1998.  
 
With a better understanding of firm responses to changes in their environment, it is also possible 
to unpack employment effects that are subsequent to changes in firm outcomes. The effects of 
firm outcomes on the quantity and quality of employment are equally likely to differ across 
sectors and skill levels. It is for that reason that any discussion trying to align labour market 
reform and economic growth policy needs to be based on a thorough understanding of such 
firm and employment dynamics. 
 
While this thesis will not be prescriptive in terms of actual policy changes that should be 
enforced, it will implore any and all policymakers to take consideration of the following two 
points before instituting any more reforms or regulations within the South African economic 
landscape. 
 
Firstly, firms are heterogeneous, and cannot be treated with a “one-size-fits-all” policy 
approach. Doing so results in unintended consequences, often at the expense of those the policy 
aims to protect. Secondly, in reference to this heterogeneity, this thesis would implore all 
subsequent studies that inform policymakers to take firm-level data into account, rather than 
focusing on aggregate statistics. The results obtained through aggregate measures often miss 
the true dynamics at play, especially with respect to the protection of workers and the 
transformation of the South African labour market. 
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6.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
While the main chapters of this thesis contribute significantly to the on-going debates 
surrounding labour market regulations in South Africa, each chapter could benefit from further 
research. Firstly, Chapter 2 focuses on results generated through an analysis on the 
manufacturing sector; however, while manufacturing is a substantial part of the South African 
economy, it is not the only sector of interest. It would therefore be of interest to analyse how 
firms from other sectors responded to the EEA. Additionally, the presence of new robustness 
checks such as “rdrobust” (in both R and Stata) would be useful to include in future iterations 
of this chapter. Furthermore, chapter 2’s analysis is conducted in a relatively short timeframe. 
It would be of interest to rerun these tests at much later dates in time to unpack whether the 
unanticipated effect of the EEA still holds, or if it has tapered off. 
 
Secondly, at the time of writing chapter 3, data was only available for three bargaining councils 
(clothing, textiles, and metal and engineering). It would be beneficial to rerun the analysis 
making use of the fully completed BCMWD. Using this expanded dataset would potentially 
facilitate an even better understanding of the dynamics that are play when it comes to the 
relationship between employment and bargaining council decisions.  
 
Thirdly, it would be of interest to expand the analysis of chapters 2, 3, and 5 to include more 
firm characteristics. With the groundwork laid, and the bargaining council data collection 
complete, it would be interesting to see how results change when including other covariates 
such as exporter status, geographical location of the firm, age of the firm, among others. 
Furthermore, using this dataset in competition analysis would ultimately be beneficial. 
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Lastly, it would be of interest to keep the BCMWD up-to-date. The initial capturing of this data 
was a gigantic task, and one that should not have been taken in vain. By collecting further 
iterations of data, this will facilitate further research in the field, and hopefully prompt more 
researchers to unpack these areas of analysis. 
6.4 FINAL REMARKS 
If there is one thing that has become clear through the production of this thesis, it is that data is 
the most essential component required for rigorous policy evaluation. Most countries still 
struggle with access to good quality data, especially at a firm level, and South Africa is no 
different.  
As South Africa continues to grapple with the legacy of problems left behind from Apartheid 
administration, this thesis would implore all researchers, policymakers, and government 
employees to do their utmost to share and provide access to good quality data – particularly 
firm-level data. This is a crucial first step in ensuring that all policies enacted from this point 
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Table A1: Number of firms per employment bracket in 1996 and 2001 







Percentage Net change 
(2001-1996) 
40 20 8.85% 16 7.21% -1.64% 
41 15 6.64% 6 2.70% -3.94% 
42 10 4.42% 11 4.95% 0.53% 
43 10 4.42% 10 4.50% 0.08% 
44 9 3.98% 10 4.50% 0.52% 
45 14 6.19% 13 5.86% -0.33% 
46 7 3.10% 9 4.05% 0.95% 
47 8 3.54% 14 6.31% 2.77% 
48 10 4.42% 17 7.66% 3.24% 
49 8 3.54% 24 10.81% 7.27% 
50 9 3.98% 18 8.11% 4.13% 
51 13 5.75% 10 4.50% -1.25% 
52 11 4.87% 7 3.15% -1.72% 
53 8 3.54% 4 1.80% -1.74% 
54 13 5.75% 3 1.35% -4.40% 
55 11 4.87% 8 3.60% -1.27% 
56 7 3.10% 6 2.70% -0.40% 
57 15 6.64% 9 4.05% -2.59% 
58 11 4.87% 10 4.50% -0.37% 
59 9 3.98% 11 4.95% 0.97% 
60 8 3.54% 6 2.7% -0.84% 
Total 226 100% 222 100%  
Note: Percentage is the number of firms for each employment bracket over the range 40-60, divided by the total number of 












APPENDIX B: LIST OF CURRENT BARGAINING COUNCILS76 
Registered Private Sector Bargaining Councils 
Amanzi Bargaining Council  
Registered on 06/09/2012 
 
Bargaining Council for the Building Industry (Bloemfontein)  
Registered on 17/09/1934 
 
Building Industry Bargaining Council (Kimberley)   
Registered on 27/09/1945 
 
Building Industry Bargaining Council (Southern and Eastern Cape)   
Registered on 16/07/1937 
 
Building Industry Bargaining Council (Cape of Good Hope)   
Registered on 16/06/1944 
 
Building Industry Bargaining Council (East London)  
Registered on 15/10/1948 
 
Building Bargaining Council (North and West Boland)  
Registered on 13/04/1950 
 
Bargaining Council for the Canvas Goods Industry (Witwatersrand and Pretoria) 
Registered on 21/09/1921 
 
National Bargaining Council for Clothing Manufacturing Industry    
Registered on 07/08/2003 
 
Bargaining Council for the Contract Cleaning Services Industry (KwaZulu-Natal) 
Registered on 30/09/1992 
 
Bargaining Council for the Civil Engineering Industry   
Registered on 07/12/2012 
 
National Bargaining Council for the Chemical Industry   
Registered on 03/12/2001 
 
The Bargaining Council for the Diamond Cutting Industry  
Registered on 19/02/1960 
 
National Bargaining Council for the Electrical Industry of South Africa  
Registered on 15/12/1998 
 
Bargaining Council for the Fishing Industry  
Registered on 14/12/2001 
 
Bargaining Council for the Food Retail, Restaurant, Catering & Allied Trades    
Registered on 30/09/1941 
 
Bargaining Council for the Restaurant, Catering and Allied Trades   
Registered on 13/07/1936 
 
Furniture Bargaining Council   
Registered on 26/04/2006 
                                                 
 







Bargaining Council for the Furniture Manufacturing Industry of the Western Cape   
Registered on 08/08/1958 
 
Bargaining Council for the Furniture Manufacturing Industry of the Eastern Cape   
Registered on 19/02/1959 
 
Bargaining Council for the Furniture Manufacturing Industry of the South Western Districts   
Registered on 23/02/1959 
 
Bargaining Council for the Furniture Manufacturing Industry, KwaZulu-Natal    
Registered on 03/06/1954 
 
Bargaining Council for the Grain Industry  
Registered on 27/03/1990 
 
National Bargaining Council for the Hairdressing, Cosmetology, Beauty and Skincare Industry   
Registered on 14/11/2013 
 
Bargaining Council for the Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Industry (Cape)    
Registered on 08/01/1946 
 
Bargaining Council for the Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Industry (KwaZulu-Natal)   
Registered on 03/03/1955   
 
National Bargaining Council of the Leather Industry of South Africa   
Registered on 19/08/1934 
 
Bargaining Council for the Meat Trade, Gauteng    
Registered on 01/04/1999 
 
Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council  
Registered on 16/06/1947 
 
Motor Industry Bargaining Council  
Registered on 15/07/1952 
 
Motor Ferry Industry Bargaining Council of South Africa  
Registered on 28/05/2003 
 
Bargaining Council for the New Tyre Manufacturing Industry  
Registered on 19/08/1970 
 
National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight and Logistics Industry (NBCRFLI)  
Registered on 11/05/1953 
 
South African Road Passenger Bargaining Council (SARPBAC)  
Registered on 20/11/1998   
 
National Bargaining Council for the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry   
Registered on 19/05/1947 
 
National Textile Bargaining Council   
Registered on 26/01/2004 
 
Transnet Bargaining Council (National)   
Registered on 02/10/1991 
 
National Bargaining Council for the Wood and Paper Sector   







National Bargaining Council for the Private Security Sector 
Registered on 21/06/2018 
 
 
Registered local government and government Bargaining Councils 
Education Labour Relations Council 
Registered on 14/10/1999 
 
General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council 
Registered on 28/07/1999 
 
Public Health and Social Development Sectoral Bargaining Council 
Registered 28/07/1999 
 
Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Council 
Registered 13/10/1997 
 
Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council 
Registered on 28/07/1999 
 
South African Local Government Bargaining Council 
Registered on 01/03/2001 
 
 
Registered statutory councils 
Statutory Council for the Fast Food, Restaurant, Catering and Allied Trades (SCFFRCAT) 
Registered on 14/12/2012 
 
Statutory Council for the Squid and Related Fisheries of South Africa 
Registered on 25/09/2007 
 
Statutory Council of the Printing, Newspaper and Packaging Industry of South Africa 
















APPENDIX C: AVERAGE NOMINAL AND REAL WAGES PER SECTOR (2012-
2017) 
 
Figure C1: Nominal and real average 
minimum wages - Chemicals 
 
Figure C2: Nominal and real average 
minimum wages - Clothing 
 
 
Figure C3: Nominal and real average 
minimum wages - Electrical 
 
Figure C4: Nominal and real average 
minimum wages - Furniture 
 
 
Figure C5: Nominal and real average 
minimum wages - Leather 
 
Figure C6: Nominal and real average 









Figure C7: Nominal and real average 
minimum wages - Motor 
 
Figure C8: Nominal and real average 
minimum wages - Textiles 
 
 
Figure C9: Nominal and real average minimum wages -                                                                                                         



















APPENDIX D: DESCIPTIVES BY FIRM SIZE 

































APPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL FIRM LEVEL QUANTILE REGRESSIONS 
Table E1: Quantile regressions with no interaction between firm size and BCA 











BCAt (0 omitted)      
BCAt=1 0.352** 0.408* 0.447*** 0.690*** 0.671*** 
 (0.125) (0.159) (0.0912) (0.161) (0.190) 
Employment (10-19 omitted)      
20-49 Employees 0.0570 0.0697 0.0605 -0.00926 -0.197 
 (0.0403) (0.0401) (0.0468) (0.0834) (0.137) 
50-99 Employees 0.206*** 0.124*** 0.0266 -0.0422 -0.252 
 (0.0385) (0.0254) (0.0479) (0.0816) (0.129) 
100+ Employees 0.0829 0.0239 0.00830 -0.0425 -0.248 
 (0.0460) (0.0310) (0.0469) (0.0841) (0.133) 
Ln(capital) 0.0818*** 0.0978*** 0.0950*** 0.0950*** 0.102*** 
 (0.00522) (0.00457) (0.00451) (0.0108) (0.0161) 
Ln(real wage) 0.948*** 0.810*** 0.724*** 0.657*** 0.619*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0171) (0.0178) (0.0274) (0.0508) 
Sector (Food is omitted)      
Beverages and tobacco 0.135 0.201 0.0635 0.524* 0.549 
 (0.0947) (0.149) (0.0382) (0.209) (0.329) 
Textiles 0.491* 0.551*** 0.506*** 0.754*** 0.791*** 
 (0.203) (0.159) (0.0653) (0.116) (0.168) 
Wearing apparel 0.442*** 0.529*** 0.555*** 0.563*** 0.839** 
 (0.128) (0.0766) (0.136) (0.133) (0.284) 
Leather -0.203 -0.245*** -0.304** -0.381** -0.400* 
 (0.149) (0.0688) (0.0989) (0.134) (0.161) 
Footwear 0.274*** 0.370* 0.354*** 0.571*** 0.776*** 
 (0.0450) (0.154) (0.0457) (0.129) (0.155) 
Wood and wood products -0.0987 -0.351*** -0.629*** -0.593 -0.645 
 (0.155) (0.0638) (0.125) (0.316) (0.558) 
Paper and Paper Products -1.442*** -0.654 -0.658*** -0.819*** -1.008*** 
 (0.407) (0.426) (0.122) (0.140) (0.230) 
Printing and recorded media -0.326** -0.456** -0.583** -0.523 -0.419** 
 (0.125) (0.158) (0.183) (0.392) (0.143) 
Coke, petroleum and nuclear 
fuel -0.506*** -0.179 -0.261*** 0.0837 0.103 
 (0.0343) (0.181) (0.0476) (0.340) (0.352) 
Basic chemicals 0.0514 0.105 0.00848 0.188 0.168 
 (0.0560) (0.151) (0.0207) (0.129) (0.173) 
Other chemical products -0.252* -0.317** -0.352*** -0.219 0.0558 
 (0.125) (0.104) (0.107) (0.191) (0.249) 
Rubber products 0.182*** -0.0780 -0.143*** 0.384 0.746 
 (0.0320) (0.151) (0.0290) (0.498) (0.842) 
Plastic products 0.126 0.159 0.0725 0.177 0.304 
 (0.129) (0.149) (0.0456) (0.130) (0.180) 
Glass and glass products -0.207 -0.153 -0.0896 -0.213 -0.167 







products 0.0221 -0.0180 -0.108* 0.00471 0.268 
 (0.0852) (0.155) (0.0463) (0.155) (0.281) 
Non-ferrous metal products -0.233* -0.197 -0.187* -0.0756 -0.119 
 (0.118) (0.162) (0.0902) (0.145) (0.170) 
Basic iron and steel 0.00461 0.0395 0.146* 0.376* 0.346 
 (0.0441) (0.162) (0.0589) (0.169) (0.217) 
Structural metal products -0.206*** 0.0696 -0.0337 0.234 0.426 
 (0.0370) (0.155) (0.0838) (0.162) (0.276) 
Other metal products 0.203** 0.175 -0.00808 0.148 -0.0565 
 (0.0749) (0.177) (0.0618) (0.144) (0.152) 
Machinery and equipment -0.0714 -0.105 -0.248 -0.164 -0.227 
 (0.0590) (0.150) (0.137) (0.131) (0.167) 
Electrical machinery 0.0704 -0.000356 -0.152*** -0.0771 -0.256 
 (0.219) (0.153) (0.0456) (0.139) (0.134) 
Radio, television and 
communication apparatus -0.388** -0.447*** -0.470** -0.250 0.00337 
 (0.124) (0.0845) (0.178) (0.176) (0.383) 
Professional equipment -0.104 -0.0540 -0.116** 0.126 0.231 
 (0.148) (0.207) (0.0392) (0.164) (0.180) 
Motor vehicles, parts and 
accessories 0.288** 0.287 0.119 0.367 0.329 
 (0.0879) (0.184) (0.0759) (0.188) (0.194) 
Other transport equipment -0.548** -0.494*** -0.601*** -0.645*** -0.606* 
 (0.175) (0.0666) (0.125) (0.133) (0.262) 
Furniture -0.485 -0.582* -0.718*** -0.808*** -0.319 
 (0.618) (0.269) (0.0965) (0.242) (0.612) 
Other manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Constant 0.497*** 1.343*** 2.164*** 2.748*** 3.491*** 
 (0.104) (0.170) (0.0923) (0.179) (0.272) 
Observations 7468 7468 7468 7468 7468 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses 






















Table E2: Quantile regressions without firm size as an independent variable  











BCAt (0 omitted)      
BCAt=1 0.361*** 0.420** 0.486*** 0.704*** 0.615** 
  -0.0624 -0.157 -0.0884 -0.178 -0.214 
Ln(capital) 0.0899*** 0.100*** 0.0932*** 0.0905*** 0.0858*** 
  -0.00701 -0.00479 -0.00434 -0.0101 -0.0165 
Ln(real wage) 0.913*** 0.811*** 0.719*** 0.661*** 0.638*** 
  -0.0135 -0.0209 -0.0183 -0.0304 -0.0545 
Sector (Food is omitted)      
Beverages and tobacco 0.189 0.145 0.0923 0.547* 0.59 
  -0.248 -0.14 -0.0542 -0.227 -0.381 
Textiles 0.549** 0.494** 0.505*** 0.779*** 0.868** 
 -0.191 -0.169 -0.0554 -0.129 -0.312 
Wearing apparel 0.449*** 0.545*** 0.516*** 0.569*** 0.920* 
 -0.09 -0.104 -0.138 -0.132 -0.378 
Leather -0.181 -0.249** -0.325*** -0.403** -0.359** 
 -0.118 -0.0858 -0.0898 -0.145 -0.13 
Footwear 0.270*** 0.380** 0.380*** 0.571*** 0.718*** 
 -0.0746 -0.141 -0.0522 -0.141 -0.195 
Wood and wood products -0.101 -0.353*** -0.668*** -0.611 -0.721 
 -0.153 -0.0877 -0.101 -0.349 -0.497 
Paper and Paper Products -1.502*** -0.663 -0.678*** -0.823*** -1.006*** 
 -0.339 -0.463 -0.114 -0.16 -0.17 
Printing and recorded media -0.195 -0.482*** -0.565** -0.526 -0.434** 
 -0.129 -0.142 -0.175 -0.458 -0.143 
Coke, petroleum and nuclear 
fuel 
-0.510*** -0.158 -0.218*** 0.0811 0.174 
 -0.0438 -0.224 -0.0588 -0.332 -0.36 
Basic chemicals 0.107 0.126 0.0402 0.185 0.11 
 -0.0957 -0.143 -0.0328 -0.139 -0.213 
Other chemical products -0.221* -0.315* -0.366*** -0.224 0.0794 
 -0.0989 -0.135 -0.103 -0.198 -0.257 
Rubber products 0.160*** -0.0685 -0.101* 0.373 0.648 
 -0.0344 -0.152 -0.0401 -0.503 -0.875 
Plastic products 0.192 0.168 0.0785 0.174 0.257 
 -0.113 -0.141 -0.0439 -0.138 -0.199 
Glass and glass products -0.172 -0.132 -0.113 -0.227 -0.135 
 -0.155 -0.108 -0.0958 -0.136 -0.166 
Non-metallic mineral 
products 
0.0303 -0.0603 -0.0703 0.0262 0.246 
 -0.0277 -0.144 -0.0476 -0.159 -0.347 
Non-ferrous metal products -0.268 -0.198 -0.147 -0.0751 -0.172 
 -0.144 -0.149 -0.0994 -0.156 -0.234 
Basic iron and steel 0.0108 0.0401 0.181*** 0.394* 0.442 






Structural metal products -0.0768* 0.0801 -0.0138 0.245 0.4 
 -0.0301 -0.17 -0.0707 -0.166 -0.234 
Other metal products 0.216 0.163 0.0351 0.156 -0.0709 
 -0.114 -0.148 -0.0486 -0.147 -0.203 
Machinery and equipment -0.139*** -0.161 -0.238 -0.144 -0.227 
 -0.0333 -0.141 -0.136 -0.15 -0.238 
Electrical machinery 0.139 0.00974 -0.125* -0.0783 -0.325 
 -0.0847 -0.156 -0.0615 -0.148 -0.194 
Radio, television and 
communication apparatus 
-0.341*** -0.457*** -0.480** -0.273 -0.00477 
 -0.0723 -0.107 -0.176 -0.183 -0.407 
Professional equipment -0.0177 -0.0467 -0.0771 0.121 0.173 
 -0.213 -0.219 -0.0479 -0.18 -0.242 
Motor vehicles, parts and 
accessories 
0.311*** 0.281 0.160* 0.362 0.273 
 -0.0281 -0.193 -0.0628 -0.191 -0.259 
Other transport equipment -0.445*** -0.523*** -0.640*** -0.672*** -0.584* 
 -0.0874 -0.0788 -0.111 -0.145 -0.274 
Furniture -0.46 -0.634* -0.776*** -0.799*** -0.336 
 -0.844 -0.248 -0.0867 -0.24 -0.574 
Other manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Constant 0.665*** 1.387*** 2.208*** 2.732*** 3.360*** 
  -0.0533 -0.171 -0.0877 -0.185 -0.305 
Observations 7468 7468 7468 7468 7468 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses 
  *p<0.05   ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001 
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